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Abstract
This dissertation discusses the relationship between international agencies,
national governments, and local governments in the implementation of housing projects.
It is argued that the local and national governments must be viewed separately in the
framework of actors, and that this separation offers new insights for problems of
implementation. This dissertation explores this relationship through a detailed case study
in Egypt.
The Egypt Urban Development Project was the first urban sector program in
Egypt financed by the World Bank and with their technical assistance. An examination
of the project indicates that it was ill-fated, fraught with political and institutional
problems. Some problems related to the lack of support for the project, reinforced by the
nature and content of the policy. Other problems were organizational: building a new
institution, too many agencies involved, lack of control, and noncompliance of local
government, and the problem of a distant lender. The political and institutional problems
encountered in Egypt were very similar to constraints facing other developing countries
implementing upgrading and sites-and-services projects.
Why are the problems the same irrespective of country, culture and political
ideology? To discover underlying factors the Egyptian case was examined in depth to
determine what lies behind these political and institutional problems, and to look in depth
at the methodologies of those who deal with monitoring and planning and those who deal
with implementation.
The author realized that these are all symptoms of the nature of the underlying
relationship between the three entities involved in the project: the international agency,
the national government, and the local government. Each of these entities differs in
goals, priorities, and concerns, and we also expect differences and similarities in their
professional and business association, political ideologies, and professional perspective.
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These differences and similarities when taken together create a relationship between the
three entities which are described by a model of collegiality The model shows a strong
collegial relation-an associate relationship-between the international agency and the
national government, while a weaker collegial relationship exists between the national
government and the local government and a still weaker relationship between the
international agency and the local government.
The inherent characteristics of officials and professionals in each entity have
shaped their actions and their drawing together or not into collegial relationships strongly
affected a project to the extent of controlling the outcome. The model suggests that
during the project's life there are five distinct phases: the Harmony or Honeymoon Phase;
the Realization Phase; the Accomadation Phase; the Frustration Phase; and finally the
Resentment Phase. Each phase is characterized by the dominance of one or two of the
actors.
A final chapter briefly explores the implication on policy of this pivotal
relationship and whether such underlying relationships are apt to persist in future projects
involving international agencies.
Dissertation Supervisor: Professor Ralph Gakenheimer
Title: Professor of Urban Planning and Civil Engineering
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Preface
The "Egypt Urban Development Project," introduced to the Egyptian Government
represented by the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction (MOHR), in early 1977, was
the World Bank's first urban project in Egypt, but not the only project in Egypt involving
international agencies. Following Sadat's Open Door Policy in 1974, the MOHR had
become a center of activity: projects, studies, international consultants, Egyptian firms,
lenders, donors, the World Bank, the United Nations, and USAID were everywhere.
The General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP), affliated to the MOHR,
was thriving too. In 1973 it was transformed by presidential decree from the Greater Cairo
Planning Agency (created in 1965 as the first physical planning agency in Egypt whose
responsibility was consulting but with no legal power to enforce its reccomendations) to the
General Organization for Physical Planning. By this decree the organization became an
autonomous national organization with its own budget and board of directors. The GOPP
was accorded overall responsibility for physical planning of the entire country. This
included establishing the general policies of town planning and drawing up plans and
programs for urban development. It also assumed legal responsibility for enforcing these
plans. Its projects ranged from regional development policies, to selection of locations and
general plans for new towns, to detailed planning for new towns and new extension areas
in existing towns, to urban renewal planning to action area programming.
The GOPP, having a dynamic and politically supported chairman, Eng. M. Hafez
Ali, and a strong technical staff, at the time was selected to prepare the studies for the
World Bank funded project. As a senior planner in GOPP, myself and others were
selected to participate in the project. We were enthusiastic about working with World Bank
officials who were renowned for their professional expertise. Enthusiasm and excitement
were the general feelings in the GOPP at that time and many projects were getting
underway. We were happy to resume work following the depressing period of 1970 to
1973.
My interest in this project was both personal and professional. Personally, this was
my second project with expatriates and I was looking forward to adding to my international
exposure and professional experience. Professionally, I had been working at the GOPP
for five years as a planner collecting and analyzing data on the physical conditions of
different neighborhoods in Cairo. In the evenings, I worked as an architect in my
husband's private architectural consulting firm. I was thus presented with the dilemma of
whether to continue as an architect or to be a planner.
As a child I had dreams of becoming an engineer like my father. I had especially
hoped to become an architect building houses for the poor. In practice, however, I realized
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that I was building for the rich. It was only on rare occasions that public housing was built
for the low income groups, and was certainly not being built for the people I interviewed in
my survey work. Collecting data among the poor only served to convince me more of the
necessity of helping them.
The turning point in my career was my first real project for the GOPP, the
comprehensive plan of a new sub-center east of the Delta. I was to be in charge of the land
use group and final structural plan. I decided to stay in planning. I believed at that time
that I could serve my country through the GOPP, a nonprofit organization, and relieve
some of the problems I had seen during my surveys in the lower income neighborhoods of
the country.
At that moment, however, I wanted more experience. The World Bank funded
project appeared at that time to offer the necessary ingredients for successful
implementation: technical expertise and money. In addition, I believed in upgrading and
sites-and-services approaches. As a young national government professional, with a
limited knowledge of informal housing, I thought these policies were simple and logical
responses to the problem of informal settlements.
I had only recently returned from a three-month study tour sponsored by the United
Nations Development Program which included visits to Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey to see
low-cost housing projects, including some involving squatter settlements. Pakistan at that
time, together with the World Bank, had initiated upgrading and sites-and services
approaches. Upgrading had been implemented by the Karachi Planning Authority in
Koringy Karachi, a squatter settlement numbering 700,000 inhabitants. We were invited to
see the improvements to the project settlement. The improvements to the settlement were
imperceptible. Remembering this at a later time of my life I could understand the reluctance
of political officials to support such projects.
The sites-and-services portion of the Karachi project, more exactly, core units,
were implemented in the Metroville, a new settlement several miles from Karachi. Most of
the settlement had been built, but no one had moved in. At the time the reason mentioned
was that the Metroville was too far from Karachi. Other reasons were political and
institutional, but, as a young professional at the time, I was more interested in the design
and technical aspects of the project. I could not comprehend the scope of these political
problems and was under the impression that they were purely local. Therefore, when the
World Bank approached the GOPP, I had already been exposed to the concepts of
upgrading and sites-and-services and, in spite of what I had seen, I believed that we, in this
project, could avoid similar technical problems. I was perhaps also overly impressed by
the World Bank officials-they couldn't possibly be wrong!
An international consulting firm, Doxiadis Associates International, was selected by
the World Bank to work with the GOPP professionals on the initial study. Most of the
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GOPP team were land use planners, and at a later stage a sociologist was included.
Mansheyet Nasser, the informal settlement to be upgraded, required many socio-
economic studies and physical surveys but did not offer too many alternatives for land use
development. On the other hand, the sites-and-services layout plans in Alexandria and
Assiut required much work. Our objective there was to produce plots of land for the target
groups requiring no subsidies. These plans were further developed in a workshop on
sites-and-services programs in the MIT Urban Settlement Design Program under the
auspices of the Technology Planning Program. A colleague and myself were invited for
two weeks following the completion of the study, and reviewed the layouts. In brief, most
of our work together, with World Bank officials and Doxiadis consultants, was targeted to
produce the study and the optimal plans. I do not recall that higher politicians or local
government were involved as work progressed.
The stage that followed the completion of the study was very frustrating to me. A
World Bank mission visited Cairo, but all its members were new. The project plans were
discussed again. Suddenly there was talk that the project would leave the GOPP. My
colleague, the senior sociologist in the project team at the GOPP, was borrowed by the new
institution, the Executive Agency for Joint Housing Projects (EAJHP). The rest of the
team were not allowed by the Chairman to leave the GOPP. At this time it became apparent
that considerable political opposition to the project existed. Through my colleague and a
few of the World Bank members I learned of the concern and anguish of those involved.
As a young professional detached from politics I was frustrated. The project we had
worked so hard on and believed in was faltering, and we could not do anything about it.
However several issues were evident at the time, the dominant being the lack of support for
the policy, which eventually led to the building of a new institution to be accountable for
the project. Meanwhile World Bank officials were experiencing bureaucratic problems in
Washington and new members were sent to Egypt with almost every mission.
By 1980 I was Deputy Project Manager on the Master Plan Study of El Obour, a
new town in the desert northeast of Cairo, in collaboration with the German Agency for
Technical Cooperation (GTZ). It was here that I got my first experience as a manager
responsible for integrating both socio-economic and political issues into planning
decisions. I was not only responsible for the built environment but also for the external
political forces affecting the planning decisions. By the time this study was completed
most of the officials who were to be involved in future decision making had been
contacted. Small meetings and seminars had been set up to explain our approach to the
study. Their views and comments were recorded and included in our work. A final
presentation was held, ending in alternative recommendations presented in the form of a
scenario, explaining the measures and the consequences. At the end of the presentation
they each believed and rightly so, that they had been part of the study and the
recommendations. They knew beforehand what finally was to be recommended and its
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consequences.
This is when I realized that our isolation from the higher political context in the
World Bank funded project was a major contribution to the lack of support for that project.
I realized, moreover, that when I met with the World Bank's Head of Mission while I was
working on El Obour and we discussed the problems he faced with the governorates, that
we had not involved the local government in the study phase of the World Bank funded
project either. I could at that time understand the involvement of higher national
government officials, but to include local government professionals was not yet on my
agenda.
As I moved up to management responsibilities I realized that there was more to our
plans than the physical and socio-economic aspects and higher politics, and this was the
implementer. I observed how planning had changed within the GOPP as it was
transformed from a consulting agency concerned with land use plans to a national planning
organization concerned with integrated socio-economic studies and physical planning of the
entire country. The GOPP used to function in isolation from the local government, now
the local government was actively involved. The GOPP used to be an organization that
appointed only engineers and a few sociologists, now it had a large organizational structure
divided into three land use planning departments, a civil engineering department, and a
socio/economic department. The GOPP also has a local office in Ismailia governorate, in
charge of the development of the Suez Canal Zone.
The GOPP's concern with local government became even more serious when the
national government realized the extent to which informal housing was springing up
everywhere. Towns on agricultural land presented a dilemma for us. How could we allow
the expansion of these towns to accommodate the natural growth of their inhabitants
without losing valuable agricultural land? Lacking master plans, towns in the Delta were
expanding on valuable agricultural land. Land was subdivided and sold for informal
housing at a rate that increased tremendously as the Egyptian workers in the Arab Gulf
states invested their savings in land and housing. The task ahead for GOPP was
enormous: 172 towns and cities. Drawing on the assistance of private and public firms
was necessary. Criteria were set to select towns and cities in the most critical condition.
Some plans were prepared within the GOPP and by others through outside consultants
with GOPP supervision. At the GOPP we had finally learned that it was necessary to
work with the local government.
At M.I.T., in the Ph.D. program, I saw that what I encountered in the World Bank
funded project and other projects in the GOPP were problems encountered in
implementation of similar projects world-wide. Upon my return to Egypt I looked at the
World Bank funded project from a new perspective. It was obvious that it would be an
excellent subject for my dissertation research. The time I had spent with the project,
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painful as it was to me, had not been wasted. With my background as an M.I.T. student
and my experience in the GOPP, I knew that there are lessons applicable to other projects
that could be learned from this project. As a practitioner I was searching for ways to deal
with this project and others.
The program of study I pursued at M.I.T. in the Department of Urban Studies and
Planning was closely related to my professional career and the needs of Egypt and other
developing countries. The program enhanced my capabilities in formulating urban and
regional development policies and helped me understand the factors inherent in the
implementation process and in the evaluation of programs. It helped me to think critically
about political factors and their effect on the formulation of policy and the decision-making
process.
In the early stages of my dissertation research, I was pessimistic. The "pitfalls of
bureaucracy," as I called it, seemed deeper than I had expected. Then it appeared that the
policy itself was at fault: the nature of the policy conflicted with the nature of the formal
government. I saw no hope for implemention of the policy by the government. My
thoughts moved from pessimism, to frustration, to accepting the given context, and hence
to the search for ways to deal with the policy and to implement it.
However, with my experience in the government reinforced by literature and case
study research, I knew there must be another, more profound explanation to what is
happening. Why was it that in this project, and in many others, policy is detached from
implementation, and why are the implementers always left out? It seemed to be a structural
problem. The Government of Egypt, as I was initially using the term, was actually two
entities: the national and the local governments, each with its own priorities, goals, vested
interests, professionalism, and hence views on informal housing, upgrading and sites-and-
services. The local government had its own views on the problem, they had an experience
with informal housing that surpassed that of the national government. However the World
Bank and the national government in most cases work closely together, and are more
distant from the local government.
Last semester at M.I.T. my advisor, Professor Ralph Gakenheimer, helped me
define the problem: "You have identified the Government of Egypt as two separate entities
each having its own views and priorities, etc., versus the World Bank as an entity. Look at
the nature of the relationship between these three entities in more detail." The pieces fell
into place. What has happened in this project and other similar projects funded by
international lenders/donors, can be explained by the model developed in this thesis. I can
thus conclude that I have finally found peace with the World Bank/National
Government/Local Government of Egypt project, and others of a similar nature.
Preface
The Case Study Selected
This research, carried out in 1985, investigated the first "Egypt Urban Development
Project" financed by the World Bank/International Development Agency and the
Government of Egypt. The investigation has concentrated on the upgrading component in
one informal area, Mansheyet Nasser in Cairo, during the implementation period between
1979 and 1982. These were the first four years of the project's life, which was ultimately
extended to 1984 and finally closed in 1985. Progress on the site-and-services components
of the project was minimal and details of their development has not been included.
This upgrading project was the Government of Egypt's first experience with
informal areas. The case study showed poor performance and the author was present
during the early stages of the project to witness the process. The timing is also convenient
because the project had gone on long enough to have an observable record, but is still
recent enough that the actors can still respond to an interviewer.
The agencies involved in the implementation were contacted and past and present
officials familiar with the project, or those who had played a role in it, were interviewed.
There are other groups of actors involved in the project: the inhabitants, local and national
politicians. However, interviews were restricted to the bodies officially responsible for
planning and implementation. Interviews with officials included questions which would
clarify their attitudes toward the nature of the project and the procedures for
implementation. Questions were designed to identify concensus, responsiveness, social
bias, or conflicts of interest. In addition to interviews, the author relied on information
extracted from the project appraisal report of 1978, the project files at EAJHP and the
World Bank aide memoires, which were prepared during the IDA missions to Cairo with
the purpose of setting down the findings and progress of work, correspondence between
EAJHP and the Cairo Governorate, correspondence between EAJHP and IDA and internal
EAJHP memorandums.
The Author
Most research is undertaken by academic or individual researchers. Most
evaluations of government projects are done by consultants and outsiders. This is one of
the very few research works where a new perspective on problems will be introduced
through a researcher who has been a practitioner and planner in the national government for
the last twenty years and who has also been involved in other work related to the informal
sector. Thus the realities of the institutional and political setting will be conveyed with a
new perspective, by one who has actually worked within it.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Background
This dissertation discusses the relationship between international agencies,
national governments and local governments in the implementation of housing projects.
It is argued that the local and national governments must be viewed separately in the
framework of actors, and that this separation offers new insights on problems of
implementation. This dissertation explores this relationship through a detailed case study
in Egypt.
The Egypt Urban Development Project was the first urban sector program in
Egypt financed by the World Bank and with their technical assistance. The project
involved the World Bank-the international lender-and the host government-the
Government of Egypt, which is represented by both national and local governments.
The project's demonstration areas were to be located in Cairo, Alexandria and
Assiut. Cairo, the capitol, and Alexandria, a major port on the Mediterranean, are the two
largest urban areas in Egypt and are the two cities in which Egypt's urban problems are
concentrated. Assiut in southern Egypt (termed Upper Egypt) is representative of a wide
range of small-to-medium size cities with high population growth rates. The upgrading
component was to be implemented in Cairo, while the sites-and-services component was
to be implemented in Alexandria and Assiut.
The arrangement specified in the project agreement involved three main
organizational entities: the international funding organization (the World Bank); the
Egyptian national government (represented by the Ministry of Housing and
Reconstruction), responsible for the preparation of studies and project monitoring during
implementation; and the local governments of Cairo, Alexandria and Assiut, responsible
for the implementation of their respective project component.
An examination of progress during implementation indicated that the project was
ill-fated. Project implementation did not proceed as expected and the completion date of
the project was extended twice, increasing the implementation period from four to some
seven years. Substantial reductions were made to the scope of the work, but several
project activities still remained unfinished when the project ended.
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The project introduced by the international lender to the Government of Egypt
was fraught with political and institutional problems. Some problems related to a lack of
support for the project, reinforced by the nature and content of the policy. Other
problems were organizational: The ineffectiveness of building a new institution,
involvement of too many agencies, noncompliance of local government, and the
problems of a distant lender.
The political and institutional problems encountered in Egypt were very similar to
constraints facing other developing countries implementing upgrading and sites-and-
services projects. This similarity has intrigued the author for some time. Why are the
problems the same irrespective of country, culture and political ideology? To discover
these underlying factors the Egyptian case was examined in depth to determine what lies
behind these political and institutional problems, and to look in depth at the
methodologies of those who deal with monitoring and planning and those who deal with
implementation.
The Model of Collegiality
It is argued that these political and institutional problems encountered in Egypt
and in other developing countries are all symptoms of the nature of the underlying
relationship between the three entities involved in a project: the international agency, the
national government and the local government. Each of these entities differs in goals,
priorities and concerns, and we also expect differences and similarities in their
professional and business association, political ideologies, and professional perspective.
These differences and similarities when taken together create a relationship between the
three entities which can be described by a model of collegiality The model shows a
strong collegial relationship-an associate relationship--between the international
agency and the national government, while a weaker collegial relationship exists between
the national government and the local government and a still weaker relationship between
the international agency and the local government.
The inherent characteristics of officials and professionals in each entity have
shaped their actions. Their drawing together or not into collegial relationships strongly
affects the outcome of the project. The model suggests that during a project's life there is
a change in attitudes, which follows five distinct phases: The Harmony or Honeymoon
Phase, the Realization Phase; the Accommodation Phase; the Frustration Phase and
finally the Resentment Phase. Each phase is characterized by the dominance of one or
two of the actors.
Harmony or Honeymoon phase: The international lender and the national
government begin to work, and the officials in the international agency are optimistic
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about the projects to be undertaken. The national government officials are eager to
cooperate with and benefit from the respected international lender. National government
professionals are immediately appointed to the project and the international agency sends
missions on a regular basis. The Honeymoon phase starts with the project identification
and ends with the completion of a study phase, almost a two year period in the case study.
This phase is characterized by an active international agency and an active national
government.
Realization phase: Politicians at the national level realize that the internatinal
lender's policy is not what they had expected. The international agency realizes that a
controversy exists about both the problem and their suggested solution. In a general
model the dominant actors could either be the national or international agency. In the
Egyption case, it was the national government which was the dominant actor. This phase
starts with the end of the study phase and extends to the actual approval of credit. The
Accommodation Phase overlaps with this phase .
Accommodation phase: The entities are forced to continue with the project
regardless of ideologies. Local government officials are now brought into the project. In
the case study the national government agrees with the international agency on the
establishment of a new agency to monitor the implementation of the project, while the
local government is to be in charge of implementation. Accommodation is considered to
start with the establishment of the new agency and ends with its consolidation. Ignoring
the overlapping period, in the case study this phase lasted for one year and nine months.
In a general model the dominant actor is either the national or international agency. In
the case study, it was the World Bank. The World Bank postponed credit until all the
subsidiary agreements had been made and institututional arrangements completed.
Frustration phase: This phase starts with problems encountered in consolidating
the new agency, parallel to the accommodation phase. Meetings with local government
officials take place and progress is painfully slow. Local government officials find
themselves monitored by the national government. Already overloaded with daily tasks,
the project, with its interference by national government officials, is one more burden.
The international agency monitoring the project expects tangible results, but the first
physical action is slow to be realized. All three actors are dominant: the lender, the
national government, and the local government.
Resentment phase: Frustration turns to resentment. From a distance, the
international agency pressures the national government for results. Experiencing
problems with its newly established agency, the national government finds itself caught
between the demands of a distant lender and the noncompliance of the local government.
The local government, with its own agenda, is torn between the demands of the national
government and its own local duties. Generally the natinal government would be the
dominant actor. Conceivable the international agency could become the dominant actor,
particularly when the national government is dominant in the Accommodation phase. In
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other words the national government is doing everything to get the funds.
The Housing Context In Egypt
The model will be elaborated using Egypt as a case study. The housing program
in Egypt is based on substantial public involvement through actual financing of
construction and the supply of building materials at subsidized prices. Both public and
private formal housing programs are heavily subsidized in an effort to meet the financial
capabilities of middle- and low-income groups. Critics of these policies have concluded
that because of current standards and the subsidies involved in the construction of
housing, it is not possible for the government to provide housing for a significant part of
the population, and, under the best of circumstances, a large percentage of the lower-
income urban population has no chance to participate in any of the formal public housing
programs. It is thus not surprising that another form of private market has developed to
cater to this unmet demand. This new form of private market has introduced what has
been called the "informal" or "unauthorized" settlements. Informal settlements are
characterized by either illegal acquisition of land, illegal subdivision, or nonconformance
with zoning laws and building regulations. Because of its illegal nature the informal
housing stock is not counted in the official statistics on housing production. As a result
of studies by international aid agencies which revealed the significant scope and role of
the informal sector, the Government of Egypt (GOE), represented by the Ministry of
Housing and Reconstruction, came to a realization of the important of this sector and the
need to seek solutions.
The Abt Associates study in 1981, Informal Housing in Egypt, indicates that
while squatting in other countries makes up the bulk of what is perceived to be informal
housing, in Egypt field observations and interviews suggest that true squatting
comprises a comparatively modest share of informal housing. Most dwellings in the
informal sector in Egypt appear to be illegal by virtue of the owners having failed to
adhere to subdivision or building regulations. The informal areas in Egypt have been
described as being areas where disregard for the law appears to be the rule. The people
live as free from government intervention as possible.
Various studies (USAID, 1976, 1977a, 1977b) have examined how the informal
sector functions in contravention to existing Egyptian laws and regulations in securing
land, construction, finance and the acquisition of building materials and labor. Other
studies have estimated that, nationwide, about 77% of all housing units built between
1966 and 1976 in Egypt were informal (World Bank, GOHBPR 1, 1978, p. 70). This
estimate was based on observations of intercensal housing changes between 1966 and
1 General Organization for Housing, Building, Planning and Research.
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1976, by comparing permit and registration data throughout Egypt. In 1981 it was
estimated that 84% of all housing units built in Cairo between 1970 and 1981 were
informal (Abt Associates, 1981, p. 20).
The Involvement Of International Agencies
The solutions presented for informal areas were introduced to the national
government by the international agencies, primarily the World Bank and the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), the same agencies responsible
for the studies of the informal housing sector. In 1977 the World Bank initiated the
Egypt Urban Development Project and in 1978 the United States Agency for
International Development authorized the Housing and Community Upgrading for Low-
Income Egyptians Project. The World Bank funded project-the focus of this
research-consisted of two primary phases: a study phase, commencing in 1977 for a
one-year period, and an implementation phase, a four-year period beginning January 1,
1978, and running through December 31, 1981.
These projects represented the first attempt in Egypt to explicitly acknowledge the
unauthorized self-help activities taking place in informal areas. The term self-help refers
to planned, so-called sites-and-services schemes, but it also refers to the unauthorized
settlements and to upgrading as official support to self-built settlements. The projects
recommended that priorities be shifted from the construction of housing with relatively
high standards serving only a few, to programs encouraging and promoting the private
construction efforts of families living in informal areas.
The purpose of both projects was to demonstrate the feasibility of providing and
improving basic housing and community facilities for low-income families in a socially
acceptable fashion and at an affordable price, while providing the Government of Egypt
with substantial recovery of its investment without the need for public subsidies. The
projects included upgrading a number of informal areas and the development of new
sites-and-services areas. The international agencies involved were to provide technical
assistance, and aid in funding and monitoring the projects.
The solutions presented were in accord with the Bank's view of the problems,
which was largely based on their experience in Latin America. Because the informal
construction process is already making an important contribution to housing thousands of
low- and middle-income, the government should look at the positive aspects of informal
construction and develop programs to capitalize on the initiative of these families in
solving their own problems. This new approach would seek to control and improve this
process, which already involves a maximum self-help effort by the residents and requires
a minimum input of government financial and technical services. Governmental efforts
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should concentrate on what cannot be done by private individuals and groups, such as
land acquisition, overall planning and control, provision of technical and social
infrastructure, and assistance in providing credit for housing.
However, to the government of Egypt, the projects initiated a new concept in
addressing the growing housing problems. Whereas in Latin America governments were
long accustomed to this type of project, in Egypt this was a new, diametrically opposite
concept. The Government of Egypt would be deviating from its customary role of
providing subsidized public housing units of acceptable standards to the servicing of sites
while providing only minimum core units. In addition, the formal bureaucracy of the
Government is asked to intervene to promote and develop areas which have been
declared illegal according to zoning and building laws, an approach the reverse of their
policies. To the national government the impact of these uncontrolled neighborhoods is
nationwide and they present a menace to zoning laws, building regulations, general
physical appearances, health considerations, and the security of the cities. More seriously
it has been argued that they represent a threat to scarce agricultural land.
Following the completion of the study phase not many officials in the national
government were enthusiastic about the new concept. Opponents claimed that by
upgrading informal areas, the government would be explicitly formalizing illegality and
that the upgrading of one informal area would encourage the creation of new informal
areas. In addition, there were fears that the government would be creating slums with
sites-and-services projects, instead of demonstrating and offering good housing standards
to the people. Another aspect, which was not explicitly apparent, was the incremental
growth of sites-and-services projects as a time-consuming process which does not
achieve immediate results, while upgrading projects lack visibility, particularly when
compared to building several-hundred public housing units in a year or two. What
increased resistance to the projects was that the concept had been developed during its
study phase at the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP), a national
government planning bureau, in isolation from both the higher political context and the
local governmental context, who were later given full responsibility for implementation.
To higher officials in the national government implementation meant public
responsibility for the new policy when the concept was new and success doubtful. The
attitude was reluctance to be directly accountable. In practical terms, this meant turning
the project over to another ministry, or building another agency.
In the case of the World Bank and USAID funded projects, they were turned over
to another ministry and a new agency was established in 1979, the Executive Agency for
Joint Housing Projects (EAJHP). Its purpose was to undertake housing and shelter
related programs jointly funded by the Government of Egypt and other international
funding organizations such as the World Bank, USAID, or the United Nations. To the
World Bank officials the new institution was a convenient arrangement, for it ensured
having a staff whose sole responsibility was this project. Given that the project was
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comprehensive and dispersed, it was simpler to deal with only one agency at the center.
The Bank relied upon this central agency for day-to-day monitoring, yet they continued to
monitor progress from Washington. It took time to establish the EAJHP and time for the
agency to define its management role. The new agency was unable to concentrate on
technical activities, as its first concern was the hiring and orientation of staff, finding a
location, etc.
The local government was not involved in the initial preparation of the studies but
was eventually invited to participate, and brought their own priorities and objectives. The
characteristics of informal housing, their activities and the size of this sector, as described
by the above-mentioned studies, were not new to the local government. The local
government is responsible for the existence of informal housing through enforcing (or not
enforcing) compliance with the law. As in many other developing countries experiencing
the same rapid growth in informal housing, the local government responded by
demolition or, in most cases, by threats of demolition.
The national government blames the local government for the spread of these
neighborhoods, while the local government believes that these neighborhoods are illegal
because, according to national planning and building laws, they are. At the same time,
the local government believes that this is a natural response of the people to address their
housing needs, because the national government is slow to respond, whether in building
or by deciding where to build. Meanwhile, where shall these people go?
The local government was not interested in objectives and priorities set by the
national government and they certainly did not want monitoring from the center. It was
their domain and they felt it should have been their project from the start. It was their
task and thus should not require any special treatment beyond the need for an expanded
budget. Other participants only made their work more difficult. As a result the local
government refused the sites-and-services projects and demanded better design standards
for the upgrading projects. Overriding the national government, the Governorate of Cairo
chose to extend the sewage system to serve the whole targeted settlement at their own
expense, independent of the project and EAJHP. The Central Project unit in EAJHP had
very limited control over the agencies involved and noncompliance by the local
government was a major problem.
The World Bank was monitoring the project from its headquarters in Washington,
D.C., in addition to short-term visits by World Bank officials every three to four months.
However, the members of the mission changed with almost each visit. Within two years,
after the first change in the mission membership involved in the study phase, four heads
of mission and most of their accompanying staff were changed in subsequent missions.
Each new staff member would refer to the former reports for guidance and, with an
unknown past and new context, hope to continue. Each mission brought new ideas and
hopes, at the same time denigrating efforts of former colleagues.
Introduction 7
In spite of these intermittent visits by the World Bank and the frequent change in
mission membership, some limited progress was made in the project during these visits.
With the project leaving the General Organization For Physical Planning (GOPP) and the
former project team who had prepared the study, the only entity which could claim
continuity with the project was the World Bank. The local government, given full
responsibility for implementation, looked to the World Bank as the one agency
responsible for the project. "These people should be working with us, not with the
national government."
In the following chapter a scenario from the Egyptian case will be used to
demonstrate how the collegial model applies. The example will be broken down into the
five phases mentioned above, and each phase, with the actors' attitudes and roles, will be
described in detail.
Structure Of Thesis
Chapter 2 explains the underlying relationships between the actors involved in the
project. It is argued that this is the underlying cause of the political and institutional
problems encountered in implementation. The chapter is divided into four sections: the
model of collegiality, the characteristics of the actors, a matrix outlining the contrasts and
similarities, and the scenario of the five phases. The model was in fact an invention
based on the conclusion of case evaluation, it is presented here at the beginning to enable
the reader to absorb the evidence of the case evaluation in such a manner as to test for
himself the applicability of the model to the case.
Chapter 3 briefly introduces the reader to the context of the project. It is divided
into three related parts. The first deals with the National Housing Policies that prevailed
in Egypt since the 1960's. This section outlines the methods and policies which were
traditionally adopted by the Egyptian government prior to the introduction of the new
programs. It highlights the policies and procedures with which the government is
accustomed and eventually how this differed from the new programs. It points out how
these policies have-to a great extent-promoted the creation of the informal housing
market. The second part introduces the informal housing settlements and the areas
planned for upgrading. It outlines the different types of informal settlements prevailing in
Egypt and in other countries. It continues by describing how the informal sector
functions in acquiring land, construction material, labor and finance, all in evasion of, and
manipulation of, the existing Egyptian laws and legislation. The third part introduces the
new programs-what the policy is about and what it entails.
Chapter 4 describes the case study-the World Bank funded project-in detail: the
components, agreements, proposed organizational structure, and financial aspects. The
focus is on the upgrading project at Mansheyet Nasser in Cairo: the settlement, the
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amenities lacking, and what was proposed.
Chapter 5 has been divided into two parts, explaining what happened to the project.
The first part describes the actual organizational structure of the project as opposed to its
proposed; the second describes how the project progressed. It focuses on the first four
years in the project 1979-1982.
Chapter 6 deals with the problems encountered in implementation, focusing on the
political and institutional issues. Each is discussed separately and the effect of each is
explored.
Chapter 7 briefly explores the implications on policy of the pivotal collegial
relationships and whether such underlying relationships are apt to persist in future
projects involving international agencies.
Introduction
Chapter 2
THE UNDERLYING COLLEGIAL RELATIONSHIPS
The Model
The formulation of policies either at an international or national level does not
guarantee the realization of these policies, and as a consequence development is not
achieved until the implementation process is completed. By implementation is meant the
process that starts with negotiation to exact policies and follows in the form of activities
undertaken to produce the outcome mandated by the policy. Most of the literature
developed on implementation, with a few exceptions, constitutes explanations that benefit
from hindsight of specific implementation cases, and most are devoted to the analysis of
the factors and actors intervening in the process as well as to the way they interact, or fail
to do so. Most authors have used these factors and interactions to explain why a policy
was modified or not achieved at all in implementation, very much in the way that
Pressman and Wildavsky (1979), did in Implementation. This literature led the author to
recognize the many factors to be taken into consideration in the analysis of the
implementation cases and confirmed the author's initial observations on the problems
encountered in the project: the ineffectiveness of building of new agencies, the
multiplicity of actors, and the two widespread remedies called by Pressman:
"sidestepping bureaucracy" and "coordination."
Other authors have gone beyond the stage of a specific case and have derived a
theoretical framework like Bardach, Grindle, Rein and Rabinovitz (1978). Bardach's
(1979) and Grindle's (1980) analysis was used to gain a different insight into the case
study. Bardach uses a games metaphor to depict behavioral patterns and to analyze the
strategies used by implementers and all other actors involved in the implementation
process. He associates the implementation process with the assembling and running of a
machine, emphasizing the underlying idea of retaining control by means of persuasion,
bargaining and maneuvering under conditions of uncertainty. His message is that unless
the implementation games are predicted, understood, and incorporated into the
implementation strategy, the chances of success are significantly reduced. However, he
indicates the difficulty of predicting what will happen in the implementation stage, the
general absence of such effort and the need for it. With reference to the extent to which
problems could be foreseen and avoided, Bardach suggests that an "implementation
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scenario" be prepared beforehand in an attempt to try to predict problem areas.
"It is no easy task for the designer to predict the outcome of such dynamic
and complex processes. The system is so complicated that it thoroughly
defies analysis by means of even the most complex models. It must be
approached through what has come to be known as "scenario-writing,"
[which] is an art. It requires imagination and intuition..." Scenario-
writing is in fact not very common among the most experienced policy
analysts and designers..." (Bardach, 1977, pp. 254-263)
In answer to "seemingly unrelated events in implementation" mentioned by
Pressman and Wildavsky, the notion of a "fixer" is introduced by Bardach, a person or
entity with a strong interest-be it sincere, vested, or political-who would follow the
project during implementation, removing obstacles as they appear. The consequences of
playing these games shed light on some of the behavior of bureaucracies. The notion of
a fixer seemed to be the answer to the World Bank funded project as there were so many
agencies involved. To replicate this procedure and to choose a fixer for every project
seems to be impractical, the choice of the right person to be a fixer poses another
problem. However the author is not refusing the approach, which has been informally
used in Egypt under the name of "El Machallassaty," specifically in the customs clearing
government bureaus where people do not know much of the paperwork required, so they
hire this person, who moves from one bureau to another clearing papers. For our
purposes, however, an initial clear framework to work with and that can be replicated is
required.
Bardach also focuses on the interaction of actors and less on the context, which is
one of the strong points of Grindle, who concentrates on two key concepts: the content
and context of policies. Her approach, emerging from the review of a series of projects
implemented in developing countries, describes the implementation process as flowing
from policy making to the design of programs, in the core of which the content of policy
and the context of implementation of implementation have their key roles. Under policy
content one should consider the interests affected, the types of benefits, the extent of
change envisioned. Under context the relevant factors are the actors, their power,
interests, and strategies, the characteristic of institutions and regimes, and the indicators
of compliance and response. In the context of critical choices Grindle emphasizes the
decision that to her has an influence in explaining the implementation process: "who
benefits?".
This overall depiction of the process by Grindle would not be substantially
different from that proposed by others like Warwick, if it were not for the roles of content
and context in the implementation phase. Also Lipsky's (1978) contention, that it is very
difficult to introduce new policies or procedural changes when the final implementer has
no substantial discretion, may be linked to Grindle's argument that the shortcomings of
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country-wide national plans should increase the discretion given to local officials in order
to adapt policies to local conditions.
Grindle's analysis made the author realize that the content and nature of the policy
of upgrading conflicts with the nature of those who are in charge of planning nad those in
charge of implementation, and for some time the policy, and the possibility of
implementing it through the formal bureaucracy, was condemned. To that effect Rein
and Rabinovitz (1978) posit that the process of implementation is dominated by three
potentially conflicting imperatives: the legal, the rational-bureaucratic, and the
consensual imperative. These imperatives refer respectively to the need to do what is
legally required, to perform according to guidelines that are both rational and
bureaucratically acceptable, and finally to do what is necessary to achieve consensus
among the influential parties who have interest in the process. A "principle of
circularity" derives from the need to reconcile the conflicting imperatives and thus
supports their argument that the implementer be included in the policy making process.
In describing bureaucracies, Grindle indicates that bureaucracies may be
unfamiliar with, or resistant to, programs requiring new forms of behavior, flexible and
responsive styles of management. They could be powerful and self-perpetuating, wanting
predictability and security (Grindle, 1976, p. 102). She describes the bureaucratic
organizations and deliver systems in India as being without initiative, ubiquity of rigid
hierarchies, which is a result of colonial civil service practices (Grindle, 1976, p. 102).
Nazih Ayoubi describes the Egyptian bureaucracy to be characterized by
compartmentation among organizational units, each jealous of its own perogative and
seeking to aggrandize itself wherever possible (Ayoubi, 1973, p. 187). Grindle also
indicates that: "While cultural, traditional and institutional patterns may be difficult to
alter, it is nevertheless possible to become aware of these variables and to try to establish
practices and methods for avoiding or minimizing them." (Grindle, 1976, p. 102)
Most of the literature, using various approaches, speaks of characteristics of
bureaucracies and attitudes which are very much influenced by administrative culture and
tradition. and the importance of linking policy and implementation. It always concludes
that many of the failures are attributed to not including the implementor in the policy
making process or that policies should be modified to suit the context of implementation.]
"Most discussions have emphasized the typically large gaps between
policy and programs as executed. The lack of appropriate methods for
anticipating these gaps and taking them into account; and consequently the
failure of virtually all policy analysis to address implementation
systematically." (Wolf, 1985, p. 132)
In brief, the literature explains what happens in implementation on the grounds of
conflicting values, stakes and views, but it does not sketch the basic structure of those
values and interests which underlie conflict. The model of collegiality offered in this
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research, tries to understand this background more systematically, especially when the
case involves international agencies, and national and local governments. To address this
need, a simple framework is offered that does not require complex analysis of
bureaucracies and cultures. This framework-or model- which outlines the prospects of
projects initiated in developing countries, is offered to planners, especially in
international agencies,.
In this respect, in the model it is considered that the nature of bureaucracies and
cultures are a given context which the planner should be aware of, but which is not open
to much tinkering. In the model bureaucrats are divided into national and local, and more
importantly to the individual professional, however this process is a means, not an end. It
is a means for understanding that allows professionals to take effective action.
The model of collegiality will be illustrated through the Egypt First Urban
Development project, the first urban sector program undertaken by the World Bank in
Egypt. The project involved the World Bank, the national government and the local
governments of Egypt. Each of the three entities exhibited differed in goals, priorities,
and concerns. One also expects differences and similarities among the professionals
within the three entities, in political ideology, management and professional perspectives.
These differences and similarities have created a relationship between them which can be
described by the following model.
The model shows a collegial relationship between the international agency and the
national government, while a weaker collegial relationship exists between the national
government and the local government. Between the international agency and the local
government the relationship is weak and lacks collegiality.
To explain this model the characteristics of the actors in each entity are
highlighted on seven issues: vested interests, professional association, business
association, professionalism, nationalism, incomes and political ideology. A matrix is set
up contrasting these characteristics. Applying this model to the case in Egypt, a scenario
then follows incorporating the main actors in the project and indicates through a story
how their characteristics shaped their actions and their drawing together, or not drawing
together, into collegial relationships, and hence affected the outcome of project.
The Characteristics Of The Actors
The characteristics portrayed reflect the author's evaluation of a stereotypical
professional working in the three entities: the World Bank, the National Government, and
the Local Government 1. The case study is a project in Egypt and the context is the
1 Law 124/1960 created the governorates by dividing the country into 26 administrative units, each
having a governor who by Law 50/1981 was given the authority equivalent to that of the president of the
republic over the governorate. According to Law 43/1979, four tiers of local units were established in the
The Underlying Collegial Relationship.
urban planning sector. Cairo and Alexandria governorates are special cases and are
compatible in many ways with the national government, to that effect they are more
competitive than the other governorates and hence tend to be less compliant to the
national government.
Vested Interests
Why do large international agencies and, specifically, the World Bank, offer loans
to governments of developing countries? Why are projects designed for the poor? What
are the many vested interests that underlie this intervention? The literature has shown us
that countries and international agencies have political agendas which they attempt to
implement through their aid programs. These perceptions have been explicitly expressed
in much of the literature about the World Bank as an entity and different, and sometimes
overlapping, hypotheses have been developed.
Having studied the policy of the World Bank since its founding in 1946, Nissen
(1975) concluded that its primary goal is the maintenance of the economic stability of
pro-western governments and of the present international trade and investment
relationships (Schlyter, 1984, p. 79). However, some observers are angered by the
humanistic image the Bank gives to shelter projects in light of perceived international
inequities. Elzinga (1982) has noted that the World Bank and other similar agencies now
can admit that early infrastructure projects, specifically those promoting the development
of roads and railroads, were primarily intended to ensure the supply of raw materials to
industrialized countries. He assumes that the current projects are likely to be part of a
changing strategy of exploitation (Schlyter, 1984, p. 80).
Other observers have interpreted the Bank's upgrading projects to be "show
pieces" the Bank has used to create an image of concern for the "progressive
development of the poor" in order to disguise a basically exploitative relation (Schlyter,
1984, p. 80). Others have put forward the hypothesis of "political stabilization," Isaac
(1981), for example, noted this regarding McNamara's advocacy of the Bank's urban
policy: "Frustrations that fester among the urban poor are readily exploited by political
extremists. If cities do not begin to deal with poverty, poverty may well begin to deal
more destructively with cities" (p. 171). Other observers have analyzed political and
social aspects of the intervention in terms of integration, emphasizing not only
stabilization, but the extension of governmental political power, for example, through the
channeling of political demands into legal institutional forms (Burgess, 1982).
As loan recipients, governments are responsible for repayment to the World Bank.
But most governments simply cannot pay. Presumably, the World Bank must take this
provincial governorates and two tiers in Cairo and Alexandria. The Cairo governorate was divided into
seven administrative districts. In 1975 these districts were given juristic powers and became autonomous.
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into account. Southhall (1980) has commented:
"the country's deeply indebted status is not necessarily a source of concern
to its creditors. It actually has some very important consequences for
them. In particular, it enables control to be placed on both domestic and
foreign policies that are in the interest of international capital." (p. 98)
Southall also gives evidence of pressures on Zambia in relation to the struggle in
Zimbabwe. This evidence indicates that the World Bank may have many objectives
which might be encompassed by the theory of "political domination." [Schlyter, 1984,
p. 8 1] Domination requires information. Urban projects, given the widening
methodological scope of appraisal monitoring and evaluation which include social
factors, can be interpreted as a form of social intelligence research, "a social intelligence
hypothesis" (Elzinga, 1981). Schlyter (1984) sums up the World Bank's engagement in
upgrading projects as
"The Bank's efforts to maintain the existing global order by making small
improvements, large enough only to remove the worst causes of
discontent. It can also be seen as a means of exploiting the market
economy and the global base for exploitation by imposing charges on poor
people. The World Bank can only work through governments. So the
Bank's roles on a global level have to be adopted by governments on a
national level. The bank can use various means to put pressure on
governments. The more indebted the government becomes, the weaker is
its position." (p. 82)
The vested interests of the international lender as an entity is what has been
discussed in most of the literature. However the concern in this research is with the
individuals. True, one can argue that the entity can be a framework to one's thoughts and
actions, but aid agencies are staffed by professionals who have their own agenda and own
personal ambitions. Many are idealistic and are driven by their resposibilities to do a
good job. Even when governments of receiver countries are suspicious, they still believe
they can do something within their limitations.
Given what is commonly written about the Bank's political agenda, why then are
national governments interested in such projects? The many hypotheses in the literature
are summarized by Schlyter, who has concentrated on those condemning upgrading.
According to Schlyter, upgrading is said by its critics to be an intervention by the state in
order to:
- lower wages because of a lower cost of reproduction of housing
- increase the supply of unpaid labor, and thereby increase exploitation
- increase control and achieve social integration over informal settlements
- strengthen the ideology of private property
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- support the commoditization processes and speculation (Schlyter 1984, p. 83)
The issues raised by critics have assumed that the national government has been
part of the meditation and setting of these policies. However, it is argued that in most
cases the international aid agencies are initiaters of the projects and at the outset
governments are not fully aware of the implications of these policies. That a policy is
introduced by the World Bank officials renowned for their intellectual capabilities has
affected to a certain degree the attitudes of governmental officials and has given that
policy credibility.
Another very important issue is that the national governments of developing
countries are continually short of funds, especially hard currency. Loans from the World
Bank appear an answer to their problems, especially if they are soft loans such as those
given by the IDA. A national government in need of funds does not think too much of
World Bank vested interests and many seem to have in part been misled by its humanistic
image. At higher political levels there are pressures to do something for the poor, and
World Bank loans are an immediate solution.
Sustaining good relations with the World Bank for future loans, perhaps for other
sectors of the economy, can also be an objective. Concern with the political image is
another goal for national government higher officials. Affiliation with the World Bank
and its projects targeted to low-income groups enhances the political image and increases
leverage and authority over other agencies. Another concern is the stabilization of the
status quo.
Professionals in the national government are also concerned with the technical
aspects of the project. They are interested in acquiring experience and affiliation with a
World Bank funded project that seems to have all the ingredients necessary for success:
financial and technical support. Bank projects seem to offer a logical and simple solution
to informal sector problems, assuming that one recognizes the existence of the informal
sector. The main goal of national government organizations is to promote development
plans for the entire nation to achieve national goals, and professionals in the national
government are trained to that effect. Personal ambitions are in most cases sought in
more experience, authority and leverage.
At the local level, officials have no say at the outset of projects but are asked to
participate because the projects are located within their jurisdictions. However, they still
have their own vested interests: they can aquire funds for local improvements. They
would like to be able to announce to the residents that they are actively making
improvements in their districts and are affiliated with a prestigious World Bank funded
project. By agreeing to upgrade informal settlements they acquire the national
government's explicit recognition of these areas, which in other cases is very difficult,
especially if the settlement is on agricultural land.
The Underlying Collegial Relationship 16
Business Association
The World Bank as an international lending organization has no business
association and the main goal is to finish the work in a given time. International tenders
are usually arranged to select the consulting firms or building contractors required.
However the World Bank mainly creates jobs for western consultants and firms. In that
respect the situation for the national government is similar. It is associated locally with
large public architectural and engineering firms and building contractors. Work is be
created for these firms. Private engineering firms are also associated with the national
government and firms are run by politically influential people with hundreds of
employees. Work should also be provided for these firms.
The Egyptian national government is also politically answerable to the People's
Assembly, which exercises legislative power and approves national policy and the
budget. It also exercises formal control over the work of the executive body, the
ministers. In addition, the national government's relationship with journalists is sensitive
and discrete. Criticism in the newspapers can build the political image substantially, or
destroy it. At the local level, higher officials are appointed by the national government,
and thus are explicitly linked to it. Local government professionals are affiliated with
small local businesses, small building contractors, landowners, and local lenders.
Professional Association
The World Bank employs large numbers of engineers; however, economists are
predominant. They focus on the use of scarce resources to yield the highest possible
return from investments and the justification of Bank spending. There are a small
number of women professionals in the urban sector and most appear to be sociologists
and anthropologists. Their opportunities for promotion within the World Bank appear not
to equal those of their male colleagues.
Professionals in the national government operate within a very competitive
national market. When the economy is robust, the private sector pays the highest salaries.
However, this sector employs only a small percentage of all professionals in the market.
A large number of these are male professionals who are, in most cases, field engineers
oriented towards execution. The national government then draws upon the best of those
professionals seeking government jobs. Job applicants are screened by examinations.
Priority is given to Cairo University graduates, but grades, appearance and social
background are also important.
Higher education in Egypt is free. As a result, most students are admitted to
institutions of higher education based upon their high school grades, thus creating a
highly competitive system. The engineering and medical schools of Cairo University
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command the highest grades, followed by economics and political science, law,
commerce, and the humanities. The universities in secondary cities are next, again with
the same sequence of faculties. Recent changes to admissions policies now stipulate that
students, even with high grades, are now obliged to attend the nearest college. This
policy further isolates the inhabitants of secondary cities from opportunities in Cairo.
Cairo University was traditionally tailored to the affluent and the elite of the
country before it became a public university. Even now, however, it is still an institution
geared to the needs of an affluent, high-technology society. Other institutions follow
Cairo University's curricula and its professors are influential in other schools. Within the
national government, one finds that most professionals are engineers who graduated from
Cairo University. Most graduates seem to be bilingual (education in universities is in
English) and many of its engineers are oriented to the needs of the affluent. Cairo
University engineering graduates are trained to prepare technically sound plans for which
resources are presumed available.
There are a large number of women professionals in the national government and
their opportunities for promotion are equal to that of their male counterparts. The idea of
women working in Egypt was for a long time considered shameful, it meant that her
spouse or family could not support her. More recently it has been considered a career,
especially for those women who went to technical universities. In that respect national
government jobs are more appealing to career women, they offer more design and
planning work, as opposed to execution, at the same time the variety of projects and the
involvement of local and expatriate consultants offer an excellent opportunity for
enhancing ones experience. Being relatively invulnerable to political and financial
pressures they tend to be impartial in their judgement, their main objective is good work
and they are very competitive.
Residents of Greater Cairo2 have greater opportunities for education, jobs,
professional status, abilities, interactions with national and international events, and a
more liveable environment. Cairo is synonymous with Egypt. This has long been the
case, although decentralization laws were issued in 1960 regarding educational, private
language schools, universities, training centers, health services, entertainment,
international firms, conventions, and government offices, to create opportunities for
greater mobility and understanding within the country. Travel abroad and international
conferences are usually offered to national government officials, while these benefits do
not exist for local government officials.
The nature of the national government professional jobs as policymakers requires
that they continue to enhance their capabilities in planning, policy making and research.
The fact that they are shielded from day-to-day problems gives them time to meditate and
do research and quite a number continue their education to the Master's and Ph.D. level.
2 Greater Cairo includes the Governerates of Cairo, city of Giza and Embaba in Giza Governerate, and
city of Shoukbra El Kheima in Kalyoubeya Governorate.
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The local government officials, on the other hand, subjected to daily demands and
pressures, have little chance for improving their planning or policymaking skills.
At the provincial level, except for Cairo and Alexandria governorates, the market
for professionals is limited to residents within or near a province. Local government
higher officials are usually appointed by the national government and are usually either
retired army generals or engineers formerly within the national government.
Professionals in the local government are engineers equipped to subdivide land, revise
drawings, issue building permits, maintain the physical resources of the city and monitor
housing developments. There are a small number of women professionals in most
provinces, and their opportunities for promotion seems to be equal with men.
Professionalism
The World Bank is by no means a monolithic organization with only one
perspective. However, the opinions of its professionals are related to those of its higher
management. Most are conservatives and display concern for helping the poor. They are
highly qualified, with a perspective that is in most cases limited to the macro level, and
very much affected by international politics. Bank professionals are competent in setting
objectives, policies, policy descriptions and terms of reference. Their effectiveness in
implementation and detailed programs is, however, limited. Many believe that these are
outside their scope of work and should be left to the host government. In most cases
World Bank policies are imposed upon the host government. The jobs of Bank
professionals are clear and well-defined and generally not accountable for project
implementation. In many cases the Bank decides that local governmental authorities are
incapable of effectively implementing projects, and special agencies within the host
government are often brought into being. This arrangement is convenient for World
Bank officials because the Bank's projects are often dispersed among a number of
provincial towns. It is preferable for the Bank to communicate with only one entity
located in the capitol, where amenities and services are readily available.
The national government often functions like the World Bank, but on the national
level. Like the Bank, it has a macro-level perspective. It sets objectives and policies and
is stronger on policies than on implementation. It imposes its policies on the local
government, which in most cases is not invited to participate. The national government
has explicitly shown interest in working with the local government, but implicitly finds
no need for such a partnership. The local government is contacted only for data and as a
means for national government officials to avoid spending time in provincial towns. The
most urgent projects are those built in the capitol city, and those arranged by the more
important politicians. They believe they set out the ideals for the people and that they
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have a responsibility to offer new and innovative solutions to the people, who in their turn
expect that from the government. Thus their projects should be visible, grandiose
projects such as large housing projects and new towns. Because of the resistance of
higher officials to delegate decisionmaking down the hierarchy, they are always
overburdened and they have no time for experiments. The instability of their positions
and the many changes that occur is also of deep concern to higher officials and an
underlying cause for requesting well-defined projects which have proven to be successful
elsewhere. Failure would be a liability politically. Their objectives are mainly on the
national level, which do not necessarily coincide with individual local goals. For
example, the prohibition of development on agricultural land is a national goal
consistently pursued by the national government. However, because of the pressing
demand for land, this objective is rarely respected at the local level. Their job, in most
cases, ends with a good plan. The shortcomings of their plans are explained by the
inadequencies of the local government to implement them. In reality they are at an
impasse, there is very little they can do at the local level without the compliance of the
local government. They can set policy but there is very little they can do to enforce these
policies, this is why they must go out of the jurisdiction of cities and construct new
housing or new communities.
The nature of problems and needs at the local level has shaped the outlook of the
local government professional. His job requires an immediate response to day-to-day
problems like water, sewerage, garbage collection, street repair, land needs, building
permits, monitoring of compliance with building permits, and penalties for offenders,
among others. Local government officials are closer to the needs of the residents. Their
objectives are local, and do not necessarily coincide with national objectives. They must,
of course, have explicitly good relations with national government officials in order to be
able to augment their budgets and expand their territories. Implicitly, however, they
would defy the national government, believing that they know their problems more than
the national government, whose plans and recommendations tend to be ambitious,
theoretical, and conflicting with reality.
Nationalism
The World Bank is an international institution which hires people of all
nationalities. Its employees naturally feel an affiliation to their original culture, but a
loyalty to the western culture is common among them.
National government officials are also imbued with western ideas. To them, the
West represents a symbol of modernization, progress and affluence. However, their pride
is in their nation. Its culture and religion are not to be taken lightly. They believe they
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can solve their own problems more effectively than outsiders could, if given the
resources.
The local government officials also admire the West and its civilization but are
more reserved towards it. They feel a greater affiliation with traditional culture. They
believe they know their own problems better than outsiders could and resent interference.
Incomes
World Bank officials, according to international standards, are a very high income
group. Most live in Washington, D.C., and its vicinity. The Bank's short-term
consultants are hired on a temporary basis from all over the world. The Bank draws on
the best professionals from both developed and developing countries. World Bank jobs
are highly competitive.
National government officials are usually residents of Greater Cairo and most
come from educated, high and middle-high income families. They can be described as
second or third generation city dwellers whose forebears originally migrated from rural
areas to the capitol city. Sometimes migration to the regional capitol preceded migration
to Cairo. In contrast, local government officials are mainly first or second generation city
dwellers.
While government salaries are fixed at all levels nationwide, national government
officials also are compensated with overtime pay, achievement pay, bonuses, committee
attendance fees, etc. In spite of these compensations within the urban planning sector,
government employee salaries can be considered middle income. However, it is
important to note that salaries are not to be taken as indicators of income groups.
Professionals in the national government tend to belong to a higher income group than
their salaries indicate. Within the same salary group the range of incomes differs
according to the availability of other sources of income, whether it is family wealth, a
second job, or having other private business: architectural or engineering, contracting
firm, small trade, etc., or several of these sources. Cairo offers a wide range of
opportunities for other businesses and activities. Egyptians tend to be classified
according to social class. One's social class is a distinct and important factor in Egyptian
society, and is very much related to family background. A few indicators of social class
would be wealth in the family, higher education, (in particular engineering, medicine,
law), family place of residence, number of years the family has lived in the city, etc.
Government jobs appeal to many because they are a secure, permanent employment that
is not subjected to economic crisis. In many cases for young male professionals it is a
transient job, where you gain experience until another more rewarding job appears. In
other cases it's a secure job, to come back to with accumulated savings after working in
the rich Arab Gulf. Women professionals in the national government tend to relate more
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to thier families or to spouse's incomes. Most women are dependent on either their
spouse or on their father for financial support.
Local government professionals cannot find part-time evening jobs in private
firms because there are few firms that practice in provincial towns. However there are
other activities in which they can be involved, mostly small enterprises, but their
opportunities are substantially less than those in Cairo. They are, however, able to
increase their incomes through the nature of their jobs. For example, because they
control the issuance of building permits, many landowners request that the local
government professionals be responsible for drawings and the preparation of paperwork
required for the permit. In that respect local government officials can make more money
than their counterparts in the national government.
Ideologies
Most World Bank officials are conservatives, their political ideologies are mostly
related to higher management. They show an explicit tendency to assist the poor but this
seems to be a means, not an end. Most national government officials are conservative,
and a very few are radical. The expression of an ideology is not a necessity, particularly
if one is a high government official, whether in the national or local government. Explicit
expressions of ideology of officials conform to the governing one. However, religion is
their main ideology, the Marxist ideology was refused from the outset without any debate
because it denounced religion. Explicitly they are related to the poor, however the
difficulty in reaching the poor makes it a burden and implictly they would like to have
them go back to their villages. Like the national government, the local officials find their
ideology in religion and the Marxist ideology has been rejected. Basically they are
conservatives but the urge for radical change is common.
The Matrix
The following tables briefly describe the characteristics of the three actors in the
collegial model. Characteristics considered are vested interests, professionalism, political
ideology, business association, income, nationalism, view of informal housing, view of
upgrading, and view of sites-and-services.
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World Bank(WB) National Government(NG) Local Government(LG)
1- Keep up flow of loan money and grant
funds.
2- Competition with other international funding
agencies.
3- Maintenance of economic stability of pro-
western governments.
4- Provide a picture of an international concern
for progressive development.
5- Encourage political stabilization in pro-
western countries.
6- Personal ambition: to do a good job and to
add to ones experience
7- Seek possibilities for travel.
8- Political domination: to control domestic and
foreign policies in the interest of international
capital.
9- Social intelligence: to keep regular knowl-
edge of what is happening in the pro-western
countries, social and political change.
1- Acquire loans.
2- Retain authority and leverage over other agen-
cies.
3- Create good relations with the World Bank
for future loans.
4- Provide an image of concern for the poor.
5- Handling of crises and maintaining the status
quo.
6- Personal ambitions: to do a good job, to en-
hance ones political image.
7- Seek collegiality and experience in working
with WB officials.
8- Seek possibilities for training programs or
travel abroad.
9- Augment budget and expand territory.
1- Acquire money.
2- Get opportunity to exercise power within the
community.
3- Acquire legalization of informal neighbor-
hoods from national government.
4- Demonstrate willingness for improvements
within the community.
5- Improve environment in own jurisdictions.
6- Seek possibilities for on the job training .
7- Seek possibilities for training programs or
travel abroad.
&
World Bank(WB) National Government(NG) Local Government(LG)
1- Most professionals are conservative on eco - Religion is their main ideology. - Religion is their main ideology.
nomic issues.
2- The Marxist ideology was refused from the 2- The Marxist ideology was refused from the
outset, because it denounced religion. outset because it denounced religion.
4 2 3- Most are conservatives and a few are radicals 3- Basically most are conservatives, however a
Explicitly their policy is to help the poor but on economic issues. large number are radicals.
imlctyhelping the poor is the means not the
end. 4- Explicitly most concur with national politics. 4- Explicitly concur with higher politics, impli-
Implicitly a few seem to concur. citely in opposition.
5- Explicitly related to the poor. Implicitly most 5- Explicitly related to the poor and implicitly
find it difficult to reach the poor and hence find seem to be relaated.
that helping the poor is a burden. They should
go back to their villages.
1- No business outside association, the bottom 1- The large public construction companies are 1- Small contracters in the infrastucture field
line is to finish the work in the given time, under the jurisdiction of the NG. are hired by the LO
Z however they create jobs mostly for the western
consultants. 2- The large pulic planning and engineering 2- Small entrepeneurs in the informal neighbor-
firms are under the jurisdiction of the NG. hoods are related to the LO.
3- The private planning and engineering firms 3- Construction materials permits and building
are affliated to the NG in an effort to undertake permits aare their leverage on development.
large jobs.
C-,
C-)
4- Responsibilitiy for developing land outside 4- Responsibility for developing land inside
city bounderies lies with NG. They either de- city bounderies lies with the LG. They either
velop it themselves or they offer it for develop- develop the land owned by them or they moni-
ment. tor the development of private sector land 1-
Most professionals are conservative on eco-
5- Most journalists, People's Assembly mem- nomic issues.
bers, political elites are affliated with the NO.
World Bank(WB) National Government(NG) Local Government(LG)
I- Many engineers but economists take the
lead.
2- Economists oriented to prepare plans which
economize on the use of scarce resources in a
way which would yield the highest possible re-
turns from investment.
3- Competitive international labor market Only
the best professionals are selected from coun-
tries all over the world.
4- All are exposed to the international realm of
events.
5- Small number of women professionals.
Their opportunities for promotions seem not to
equal that of men.
1- Majority are engineers. Engineers take the
lead. Every other discipline comes in a lower
position.
2- Engineers equipped to prepare plans which
are technically sound. Resources are assumed
available.
3- Competitive national market Professionals
go through exams before being appointed.
4- Many have been exposed to the international
realm of events.
5- Most are graduates of Greater Cairo universi-
ties and institutes.
6- Educational institutions suited to the needs of
an affluent, high technology society, which
presents expectations for high technology and
modernism.
7- Many have had training programs abroad.
8- A number of them have higher degrees, MSc
and PhD, acquired from Egyptian universities
or from foreign institutions.
9- Large number speak foreign languages.
10- Large number of women professionals. Op-
portunities for promotions are equal to men.
1- Engineers lead.
2- Engineers equipped to subdivide land and to
issue building permits and maintain the water
and sewerage networks.
3- Market for professionals is limited to resi-
dents within the region.
4- Few have been exposed to the international
realm
5- Many are graduates of regional universities
and institutions.
6- Universities suited to the affluent, high tech-
nology society - most of the professors are
from Greater Cairo universities.
7- Few have had training programs abroad.
8- In the long term and by years of experience
the gap between professionals of NG and LG
increases. The former are more involved in
planning and design while the latter become
more distant from it.
9- Few speak foreign languages.
10- Few women professionals, opportunities
for promotions seem to equal men.
I World Bank(WB) National Government(NG) Local Government(LG)
1- Macro level in planning - global perspective.
2- Stronger on formulation than on implementa-
tion.
3- Comprehensive plans and objectives.
4- Distant donor - enters into working relation-
ship with officials of recepiant country but must
maintain enough distance to avoid being cap-
tured.
5- Shortcomings of planning reflect the inade-
quacies of the administrative environment with-
in which plans are carried out, usually the NG
is blamed.
6- Believe that authorities are incapable of ef-
fectively operating the program so special agen-
cies are in many cases brought into being, usu-
ally at the national government.
7- Sense of urgency for most projects, they
should complete projects in the given time.
8- Objectives are generated to the westem and
managerial goals.
9- Can articulate themselves in written and oral
forms and are comfortable with developmentjargon.
1- Macro level in planning -national perspec-
tive.
2- Stronger on formulation than on implementa-
tion .
3- Comprehensive large scale projects and idea-
listic objectives.
4- Drafting of plans is an end in itself the job is
completed after plan preparation. Up to others to
work out the detailed programs.
5- Shortcomings of planning reflect the inade-
quacies of the administrative environment within
which plans are carried out, LG is usually
blamed.
6- Make a show of working with LC officials.
Implicitely they believe they can do their job
without having to resort to the LG. They be-
lieve that LG officials have their local objectives
which in most cases are in conflict with national
objectives.
7- Sense of urgency is usually for projects
which are requested by higher politicians.
8- Objectives are generated by national goals.
9- In some cases projects are selected to fulfill
political ambition and image of ruling persons.
1- Local level perspective and to a lesser degree
the regional level.
2- Stronger on implementation than on formula-
tion of plans
3- Small scale plans and modest objectives.
4- Busy with day to day problems.
5- Shortcomings in implementation reflect the
unrealistic approaches of NG professionals.
6- Explicit display of working with NG offi-
cials. Implicitely they believe they can do their
work without the interference of NG.
7- Main tasks are building permits and mainte-
nance of existing water and sewerage networks
in addition to subdivision of new land, extend-
ing infrastructure.
8- Have their own local objectives irrespective
of national ones and little interest in objectives
set by the NG.
9- Subject to pressures from local residents.
Projects show deference to their demands.
& &
World Bank(WB) National Government(NG) Local Government(LG)
10- Being detached from local politics and ad-
ministration they are freer than local officials to
stand publicly for progress and high principle,
for the administrative burdens of these tasks
shall be bome locally. Financial criteria are a
constraint.
11- Seek to augment budgets and increase ad-
ministrative units.
12- Decision making is delegated down the
hierarchy as far as possible.
13- Achievement is measured by amount of
loans approved.
14- Competitive with other international agen-
cies.
15- Rely on university research and undertake
own research.
16- From research believe that what people do
for themselves is likely to be best.
10- Being detached from local politics and ad-
ministration they are freer than local officials to
stand publicly for progress and high principle
for the administrative burdens of these tasks
shall be bome locally.
11- Seek to augment budgets and increase ad-
ministrative units.
12- Most resist delegating decision making
down the hierarchy.'
13- Achievement is measured by spending.
14- Resent competitive power outside the na-
tional government.
15- Occassionally rely on research.
16- Defensive. Much effort is spent to avoid
blame.
17- Do not believe that what people do for them-
selves can be right.
18- Reluctance to take direct responsibility
which might bring less political s
19- Concentrate in the capitol, and are reluctant
to live in small towns. They perceive an assign-
ment to these towns as requiring a sacrifice of
amenities .
20- Most plans are prepared by a few people
who have only occasional recourse to other
government organizations to collect information.
10- Forced to bear the administrative burden of
projects.
11- Seek to augment budgets and increase ad-
ministrative bounderies.
12- Decision making is not delegated down the
hierarchy.
13- Achievement is measured by the actual im-
plementation of projects.
14- Competitive power outside their units is the
usual.
15- Rarely do they resort to research.
16- Must take responsibility for their actions.
17- Believe from practice that what people do
for themselves is likely to be best.
18- Are used to live in a small towns and are
used to lack of amenities.
World Bank(WB) National Government(NG) Local Government(LG)
1- WB officials are in high income groups. 1- Most come from high and middle income 1- Most come from middle and low middle in-
families. come families.
2- Most live in Washington D.C. and vicinity. 2- Most live in Greater Cairo and vicinity. 2- Most live in the vicinity of their jobs.
3- Second or third generation of city dwellers. 3- Most are first or second generation of city
dwellers.
0 4- Many have second jobs or other sources of 4- Opportunities for second jobs are limited ex-
income outside regular government jobs. cept for the Cairo and Alexandria governorates.
5- Opportunities to make money from govern- 5- Opportunities to make money through gov-
ment jobs are limited. ernment jobs are readily available.
6- Most come from educated families.
1- Most relate to the western culture, and believe 1- Believe that the western culture is the basis
1 -Variety of cultures but all relate to the western its a basis for progress. of progress.
culture.
2- They have very strong national and cultural 2- National and cultural issues are very impor-
pride. It might not be clear to outsider but would tan, however they also seek both regional and
appear instantly if provoked. local image.
3- They believe they are the largest and most 3- Have the same pride in their country as the
progressive country among most of the develop- NG.
ing countries and within Africa and the Middle
East
z
4- Development is measured in regards to the 4- Resent interference by NG in own problems.
Western countries, even the USSR and the They believe they know their problems better
countries in the Eastern Bloc are not regarded. than the NO and that they are able to solve
these problems in a simple and unsophisticated
5- T2hey believe they know their problems more manner
than outsiders and are skilled to solve these
problems if given the resources.
World Bank(WB) National Government(NG) Local Government(LG)
Their views ar influenced by their economic
background:
1- Although squatter areas ar unplanned they
nevertheless represent assets both in social and
financial terms
2- These neighborhoods are the solutions
sought by the people, based on the nature of
their needs.
3- They represent the standards affordable by
the people.
4- Aesthetics is not a goal when basic needs are
to be fulfilled.
Their views are influenced by their engineering
background and their sense of having to repre-
sent to the people the symbol of legitimacy and
power.
1- Informal areas, according to the laws are ille-
gal neighborhoods.
2- Ugly neighborhoods which are an eye sore to
the city dweller.
3- Inhabitants are marginal to society. Should
go back to where they came from.
4- Neighborhoods that offer hiding places for
criminals and outlaws.
5- Settlemeents springing up in areas not desig-
nated for development.
6- Settlements springing up in many cases on
valuable agricultural land.
8- Initiated by the people outside public authori-
ty and hence cannot be right.
9- Settlements that present a health menace.
Their views are influenced by their engineering
background and by their realism and struggle to
survive.
1- Informal housing are illegal according to NG
laws and standards.
2- The NG is slow to respond to the shortage of
housing so the people have resorted to build
their own dwellings.
3- These areas are a normal development of the
town and represent the needs of the people.
Where shall people go ?
4- Most of the inhabitants have some form of
security of tenure: they have managed to manip-
ulate the laws to their interest.
6- The planning and building laws prohibit in-
formal housing but the civil law gives them the
right to develop land they own.I- Against gov-
emment image-not law abiding-government
should not be explicitly formalizing what it le-
gally refuses.
L L
World Bank(WB) National Government(NG) Local Government(LG)
1- The planning and provision of services to
such areas is better than demolition.
1- Against government image-not law abiding-
government should not be explicitly formalizing
what it legally refuses.
2- Encourages creation of other squatter neigh-
borhoods in areas not designated for housing
and more importantly on valuable agricultural
land.
3- It represents loss of control-the people have
proven they can cope.
4- Loss of technocratic dominant ideas.
5- Upgrading projects are within the jurisdic-
tions of local government, it creates difficulty
for the national government to intervene.
6- Upgrading is not attractive for political dis-
play. Too low a standard to be a good show
piece and it has no visibility.
1- Positive solution for improving the environ-
ment.
2- Implementation in many cases involves tech-
nical problems----because neighborhoods are
unplanned they can be improved only to a cer-
tain extent.
3- Legalizing these neighborhoods would ap-
pease local residents.
4- Increases administrative bounderies of
towns.
5- If the national government would legalize
these neighborhoods, it would become easier
for the municipal engineers to do their work.
6- Selling the land legally to the people would
bring revenues to the towns.
7- World Bank standards are too low.
8- Within their realm of work, national govern-
ment should not be involved. 1- The planning
and provision of services to such areas is better
than demolition.
World Bank(WB) National Government(NG) Local Government(LG)
1- People would build and the government
should offer the land and should do what these
people cannot do--provide the social and physi-
cal infrastructure.
2- Offers a means to abolish subsidies.
3- Offers a means for cost recovery.
4- Represents the standards affordable by the
people.
5- A solution which addresses the very low in-
come population.
1- Sites and services programs have unpredicta-
ble results.
2- It is the creation of slums, but this time by the
government
3- Very low standard and lacks aesthetics.
4- The positive aspect in comparison to upgrad-
ing is the possibility to choose neighborhoods in
locations designated for development.
5- In comparison to upgrading these neighbor-
hoods will be initiated by the government and
under their control.
1- Sites and services have unpredictable re-
sults.
2- It is the creation of slums.
3- Very low standards and lacks aesthetics.
4- Possibility to develop new land and increase
city's boundaries.
5- Neighborhoods initiated by the government
and under their control.
6- Neighborhoods are planned which would fa-
cilitate installment of physical and social infra-
structure.
7- Sites and services offers a ource of revenue
for the town, by selling serviced land.
I I
The Scenario
Introduction
The following scenario incorporates the characteristics of the main actors in the
project and indicates how these characteristics shaped their actions. In looking over the
text of the scenario, the reader will note five phases which reflect the evolving attitudes of
the actors to the project.
Harmony or Honeymoon Phase: The World Bank and the national government
begin to work together after a long period of separation. The Bank's officials are
optimistic about the possibility of projects to be undertaken with the leading Arab nation
and the newest member in the pro-western bloc. The national government officials are
eager to cooperate with and benefit from the West. Egyptian professionals are
immediately appointed to the project and the World Bank sends missions to Egypt on a
regular basis. The honeymoon phase starts with the Project Identification in October
1976 and ends with the completion of the Study Phase in July 1978, a two year period.
This phase is characterized by both an active lender and an active national government.
Realization Phase: Starts with the end of the Study Phase in July 1978 and when
negotiations were to start for credit approval proposed in August 1978. It shall be
considered to extend until actual approval of credit in June 1979, which is a nine month
period. Higher politicians in the national government realize that the Bank's policy is not
what they had expected. The Bank's officials realize that a controversy exists about both
the problem and their suggested solution. However, the accommodation phase is parallel
and overlapping with this phase. The national government is dominant in this phase,
realizing that they have been pushed into a project they don't agree to.
Accommodation Phase: In this phase, the entities are forced to continue with the
project regardless of ideologies. The national government agrees with the World Bank on
the establishment of a new agency to monitor the project. The local government to be in
charge of implementation is now brought into the project. Accommodation can be
considered to have started with the establishment of EAJHP and the Steering Committee
in March 1979. The end of this phase is identified by the relocation of EAJHP in March
1981. However, the strengthening of the staff continued until much later in 1982.
Ignoring the period overlapping with the realization phase, we can say this phase lasted
for one year and nine months. The World Bank is the dominant actor in this phase: it had
postponed credit until all subsidiary agreements have been made and institutional
arrangements completed.
Frustration Phase: Had already started in July 1979, parallel to the
accommodation phase, when the Low Income Fund was discontinued. It took four
months for the authorization of EAJHP to take its responsibilities. It continued with
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problems encountered in consolidating the new agency. Meetings with local government
officials take place. Progress is painfully slow. Local government officials find
themselves monitored by the center. Already overloaded with daily tasks, the project,
with its interference by national government officials, is one more burden. The World
Bank, monitoring the project from Washington, expects tangible results, but the first
physical action is in October 1980. All three actors are dominant in this phase.
Resentment Phase: Frustration turns to resentment. From a distance, World
Bank officials pressure the national government for results. Experiencing problems with
its newly established agency, the national government finds itself caught between the
demands of a distant donor and the noncompliance of the local government. The local
government with its own agenda is torn between the demands of the national government
and its own local duties. The national government is the dominant actor in this phase.
The Scenario
Following the establishment of President Sadat's Open Door Policy, Egypt
became a country of political interest to the West. Funds and technical assistance were
channeled into the country in a way unprecedented since 1959, when the World Bank
refused to fund the building of the Aswan High Dam, resulting in President Nasser's
turning to the Soviet Union for assistance. Sadat had announced Egypt's new orientation
toward the West and showed his good intentions by terminating the contracts of the
Russian experts, who had penetrated into most sectors of the Egyptian economy.
The World Bank, as an organization for granting funds, is highly motivated by
investment opportunities which assist development and international politics. Apparently
Egypt in the seventies represented both good financial and political opportunities. It had
unexplored potential in all sectors of the economy. The time was right for investment in
Egypt. The World Bank as an entity also saw the chance to stabilize the political status of
the country and to maintain its pro-Western regime. Finally, it recognized that this was
the time to study the leading nation in the Arab World, one that had been isolated from
the West through its Soviet alliance for several years. The timing was right, both
politically and economically, to give loans to Egypt.
World Bank officials negotiated loans with the government of Egypt in several
sectors of the economy. The Egypt First Urban Development Project was the first urban
sector operation. The project comprised both upgrading and sites-and-services
components. Upgrading and sites-and-services projects had been undertaken by the
World Bank and other international donors since the early 1970's in other developing
countries. For the World Bank, housing built by the poor is an investment to be
maintained and promoted. The World Bank had widely promoted its housing policy
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through policy papers in the seventies (WB, 1971, 1975), demonstrating a deep concern
for the poor's basic needs for shelter. The papers argued for self-help methods and home
ownership. More than $350 million was invested during the seventies in urban projects
along these policy lines.
Egypt in 1978 seemed an excellent setting for programs of this nature. The
government of Egypt appeared to be dissatisfied with its current public housing, rent
control and subsidy policies. It was also concerned about the spread of informal housing,
which was perceived to be an eyesore to city residents, a health menace, a hideout for
criminals and more seriously, in many cases built on valuable agricultural land.
The Honeymoon Phase
The World Bank officials, aware of Egypt's past affiliation with the Soviet Union,
cautiously approached the national government, not quite knowing what to expect. Most
national government officials, on the other hand, had never really supported their past
alliance with the Soviet Union and looked to the West with admiration, it was viewed as a
symbol of progress and modernism.
The World Bank was renowned for its intellectual capabilities, experience and
credibility. When it turned to Egypt, the national government officials were very
receptive. It was an opportunity to see how the West operated. New approaches were
expected. It was also a chance to be affiliated with the World Bank, to have leverage
over other agencies and even to augment budgets and expand territories. The World
Bank's offer was an opportunity to do something for the poor, perhaps there was a way to
reach these people, which was -always a problem in former projects. Success with this
project would certainly give credibility to the political image of the national government
officials. Little was known about the project in its early stages, but one objective was to
get it approved in order to maintain good relations with Bank officials in hopes of further
loans. In addition, the experience and credibility of the World Bank overshadowed any
doubts that might have risen concerning the project's feasibility.
When the project was first introduced to the GOPP, the agency to be responsible
for the study phase, it generated excitement and enthusiasm. GOPP had a dynamic,
politically supported chairman and a good technical staff. Since impressing the World
Bank officials was an objective, the higher management of the GOPP drew on well-
qualified, hardworking professionals who spoke English and who had previous
experience with similar projects in other developing countries. The project team were all
physical planners with engineering and architectural backgrounds and graduates of Cairo
University (a sociologist, also a graduate of Cairo University, was later added). Working
on this project gave them a professional advantage, for they gained additional experience
and were affiliated with a World Bank funded project and their consultants. It was an
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opportunity, they then believed, to see projects eventually implemented, given that money
and technical expertise was readily available.
Upgrading and sites-and-services, as introduced to the national government
professionals, seemed uncomplicated and logical. In simple terms, these policies
appealed to the professionals who worked on the project. Government had for many
years been building and spending money on public housing. Housing was always in short
supply and in most cases, when the units were completed, there were no funds left for
other services and amenities. Here was an approach that allowed housing to be provided
in a way that suited people's needs. The government would install technical and social
services. Why not build a partnership between the government and the people in these
neighborhoods, allowing each to do what he could do best, to everyone's interest?
The GOPP team and its higher management were enthusiastic about the concept,
having, like the World Bank officials, a professional and management perspective that
dealt with macro policies and general plans, as separated from local politics and
administration. They were stronger in formulation than in implementation and hardly
considered the administrative burdens which would be borne locally. Their problems
were limited to the plans they produced. They did not concern themselves with the
implementation of those plans and their job ended with the design of a good plan. They
were quite detached from everyday realities and concerns confronting the local
governments.
Project identification started in October 1976, followed by project preparation,
approval of the project, and then the study phase which was completed as scheduled in
July 1978. For almost two years both the World Bank and the national government
officials and professionals were eager to cooperate and work proceeded in complete
harmony, with both playing a major role. However during the study phase no contact was
made by the team with higher officials in the national government or with the local
government which was later given full responsibility for implementation.
At that time, no one was concerned with involving the local government or higher
politicians. To the international firm, Doxiadis Associates International, who were
contracted to work on the study with the GOPP team, they had a specific job to complete
and their terms of reference did not include the local government. In the World Bank
Appraisal Report of 1978, the different agencies to be involved in the implementation
were identified, but that was merely in the context of a required organizational chart. The
World Bank officials' short intermittent visits made it difficult for them to consider
anything beyond the study. For the GOPP officials, involving the local government was
never on their agenda. This is how they had always operated and no one thought to do
otherwise.
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The Realization Phase
The consequences of the isolation from higher politics appeared at the completion
of the study phase, and when the credit was to be approved by the World Bank, in August
1978. Higher politicians in the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction and its affiliated
firms were ready to start work on the projects but were disappointed. The large private
and public engineering firms were ready to bid for the design of houses and services for
low income residents and the large public contractors were ready to bid for the
construction contracts. The Ministry's executive agencies were waiting to be involved.
The Minister wanted to announce that he would be building a couple of thousand units in
a year or two for the low income sector in Alexandria, Assiut and Cairo with loans from
the World Bank. All these entities, associated with the national government, waiting to
work on the World Bank funded project, were told that they would not be involved. The
national government would monitor the project while the local government implemented
the infrastructure and services. The residents themselves were to do the actual
construction.
The higher officials in national government were to learn that not only would it
not be involved, but that the residents would be responsible for construction.
"The World Bank wants these people to continue building their ugly
houses everywhere! They want whole cities to become slums! Now we
are asked to authorize and encourage this low quality housing! How can
we agree? These people do not know what is right for them. How can we
the government, the symbol of legitimacy and power consent and legalize
their informal activities?"
They felt they had a responsibility to the people, who had always expected the
government to offer good standard housing of a better quality than what they themselves
build. The national government officials were truely concerned about the outcome of
such projects, the negative effects on cities, and hence their political reputation at the
national level.
The national government is the dominant actor in this phase, realizing that it has
been pushed into a project that does not meet its criteria. The lender also realizes that
there is a controversy on the problem and hence the solution, and postpones the credit
approval until both the national and local government complies with the prerequisites.
Accommodation Phase
It was too late to change policies. According to previous agreements, an agency
in the national government must monitor the implementation of the program and the local
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government was to be totally responsible for implementation. World Bank officials spent
long hours with higher political officials in the national government explaining their
policies and specifying what would be required by the loan. After long negotiations, the
parties agreed to create a new agency within the national government to be responsible
for monitoring the implementation of the project while implementation was to be the
responsibility of the local governorates.
Meanwhile, USAID proposed a similar project to the government of Egypt, but
one with a substantially larger budget. The project was a grant, and was still at the
beginning of the study phase. As a result, the idea of a new agency was even more
favorably received. To the national government, creating a new agency would shift
accountability, until it would be known whether the projects would be successful or not.
To the lender and donor officials, the new agency was a convenient arrangement. It was
expected to have a staff whose sole responsibility was the project. This was particularly
attractive to World Bank officials because of the decentralized nature of the project and
its many components. It would only be necessary to deal with one agency, preferably in
Cairo. The central agency would be responsible for the day-to-day monitoring and
performance of the local government, while the World Bank officials could monitor from
Washington, D.C. and via short visits. It was also convenient to have the agency in
Cairo because World Bank officials could drop by en route to other projects. The World
Bank officials also preferred to deal mainly with national government officials who spoke
English and who were closer to the World Bank officials in professionalism than the local
government officials, a strong collegial relationship.
At this point the local governments were invited to be in charge of
implementation. Subsidiary agreements were signed in August 1978 by the World Bank
with the Governorates of Cairo, Alexandria, and Assuit, each to be responsible for their
respective project component. An Egyptian ministerial decree followed in February
1979, creating the new institution. The World Bank being the dominant actor in this
phase signed the credit, following all the necessary subsidiary agreements and
institutional arrangements, in May 1979. For almost two years, accommodation
continues: 'recruitment of staff, equipment, and finally relocation of the new agency in a
separate building and in a different neighborhood, in March 1981.
The Frustration Phase
The study phase was over and the main organizational structure of the project had
been established by the national government and the lender. The local government
officials initially supported the project. They had hoped to be involved in the early stages
of the project, they saw it as an opportunity to work with World Bank officials.
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However, the local government officials were to be disappointed. They learned that the
national government was fully in control and only they would deal directly with World
Bank officials. Although informal housing was within the local government's realm of
knowledge, and they knew more about it than national government professionals, it was
not to be the local government's project. To the local government, informal housing was
a daily responsibility. By law they were responsible for maintaining and improving
neighborhoods within their jurisdictions. They were responsible for all functions which
by their nature were predominantly local. Why was the national government involved?
To the local government, the national government professionals were theoretical and
unrealistic. They did not know the problems of informal housing. They had beautifully-
drawn plans that were wholely unrealizable. They wanted to tell the local government
where and where not to build. What should the local government do about the pressures
of local residents for land for housing? A ready supply of land is needed and the national
government is always prohibiting development on agricultural land. The project funds
should come to them directly and they would spend it accordingly. However, in their
view, the funds allocated to each governorate were too small in comparison to their
normal budgets and sites and services projects lacked aesthetics and would turn into
slums, while upgrading required lowering standards, which was against their norms.
They had hoped to announce to the local residents that they would be in charge of the
project.
The attitude of the local government to the project had been set. National
government officials in charge were unaware of what lay ahead. They started with
enthusiasm and the best of intentions. Steering Committees at the central level were set
up to coordinate the different agencies involved. At the local level a request was made
for steering committees to be set up to coordinate different departments. Meeting after
meeting was held. Letter after letter was sent. The local government officials, in order to
comply with the written agreements, attended meetings, nodded their heads in approval,
made promises and left, not thinking about the project until the following meeting. An
unexpected event takes place, the Low Income Fund was discontinued by a presidential
decree in July 1979, only two months of the credit effective date, it takes another four
months for the new agency to be authorized to undertake the former fund responsibilities.
Meanwhile, the new agency responsible for the two projects has yet to be set up. There
was still no staff, no offices, no equipment, no cars. It was taking far more time than
originally expected. The World Bank mission was to arrive soon to look over what
progress has been made. Their arrival was postponed and then postponed again. When
the World Bank officials arrived, both national and local government officials were
present. They showed interest and all pointed out the administrative and technical
problems they encountered regarding project locations, the inadequate previous studies,
the unrealistic work schedule which did not include activities that must be undertaken
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prior to implementation, etc. The national government prepared a report of progress and
problems, expecting the World Bank to understand that they were establishing a new
agency, there were two projects on hand, and that the USAID consultants are continually
present and demanding priority. USAID was determined to be the first international
donor to implement upgrading and sites-and-services projects in Egypt. Finally, the
World Bank officials were told not to worry and that everything would be all right in the
near future. All three actors are dominant in this phase-each experiencing frustration.
Resentment Phase
But everything was not all right. More administrative problems arose at the
national government level regarding the consolidation of the new agency. More
seriously, at the local level, there was strong resistance. The local government officials
were insisting on changing the plans. They had not appointed personnel to be in charge
of the project and were skeptical of the young national government officials who, in most
cases, were to deal with higher officials in the local government. In brief, the local
government officials were not interested in the project.
The World Bank's officials began to get letters, and telexes were sent to the
national government inquiring about progress. Over time, the tone of the telexes
changed. The national government officials found themselves at an impasse. They were
caught between the demands of the World Bank and the noncompliance of the local
government. In addition, they faced the administrative problems of setting up a new
institution which, to make things worse, had no legal or autonomous credibility. The
national government officials began to resent the World Bank's attitude toward them.
They felt that the World Bank, far away in Washington, D.C., was not aware of the
problems they, the national government, had to face every day. Several of the World
Bank missions included new members who did not know the history of the project and
expected to be brought up to date in a few meetings. The national government had
imagined that the World Bank officials would be more involved in the work and more
understanding. The World Bank was responsible for selecting and initiating the project
and financing it through the government of Egypt. They helped choose technical
consultants and approved them, so why were they not more involved in the problems
arising in the project. They must be told that the local government was not interested in
the project, only in its own priorities and larger budgets. This project was only a blip on
their agenda and required much more effort from the local government than they could
ever hope to gain. In addition, Mansheyet Nasser was a rocky site with many technical
problems.
The national government officials believed they should inform the World Bank
officials of the reality of the situation, and they did. Each new mission was informed.
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The national government began to wonder what was happening in Washington, D.C. "It
couldn't be a bureaucracy like ours! But it's very clear that this is what it is!" In no way
did they consider the World Bank a monolithic organization. It was as fragmented as the
national government, different parts having different perspectives. The structure of the
international agency paralleled that of the government ministries, both organized along
functional lines-industry, water, transportation, etc.-with very little attention paid to
linkages between one sector and the other. The project continued at the same slow rate,
with the same administrative and political problems. As time elapsed, those hired for the
project lost their enthusiasm. Every day the national government fought battles unnoticed
by the World Bank or local government officials. Finally, many components of the
project were dropped and what few remained showed little relation to what was originally
envisioned. More telling, the Governorate of Cairo had extended the infrastructure in
Mansheyet Nasser-the settlement designated for upgrading-irrespective of the project
and the monitoring central agency, EAJHP. The national government was the dominant
actor in this phase.
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Chapter 3
NATIONAL HOUSING POLICIES AND CONSEQUENCES IN EGYPT
State Intervention: Rent Control and Government Subsidies
This chapter will review briefly the housing policies and regulations in Egypt for
the past twenty years and focus on two issues: rent control and government subsidies. On
these two issues revolve the entire political and social rationale for government
involvement in housing. The purpose of this section is to provide the setting of the
governments attitudes on housing, particularly towards sites-and-services and upgrading
approches.
The Egyptian housing program is based on substantial public involvement in
actual construction as well as in financing house building and in building materials
supply. Both the public and the private housing programs are heavily subsidized. The
form of subsidy presented by the government is to provide construction materials at
subsidized prices and to provide housing for rent or sale below market prices in an
attempt to meet the financial ability of the lower income population. The government
started sponsoring public housing projects in the late 1950s. Public sector housing
provides housing primarily for the middle and lower income groups. They are built by
the public authorities, either centrally through the Ministry of Housing or locally, through
housing authorities of the governorates. In the Cairo Governorate alone, public housing
construction between 1955 and 1975 totalled 38,757 units (Joint Land Policy Team,
1977, Appendix, p. 60).
Public housing buildings are typically five story walk-up structures, built of
poured-in-place reinforced concrete frames and slabs with brick or block infill. The units
range in size from 28 to 80 meter 2 and from one to four habitable rooms, plus kitchen and
bedroom. All are provided with utilities. Prices of these units averaged around 4000 LE
($5700 US) in 1978 but rents were fixed at only 72 LE per year ($100 US). Revenues
therefore covered only about 20% of costs when reasonable interest rates are used, e.g.
10% (TAP 1979-5, p. 16). However, much of this housing is deteriorating due to the
inability of local authorities to maintain the units because of the low rents collected. The
private sector includes cooperative housing and housing built by individuals. The formal
private market deals exclusively with higher, middle and upper income groups who
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comprise less than 15% of the urban households.
In an attempt to reduce the cost of housing for middle and lower income people,
the GOE passed in 1969 a series of laws which placed a fixed rent on housing units.
Rents in new buildings were based on 8% of the construction cost and 5% of the land
value at the time of construction (Law No. 52 of 1969). At the same time, Law No. 52 of
1960 and prior legislation concerning rent control did not include apartments sold as
condominiums. Assessing committees generally estimated building costs in accordance
with the official standards defined in the building permit, rather than actual cost incurred.
Under this law, allowing for maintenance and repair, the rate of return to capital was
below rates of return to capital in other sectors of economy. The housing law passed in
August 1977 tried to modify the situation and increase the rate of return upon which
rental prices for such buildings are based on 10% of the construction cost and 7% of the
land value at the time of construction. More importantly, the law increased the official
prices on building costs upon which such rents are based from 1970 costs to market value
costs in 1977 (Joint Land Policy Team, August 1977). With respect to already existing
and older buildings, a series of laws were passed at intervals to reduce their rents
gradually. Rents for apartments in many good localities built before 1960 were assessed
as low as 6-10 LE per month for a five room apartment, 120 square meters ($1 US = LE
45, 1960 prices). The maintenance costs exceeded the rents collected, and owners let the
units deteriorate especially those built before 1960.
As a means of securing an economic return on building through evasion of rent
control, the payment of key money appeared which is equivalent to the difference
between regulated rents and actual costs. Key money enabled the private sector to earn
enough return on housing to continue supply. This form of return on investment has been
declared illegal by law, but is still commonly practiced, and seems to be accepted by both
tenants and owners as a normal condition of the housing market. Similarly, tenants will
ask for key money in order to surrender a rented flat to the owner or to another tenant so
as to be able to pay for a new apartment (Joint Land Policy Team, 1977, Appendix, p.58).
Key money became an important feature of the housing market in Egypt. It emphasized
the scarcity of housing and favors people who are well capitalized, contrary to former
intentions. Key money is financed out of wealth rather than income. Young couples and
new migrants to the city cannot afford to pay these prices. In some cases they can afford
to pay higher rents out of their income but have no accumulated savings to pay for key
money or for condominiums (TAP report 1979, p. 15).
Rent control and key money isolates both vertical and horizontal notions of social
equity. In vertical terms, wealthy people benefit from rent control perhaps as much as the
poor (TAP report 1979 -5, p. 15). Horizontally, two identical families will experience
widely different welfare levels, depending on whether they have lived in a controlled unit
for many years, or whether they have recently arrived and must pay the cost of key
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money (TAP report 1979-5, p. 15). The disincentive to move is enormous; if a tenant
must vacate a unit, he can count on receiving only a portion of the "new key money" that
the apartment will now command. In seeking a different unit he will be forced to pay the
full amount (TAP report 1979-5, p. 15). People who can afford new key money move to
the new apartments but keep the former, especially if it was built before 1960. These
tenants either keep the former apartment vacant for future use by children or if it is in an
area designated by the governorate as a tourist area, they have the right to rent it
furnished to foreigners giving the owner a raise of 70% of the former controlled rent as
set by Law 52 of 1969.
However, because of the illegal nature of key money, owners were forced to sell
units rather than rent, since sold units are exempted from Law 52, 1969. Gradually
apartments for rent were disappearing from the market and condominiums were offered
instead. Condominiums that sold for LE 5,000 to 8,000 ($1 US = LE 45, 1960 prices) in
the late 1960s reached LE 10,000 to 15,000, ($1 US = 0.60 LE, 1970 prices) in the early
1970s. In choice locations on the Nile, prices in 1978 reached LE 120,000, (personal
survey, $1 US = 0.70 LE, 1978 prices) for an apartment 180 meter 2 in area. Privately
built condominiums require a very high down payment and the total price of the unit must
be paid upon receiving the apartment.
As a consequence of government subsidy and rent control, the formal private
market deals almost exclusively with high middle- and upper-income groups that
represent less than 15% of the urban households. This leaves more than 85% of the
population housed by the public sector. Rent control was conceived as a measure to
reduce the cost of housing for lower income people, but has had a major effect in
reducing the amount of low and middle income housing built. The government is
subsidizing high standards of housing consumption. This level without subsidies can be
affordable only by the wealthiest 10% or so of the population (TAP 1979-5, p. 7).
Providing this level of housing for all individuals would absorb an enormous share of the
GNP even with an annual real rate of economic growth around 5-6% (TAP 1979 - 5, p.7).
Because of the present subsidy involved per unit, it is not possible for the government to
provide housing for a significant portion of the population. In summary, under the best
circumstances, a large percentage of the lower income urban population have no chance
in participating in any of the formal housing programs.
The Appearance Of The Informal Housing Market
It is clear that the existing market is not providing housing services as adequately
as it should. There is virtually no turnover in the stock, leading to a considerable
inefficiency in the way housing is allocated. Rent control is especially discriminatory to
low-income migrants as opposed to long-term residents, who are more likely to be
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middle-income persons. Enormous horizontal inequality is introduced which adversely
affects the young. The dependency on wealth inherent in the system has created
intergenerational inequity, since the young are penalized relative to the old (TAP Report
1979-5, p. 15). As a result these disenfranchised groups found no chance to participate in
any of the formal housing programs and have searched for other housing markets for
which they can afford to pay rents. The market that catered to this demand was another
form of the private market. In this market, rents are set at a rate that seems reasonable to
both landlord and tenant. The people live as free from government intervention as
possible and they simply disregard the law. This form of private market has been the
focus of studies by the international donors and has been called the informal housing
market.
Definition of Informal Housing
The unauthorized or informal settlements are an illegal housing market
functioning in contradiction to all laws and legislation either in securing the land,
constructing the dwellings, or in financing and acquiring buildings materials and labor.
Because of its illegality, this informal housing stock lies outside the official statistics on
housing production. The study which has produced the report "Informal Housing in
Egypt" (Abt Associates, 1981) identifies in general several degrees of informality in
housing among which the following cases are presented.
1. Dwellings constructed on illegally-occupied land not included in a legal
subdivision. Examples of this are temporary or permanent structures situated on
public land abutting a canal or right-of-way or private land (vacant land
comprising part of a building site slated for non-residential construction).
2. Dwellings constructed on illegally-occupied land included in a legal subdivision.
Examples of this are temporary or permanent structures situated on private
residential building lots where the land owner is absent, or on rights-of-way, or in
public open spaces.
3. Dwellings constructed on legally-owned land not included in a legal subdivision.
Examples of this are temporary and permanent structures situated on private land
included in a parcel which has been subdivided and sold by a subdivider without
obtaining a permit to subdivide and re-sell land and in which no zoning
regulations are complied.
4. Dwellings constructed on legally owned land included in a legal subdivision.
Examples of this are permanent dwellings situated on private land zoned for
residential use and included in a subdivision which has been legally subdivided,
and where the subdivision has been in compliance with most or all zoning
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regulations, but has been built without a building permit or without adhering to
the building codes, despite having received a permit.
The report further identifies the degree of informality prevailing in Egypt as
opposed to other countries: levels 1 and 2 are representative of the highest degree of
informality and are by definition situations of squatting. In other countries these housing
types make up the bulk of what is perceived to be informal housing. In Egypt, however,
field observation and direct questioning has suggested that these two types comprise a
comparatively modest share of the housing stock. Most dwellings in the informal sector
in Egypt appear to be illegal by virtue of the owners having failed to adhere to
subdivision or building permit regulations levels 3 and 4 (Abt Associates, 1981, p. 25-
26).
Following this definition and the type of informality prevailing in Egypt; the
World Bank/GOHBPR1 "Construction Industry Study," 1978, estimated that
nationwide about 77% of the housing units built between 1966-1976 in Egypt were
informal. This estimation was based on observing intercensal changes in 1966 and 1976
housing stocks and were compared to permit and registration data throughout Egypt.
Estimates of informal housing in Greater Cairo range as high as 84% (Abt. Associates,
1981).
The informal sector in Egypt which is in contravention to both zoning regulations
and building codes has catered to the demand of the low income population by building
both on privately owned agricultural land and government-owned desert land.
Conversion of agricultural land to residential uses is in contradiction to the laws but the
demand for urban land and the high prices it commands compared to the return of
agriculture has spurred this conversion. Small contractors find it profitable to subdivide
agricultural land into urban uses. In addition, agricultural land is attractive because of the
availability of water for construction and subsistence.
By not adhering to subdivision laws regarding land and buildings, small
contractors are able to maximize profits through maximum utilization of the land. These
entrepreneurs have made use of the very weak enforcement of laws by the government.
They cater to the needs of rural migrants for dwellings and enforced their own laws and
regulations. The Abt Associates, 1980 study, using in-depth interviews, indicate that
informal settlements or parts of these settlements are dominated by people from a
particular tribe, region or group of villages, with many of the old networks and informal
political and business systems intact. Many of the activities in these areas are in evasion
of all government laws. The spectrum of violation includes those in the physical realm,
which as a consequence of not being acknowledged by the government leads to evasion
of other laws regarding wage limits, non-payment of social tax for laborers and non-
registration by contractors of their activities and profits in order to avoid taxes. Through
1 General Organization for Housing, Building, Planning and Research.
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these violations, contractors maximize their profits.
The following summary of the salient characteristics of the informal housing
sector emphatically point to the diverse functions that unauthorized settlements play for a
wide range of interests. Unauthorized settlements are usually premeditated and planned
by agents with clear interests in sponsoring such developments, e.g., real estate "sharks",
politicians, local leaders, racketeers, even directors of housing agencies (Burgess, 1982,
Connolly 1982, Ward 1984, p. 150). Also "We know perfectly well that some informal
investors are in fact attracted to this sector, but they are in all cases we have met, to be
classified as users." (Schlyter 1981, p .5). "Moreover, unauthorized settlements have also
benefitted interest groups in addition to the developers and residents. The building
materials industry has discovered an expanding market from self-builders, transporters
and local retailers of these materials who also benefit. The growth of unauthorized
settlements is therefore a complex business and each case is likely to be the outcome of a
carefully orchestrated attempt to further the interests of the agents involved, be they land
developers, vote catchers, radicals, do-gooders, ministries, unions, etc." (Ward 1984,
p.150-151).
Once we are confident we understand the process of illegal development we begin
to understand the context in which the GOE is asked to intervene. We must investigate
the mechanism whereby land is illegally subdivided and sold, the legal framework (laws,
regulations, etc.) related to human settlement issues, and the procedures of land
ownership, registration of titles and the interests that underpin such settlements and how
they are articulated.
Characteristics of Informal Housing Activities
The informal areas since their inception have been self-generated and self-
improving settlements. Their activities were more concerned in meeting the individual
needs rather than the community's. How does this sector survive? How it caters to the
demand of the low-income population and how it functions in contradiction to all laws
and regulations in securing land, building materials, labor and finance is described in this
section.
Securing the Land
The informal sector is most active along the urban periphery where either desert
government land is available or agricultural land is subdivided. These locations are in the
vicinity of employment, especially industries and in areas where it is accessible to main
streets or means of transportation. Most informal development has occurred on land
adjacent to main arterial or secondary feeder roads and in some cases also railway lines.
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On-site availability of water in agricultural areas and immediate access to it by pumps has
made settlements highly desirable. Desirable desert areas are usually those in the vicinity
of other areas serviced by water (industrial estates or formal residential areas). Sewerage
is of less concern because it can be resolved by the installation of septic tanks, cesspools
or holding tanks. Also since residential land prices exceeded the return that a land owner
would receive from keeping land in agricultural use, the agricultural land was subdivided
and sold for the higher prices. Further encouragement was provided by the fact that once
neighborhoods are established in illegal subdivisions, the law is very difficult to enforce.
Even when a citation is made soon after the subdivision has been established, it is
difficult to remove people who have bought parcels and constructed houses on them. The
city can sue the subcontractors for violations as well as the individual parcel owner, but
the sanction on the individual's right to develop private property protects the subdivider
and property owner in most cases.
Private owners find it quite profitable to subdivide their land in contravention with
existing regulations. On the average lot sizes are about 80 meters 2 . Rarely do they
exceed 120 meters 2 (Joint Housing & Community Upgrading Team, August. 1977, p.
35). The minimum lot size by law is 150 meter 2 (Ministry of Housing Regulation,
August. 28, 1971). Small plot sizes are more affordable to a greater population and at the
same time more profitable to the subdivider. Prices vary between LE 5 and LE 15 per
meter2 ($7-21, 1977 prices), in areas where access to water and electricity is possible or
visibly forthcoming in the near future. In the fringe areas where there are no utilities and
little hope of being serviced over the next eight to ten years, land sells for LE 4-5 per
meter2 ($6-7, 1977 prices) (Joint Housing and Community Upgrading Team, 1977,
Appendix, p.35).
The other alternative to buying land is found through squatting on government
land with the hope of ultimately obtaining title, if not evicted within 15 years. Ownership
laws help the squatters to gain hold of land. Furthermore, once they start building it is
virtually impossible to remove them. The possessor or user of a plot of land can gain
ownership of that land, if he occupies it continuously for 15 years and if the owner does
not assert his rights. Thus, it would be possible for a squatter to gain legal rights after
that period, de jure as well as de facto, "Right of Prescription." Furthermore, once they
start building, it is virtually impossible to remove them, e.g., the law "Separation of Land
Ownership from Ownership of a Building." Under the Civil Law, there is no difficulty in
distinguishing between ownership of land, ownership of the building on that land, or
ownership of different stories of the same building. The right to build an upper story on
an existing building adheres not to the owner of the land but to the owner of the existing
upper story although the building may not be heightened so as to injure a lower story
(Civil Code, Articles 856-861). Thus, low-income persons can expand their houses, even
if they do not own the underlying land upon which the house is situated (Joint Land
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Policy Team, 1977, Appendix). Also, land can changes hands any number of times with
only a civil contract, whereby the buyer pays the seller an amount equivalent to his equity
and assumes the responsibility for the payment of due installments.
The legal way to confirm land ownership is through registration at the local office
of land registration. The land registration system in Egypt was adopted from the French.
All major rights to land must be registered with the local district office of the Land
Registration Division of the Ministry of Justice (Law No. 18 of 1923, Article 1). These
rights include mortgages and tax liens as well as transfer of property by sale or
inheritance. The fee for registration is a major cost to buyer on the sale of property. It
ranges from 2.0 to 7.0% of sales price, depending on that value, 2% for value of 1,000 LE
or less, 4% for 300 LE and 7% for 4,000 LE or more, in addition to the application fee.
Existence of an informal way for registration encourages evasion of the high cost of
registration, and evasion of having to deal with the authorities. Some land owners in the
informal sector have an informal way of registering which confirms that a transfer has
been made. The seller goes to court with the buyer and the former alleges partial non-
payment for land on the part of the latter. The court then charges in writing that the buyer
must pay the unpaid amounts and a court order is issued. The buyer then pays and
receives a receipt from the seller. Persons buying land by the kirat or square meter would
go to their local district office after they have finished building their houses and register
their lot numbers and addresses, so that they may be eligible for postal service (Abt
Associates, 1976, p. 41).
Constructing the Dwellings
There are two types of construction activities going on in the informal settlement
areas:
1. Three to five story walk-ups, built by local entrepreneurs, for the most part
contractors. They buy or otherwise gain control of the larger lots fronting the
main streets early in the development process, when land is still quite inexpensive.
2. Small structures, two to three stories at various stages of completion, built by
individuals for their own shelter. Subsequently rental income often is generated at
later stages through vertical and/or horizontal expansion.
Construction in the first type is usually a completed five story concrete structure
with brick infill. The owner lives in one unit and rents the others. Most of the dwellings
in the second type are gradually constructed from red bricks or stone starting with a basic
one story structure, usually not more than one or two rooms. The foundations for the load
bearing walls are ordinary concrete made from cement and old brick pieces. For the
walls, new bricks are brought or sometimes old bricks salvaged from demolitions.
While putting up walls is relatively simple in terms of skill and expenses, roofing
is another matter. Because of the magnitude of the investment involved, reinforced
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concrete roofs are often delayed for one or two years and alternative roofing systems
adopted in the interim. The temporary systems rely on wood joists covered with a variety
of materials: palm, straw mats, canvas, and asbestos panels. Reinforced concrete roofs
are hardly ever poured before the homeowner is ready to add a second floor to his
structure. Similarly, the new story will have a temporary roof until such time as a third
floor is added. Most dwellings built in this manner can hardly go above three stories.
The outside of the structure is left unplastered. Stairs are made from stone and concrete
slabs, and flooring is in lower grade cement tiles. Basic utilities are lacking in most
informal settlements. In most areas there are no public sewers close by and the drainage
relies on pits built of limestone and red bricks.
Obtaining a building permit requires that an owner present architectural drawings
of the proposed structure from an architect or engineer, to local officials for approval.
These drawings should adhere to the existing building codes and regulations (Law No.
169 of 1969 and No. 106 of 1976). Obtaining a building permit entitles recipients to
obtain subsidized building materials (Joint Land Housing Team, 1977, p. 98). However,
the law is handicapped in tearing down dwellings built without building permits except if
built on public land. Most commonly, when violators are caught, a comparatively modest
fine is the punishment (Abt Associates, 1976, p. 46).
Financing The Dwelling
Many obtain seed capital by selling inherited land or by spending a period of time
earning money in other Arab countries. Almost half the contractors and subcontractors
began in the same way with less spectacular savings (Abt Associates, 1981, p. 104).
Sometimes the landowner supplies credit to purchasers. Landowners normally require a
20-25% down payment on the lot and extend monthly installments as necessary over five
to six years (Joint Housing Team 1977, p. 40 ).
Owners tend to give contractors a 20% to 30% advance, with additional payments
as floors are completed. Contractors similarly give advances to subcontractors.
Contractors offer financing under the following terms: 20-25% down payment and
monthly installments over a maximum of 4-5 years. Since 50% of the cost to the
contractor, including labor, is actually covered by the down payment, the installments
have to cover the remainder of the overhead cost, profit, interest and risk. If an allowance
of 20% is made for overhead:and profit, then the effective interest rate charged is in the
order of 20-25% per year. The larger the amount to be financed, the lower the rate.
Tenants in informal settlements expect to pay both key money and unregulated rents.
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Acquiring Building Material
The government regulates the supply of basic materials. These materials are
supplied in accordance with the designs and specifications stated in the building permit
issued and the monitoring of construction progress at fixed prices which are below actual
costs. Illegal building activities have resulted in a thriving black market for building
materials, with prices of individual items fluctuating in accordance with the severity of
the shortage. Thus while formal sector contractors are able to use subsidized,
government-controlled supplies, the informal sector contractors use materials from
private distributors, which are more expensive in terms of out-of-pocket costs, but much
more quickly acquired. Since many build units without building permits they are also
building without the benefit of cheap supplies.
Private distributors include both the legal and black market operations. The
former include both public and private sector distributors selling materials obtained
legally at regulated but non-subsidized prices. The latter include distributors of materials
obtained at subsidized prices who sell them at a profit in the open market. These
materials may be obtained initially from contractors who inflate their estimates of
material needs when applying for building permits. Alternatively, contractors with
permits will use non-subsidized materials, when they finally arrive, at market prices to
recoup their original expenditure. The prevailing attitude seems to be that it is more
economical to build at today's prices and wage rates than to delay and possibly forego the
opportunity of providing one's self with a home before inflation (Abt Associates, 1976, p.
89). The stockpiling of materials is not common. Most builders of low cost, informal
dwellings obtain their materials from small scale distributors. Many rely as much as
possible on used or recycled materials which are cheaper and easier to obtain.
Recruiting Labor
Labor for informal housing is readily available. It is recruited from cafes and
other gathering places, sometimes directly by the contractor, sometimes by his foreman.
Few contractors have large permanent labor forces, the smaller ones have none at all. A
typical small contractor employs various laborers on a part time basis whenever there is
work. The quality of labor is generally adequate for lower quality housing. Despite the
fact that private informal builders often buy materials in the black market, hence at higher
prices than the public sector, they are able to offer low costs and still make a profit. This
is achieved through higher labor productivity at lower wages and through the evasion of
social security taxes, and by a lower waste factor in the consumption of building
materials.
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Introduction of New Approaches by the International Agency
The National Housing Policies together with the short supply of housing provided
by the government have forced the lower-middle and low-income people to search for
shelter alternatives in the informal sector. The government simply does not have the
resources to build new standard housing units for all those in need. If they do build, the
physical standards are so high that they necessitate high subsidies to be affordable by the
low income population. In response to the significant scale and role of the informal
sector described in the studies sponsored by the international agencies, the government of
Egypt (GOE) represented by the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction, realized the
importance of the sector and the necessity to find solutions to these settlements.
The solutions presented for informal areas were introduced to the national
government by the international bodies, the World Bank and USAID. In 1977, the World
Bank initiated the Egypt Urban Development Project and in 1978, USAID authorized
the Housing and Community Upgrading for Low Income Egyptians project. Both
projects were the first attempt in Egypt to acknowledge explicitly the unauthorized self-
help activities taking place in informal areas. Self-help can refer to planned, so-called
site and service schemes but it can also refer to the unauthorized settlements and to
upgrading as official support to self-built settlements. Both projects included upgrading
of a number of informal areas and development of new site and service areas. Projects
would provide in addition to shelter facilities other numerous components which were not
included in former public housing offered by the GOE: employment opportunities,
health, nutrition programs and community services.
The solutions presented were in accord with the international agencies view of the
problem, and based on their former experience in Latin America. In essence, the
solutions sought to promote informal settlements. Since the informal construction
process is already making an important contribution to housing thousands of low middle
income Egyptians, the government should take a closer look at the positive aspects of the
informal construction and programs should be developed to capitalize on the initiative of
these families in trying to solve their own problems. The new approach would seek to
control and improve this process which already involves a maximum self-help effort by
the residents and requires a minimum input of government financial and technical
services. Governmental efforts would concentrate on things that cannot be done by
private individuals and groups, such as land acquisition, over all planning and control,
provision of technical and social infrastructure and assistance in providing credit for
housing. Both projects recommended that priorities should shift from the construction of
traditional standard housing with relatively high standards serving only a few, to
programs of encouraging and promoting the private construction efforts of families living
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in the informal areas.
Sites and Services Versus Upgrading
The World Bank indicates in its Appraisal Report 1978, p. 10, that "the project
would demonstrate the feasibility of providing low cost housing affordable to the lowest
income groups," referring to sites and services "the minimum plot costing.. .etc." It
continues, "the project would also initiate slum upgrading with provision of security of
tenure as a low cost approach to improving the living conditions of the urban poor." Site
and services and upgrading projects are always referred to in one package or as the
former complementing the latter.
In this research, the author would like to handle each separately and emphasize
the difference between the two approaches and the difference between slum upgrading
and informal housing upgrading. The aim is to clarify the nature and content of these
projects from the very beginning with regards to concept, target groups, agencies
responsible and nature of obstacles to be addressed during implementation. Realizing
these differences when addressing these two approaches during planning, would
minimize problems during implementation. The difference between these approaches are
important during the implementation phase for it is these characteristics that make it
possible for government to intervene enthusiastically or to intervene reluctantly or not to
intervene at all in an effort to avoid legal and technical difficulties.
These two approaches aim at improving the living conditions of the urban poor by
improving shelter conditions and installing social and physical infrastructure and
generating employment. However, during implementation the site and service concept
deals with a new site, and marketing efforts to attract people to this site . From the
technical side, in site and services we are dealing with a planned, new area which would
facilitate installment of physical infrastructure. Provision of social and community
facilitates is also possible from the very beginning. However all plans are built on
demographic estimations and projections for the future. Security of tenure would be
granted from the start. Provision of social and community facilities is also possible from
the very beginning. Most important in site and service projects, is the possibility to
choose, at the outset the location of the sites and to avoid construction in areas not
designated for housing. In brief, site and services is a form of land development for the
poor.
In the already existing low income informal areas this is not the situation. The
site, the people and the problems are all given at the outset of the project. There is also a
difference between upgrading slums as mentioned in World Bank report and upgrading of
informal areas. Slums by definition are older areas that have dilapidated gradually due to
age and neglect. These areas are in most cases formal and legal housing areas and are
planned according to zoning and building codes. Inhabitants of these areas have not
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resorted to self help but have moved to these homes when former owners moved out.
The responsibility of maintaining these areas lies with the local authority, exactly as does
the responsibility of maintaining and improving any other legal high income area in the
city.
On the other hand informal areas have been identified as illegal unplanned areas
in continuous development in contradiction to all zoning and building codes, people
living as free from government intervention as possible. In upgrading projects there is no
security of tenure at the outset. Improvements of already existing unplanned settlements
pose technical problems (sewerage, water) particularly because of the need for low-cost
design solutions. Because it is unplanned, the plan can be improved only to a certain
extent. Improvements are very restricted to open spaces and vacant land which has not
been occupied. Scarcity of vacant land limits establishment of community and social
buildings. Because of these restrictions, residents of these areas may have to settle for a
lower level of services.
In upgrading projects, the issues of illegality features prominently. Conferring
legality on these areas is a necessary requirement for implementors more than it is a
requirement of the inhabitants themselves. The mere announcement that these areas are
designed for upgrading is an explicit recognition by government that these areas are not
threatened by demolition. Together with the status formerly acquired by the residents
themselves in acquiring the land and building on it (see section on informal activities).
However, to install sewage, water and electricity, the legality of the neighborhood is a
prerequisites for the bureaucrat. There are a number of documents that must be fulfilled
to be able to approve physical intervention in the area (water, sewage, etc.) Legal
ownership is one of them. Without the formal registration papers he cannot be
responsible to issue an approval for works, even if he wants to. So the major problem is a
legal one. Upgrading is a solution not for housing but for a different kind of problem. It
is often considered a comprehensive solution dealing with elevating the standards of the
urban poor (Schlyter, 1984).
Government authorities responsible for betterment and upgrading are from the
local government while new development outside the jurisdictions of cities is the
responsibility of the national government. More importantly, sites and services are
neighborhoods initiated by the government while informal neighborhoods are illegal and
have been initiated by the people. Already existing housing areas are the responsibility of
the local government, however recognition of these areas are the responsibility of the
national government according to which land titles can be issued by the local
government.
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Chapter 4
THE PROJECT AS INTRODUCED BY THE WORLD BANK
This chapter describes in detail the site-and-services and upgrading project
suggesed by the World Bank. The Egypt First Urban Development Project was the first
urban sector operation assisted by the World Bank in Egypt (World Bank, PPAM, 1986).
Project Appraisal (1977) occurred only three years after the Egyptian Economy became
more open (Sadat's policy of "El Infitah," the opening). Costs of financing the project
was shared between the Government of Egypt (GOE) and the World Bank. The World
Bank contribution was a loan which is to be paid back with interest. In the end the costs
would be recovered by charging the inhabitants. The proposed project embodied an
approach, which departed from traditional government practices in Egypt and the World
Bank recommended that it should be developed on a small-scale demonstration basis, to
be replicated on a larger scale in the future. Implementation was planned over a four year
period, January 1, 1978-December 31, 1981.
The demonstration areas were to be located in Cairo, Alexandria and Assiut.
Cairo (the capital) and Alexandria are the two largest urban areas in Egypt, together
accounting for two thirds of the country's population, and are the two cities where
Egypt's urban problems are concentrated. Assiut (in Upper Egypt) is representative of a
wide range of small to medium sized cities with high population growth rates. It was
selected in support of the governments policy of spatial decentralization (World Bank,
PPAM, 1986, p. ii).
The major aim of the project was to demonstrate the feasibility of providing and
improving shelter, providing employment and urban services for the lowest income
groups, at costs which they can afford and at costs which provides to the GOE a
substantial recovery of its investments without need for subsidies. To achieve the
objectives the project comprised an upgrading component in Cairo and the development
of sites and services scheme in Alexandria and Assiut. Both programmes were to include
social services in the fields of education, health and nutrition, community and religious
facilities and training and job creation through employment in small scale enterprises. In
addition the project envisioned the strengthening of a shelter financing agency, to provide
mortgage financing to the low income groups under conditions of full cost recovery and
reduced levels of interest rate subsidies. General institution building in the sector was to
be provided through technical assistance.
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Summary Of Project Components
Upgrading: Improvements of four low-income settlements were to be upgraded
in Cairo and Alexandria. Upgrading would be achieved through provision of secure
tenure and improved or new on-site and off-site infrastructure.
Sites and Services: Provision of about 4600 serviced plots, with on-plot water
supply and sewerage facilities, ablation units, plot perimeter walls, home construction
loans and community facilities, as well as areas for work-shops and commercial
activities.
Small Business Assistance And Manpower Training: Provision of loans, technical
assistance and vocational training for small businesses.
Improvement in Solid Waste Collection and Disposal: Introduction of low-cost
intermediate technology waste disposal systems, and improving waste collection
particularly in low-income areas by expanding the role of small private contractors (the
Zabbaleen). Cairo: Provision of a 10 tons a day pilot composting plant. After one year of
testing and monitoring performance, a 200 ton per day plant would be built. Provision of
a 35 tons/day plant at Mansheyet Nasser with technical assistance and training to the
Zabbaleen and introduction of a daily collection service in the main Manshyet Nasser
settlement. Alexandria: Provision of street cleaning equipment, depots, maintenance
equipment and vehicles to help strengthen the Governorate's street cleaning and waste
management service. Provision of a pilot composting plant with a 10 ton per day
capacity .
Urgent Repairs of Assuit Water Supply and Sewerage Systems: Provision of
consultant services to design and assist in urgent repairs of treatment plants, pumping
station.
Organization, Management and Finance of Overall Project
According to the World Bank Staff Appraisal Report (1978) the organization of
the overall proposed project is broadly as follows:
The main channel for project financing would be the Low Income Housing
Fund(LIHF)1 which was established as a legal entity in 1976. It's objective is to
finance low income housing projects. The fund is governed by a board of five directors.
The chairman and four members representing the Ministries of Finance and Local
1 The LIHF was discontinued in July 1979 by a Presidential Decree. One month following the approval
of credit by the World Bank in June 1979.
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Government and Authorities for Government Services and Wakf (religious institutions).
The Minister of Housing has overall responsibility for the funds performance. The fund
is expected to recover all loans made to entities or persons developing low income
housing and will thus have a substantial inflow of funds from borrowers much of which
will be available for relending. The fund shall be a form of real estate banking operation.
Interagency coordination shall be undertaken, by the Low Income Housing
Development Unit (LIHDU) within the Ministry of Housing. It would have overall
responsibility for project coordination and for the initiation of future upgrading and sites
&services schemes, it would be responsible to advise agencies responsible for low
income housing projects on all aspects of design, construction, beneficiary selection,
training of staff and performance monitoring. All project components will be
implemented largely by existing institutions without major organizational changes. Only
the LIHDU would be established. The shelter and related services components are to be
implemented primarily by the governorates of Cairo, Alexandria, and Assiut through their
various directorates coordinated by the Directorate of Planning and Monitoring within
each governorate.
In addition, the state utility companies shall be responsible for water supply,
sewerage and electricity, with the assistance of the central unit (LIHDU) and the financial
intermediation of the LIHF. Exceptions to these arrangements would be the
implementation of the employment component which would mainly be the responsibility
of the National Bank of Egypt (NBE) through the provision of loans, and HIPCO through
technical assistance and training. The consultant studies and repairs of the water supply
and sewerage systems in Assiut would be the responsibility of General Organization for
Potable Water and General Organization for Sanitary and Sewerage Drainage (GOSSD),
respectively.
The World Bank would monitor the project out of its Washington Headquarters
through periodic visits to Cairo. Regarding local agency monitoring the LIHDU within
MOH would approve and sign all contracts for consulting and construction services with
the concurrence of the appropriate governorate where the project site was located. The
governorates are to be responsible for day-to-day supervision of the contracted work.
(See following table). The responsibilities for implementing individual projects
components would fall ordinarily on the Governorates of Cairo, Alexandria and Assiut
through their various directorates (World Bank Appraisal Report, 1978, p. 26). These
responsibilities are as follows:
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COMPONENTS
1. Upgrading and site and services in
Cairo, Alexandria and Assuit.
Full responsibility to respective governors
for the subsequent operation of facilities and
services and meeting financial commitments
to the fund.
-Key project coordination
-Land acquisition, site development,
design and construction of core units, on-
and off-site infrastructure and construction
of community facilities: schools, health centers.
-Selection of beneficiaries, allocation
and pricing of plots. Allocating credits
for home improvements.
-Advice on school building design and
for furniture and equipment provision
-Advice on provision and equipping health
centers and community centers
2. Small business assistance and
manpower training program.
(a) Loans to entrepreneurs
(b) Extension services
(c) Vocational training
3. Improvement in solid waste collection
and disposal
4. Urgent repairs to water supply and
sewerage in Assiut
5. Consultant and advisory services
and training
6. Project administration
General secretaries of Cairo and Assiut
governorate and assistant secretary of
Alexandria, Cairo, and Assiut through
their Directorates of Planning and
Monitoring as general coordinators and
their respective directorates as listed below:
Directorates of Planning and Monitoring
Directorates of Housing and Social Affairs
(under Secretary of Housing)
Directorates of Housing, Finance, Social
Affairs and local council
Directorates of Education and Social
Affairs
Directorates of Health and Social Affairs
National Bank of Egypt
HIPCO/Engineering and Industrial Design
and Development Center
HIPCO/Ministry of Industry
(Productivity and Vocational Training
Department)
Governorate of Cairo
Governorate of Alexandria
General Organization for Potable Water (GOPW)
and General Organization for Sewerage and Sanitary
Drainage (GOSSD), governorate of Assiut.
Governorates/GOPW/GOSSD/HIPCO/
Low income Housing Development Unit Fund/GOPP
All Agencies listed above with
coordination by LIHDU.
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AGENCY
Project Agreements
In October 1976, an IDA reconnaissance mission, reviewed the governments
proposal and found it to be congruent with Bank group policies for the urban sector at the
time (World Bank, PPAM, 1986, p. 13 ). Project preparation proceeded rapidly, starting
in early 1977 for a one year period. The General Organization For Physical Planning, in
the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction, undertook the task, with assistance from the
expatriate consultants firm Doxiadis Associates International.
Appraisal of the project took place in November 1977, within one year of the
reconnaissance mission. The transcript of the World Bank Executive Directors meeting
indicated that the credit was approved without discussion. The credit was processed
rapidly from project identification in October 1976 to appraisal in November 1977 and
approval in June 1979. (World Bank, PPAM, 1986)
Subsidiary Agreements were signed on August 30, 1978 between IDA and each of
the governorates-Cairo, Alexandria and Assiut, for the responsibility of implementing
the project in the respective governorates. On February 24, 1979, another subsidiary
agreement was signed between the government of Egypt, represented by the "Ministry of
Economy" and the Low Income Housing Fund to deposit proceeds of the loan and other
funds, made available by the government to the project under the state budgets. On May
27, 1979, an agreement was signed between the "LIHF" and the "Credit Foncier
Egyptien," whereby the Fund delegated and entrusted the "Credit Foncier" to undertake
its obligations set forth in the agreement signed on February 24,1979, between the
Egyptian Government and the Fund.
Credit 831-EGT was signed in August 1978, but became effective only in May
1979, eight months later, due to delays in the signing of the two subsidiary loan
agreements by Borrower (World Bank, PCR, 1986, p. 17). The project was to start on
January 1978 and end December 1981 (four years period), with all works completed on
all components. Because of the delay in the subsidiary agreements which resulted in the
postponement of effective date of credit to May 1979, the completion date was postponed
to December 1982.
The Upgrading Component
In 1978, the project comprised the upgrading of four low income areas, with a
total population of about 97000 people and covering 160 hectacres. These neighborhoods
were selected as representative of urban problems that exist in rapidly expanding
settlements that grow illegally on the fringes of existing legal urban areas. All sites had
very limited infrastructure and services. Three of the upgrading sites were to be located
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in Cairo: Mansheyet Nasser main settlement, Mansheyet Nasser Zabbaleen settlement,
and North Bassateen, Kulaha settlement. The fourth site was to be located in
Alexandria-New Nagaa El Arab. Upgrading of these areas would be achieved through:
Improvement, extension and provision of shelter and associated infrastructure services
(Streets improvement, water, sewerage, electricity and sold waste collection).
Community, religious and social services facilities (education, health and nutrition).
Maintenance and development of the economic and social fabric of the communities
concerned. Community participation; small business and vocational training; home
improvement loans; credit for small scale enterprises. Rationalization of land tenure in
these areas belonged to the government. When implementation was started, upgrading in
Cairo were restricted to the two contiguous settlements in Mansheyet Nasser, while the
Bassateen and Alexandria areas were cancelled.
Description of Mansheyet Nasser Main Settlement
The settlement is situated on the eastern edge of Cairo built up area, between the
city of the dead (main cemetery grounds in Cairo) and the Mokattam Hills. Its distance
from Central Cairo (Tahreer square) is about 5 km and from the handicraft, business area
Khan El Khalili, about 1.5 km. The main settlement extends over approximately 96 ha
and has a population estimated during reconnaissance surveys at about 55,000 persons
(World Bank, Appraisal Report, 1978, p. 10). Occupying areas with quarrying activities,
in the steep Mokattam hills, had rendered the area suitable for building. As the quarrying
activities were producing land, illegal houses were constructed for immigrants from rural
Egypt. All of the land belonged to the government.
It is possible to define four district housing areas within the settlement which have
been created during its evolution: Northwest and central areas which are the older parts,
are considerably dilapidated, and have very poor housing conditions. Overcrowding
prevails and, public open spaces are neither maintained nor cleaned. Plots are smaller
and irregular in comparison to other parts of the settlement. The northern and southern
edges are the new areas in the settlement. Housing, two to three stories high, is relatively
better but still considerably poor. Plots are quite small. The southeast area is new and is
developing towards the hills. Conditions in this part are comparatively better and plots
are larger.
Only eight percent of the inhabitants have water inside their dwellings compared
to 70% in Cairo and 61% in urban Egypt. Most of the settlers rely on water vendors and
on a few public standpipes, of which several are not functioning. No dwelling unit has
any sewerage connection. Seventy percent have no private W.C.s and use a public W.C.
Individual investments have been made in cesspits which have been constructed for about
80% of the plots. They are emptied irregularly with donkey carts. Most houses have no
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kitchens and food is prepared in rooms or in yards if they exist. Access to the site is
difficult with no surfaced roads and all roads are in very bad condition. There is no solid
waste collection.
Electricity service to plots is fairly good, a system of on-ground cables prevails.
Over 58% of plots are connected to the electricity network, but there is no street lighting.
Community facilities are poor. There is only one primary school of 16 classrooms
meeting only about 18% of the need (World Bank, Appraisal Report, 1978, p. 11). A
health center occupies 10 rooms in a public housing apartment building.
The study area lies within the Cairo Governorate which has its own budget, two-
thirds of which is provided by the national government, the rest coming from land and
building taxes, revenues from projects and properties. Due to the two tier administrative
system of Cairo, the largest northern part of Mansheyet Nasser lies within the jurisdiction
of Gamalia Kism (district), and the rest within the Darb El Ahmar Kism (district). In
1960, the Governorate Council was given responsibility of establishing and managing the
local services while the district council solve local problems aiming at the welfare of their
citizens. District Councils are comprised of eleven members elected by the people.
Proposed Improvement In The Mansheyet Nasser Community
The area was illegally built, and its plan has many deficiencies which could be
improved only to a certain extent. To combine improvements with demolishing existing
houses was not to be considered, therefore the recommended actions have been limited to
the improvement of open spaces and vacant land which could be planned before it is
occupied. Difficulties were compounded by the rough configuration of the ground and
extreme level changes. These constraints restricted major improvements to the the
central area of the site.
For improvement purposes the area was divided into two zones, the central with
20,000 inhabitants and the peripheral with 35,000. The central zone was to be served by
a water network which can provide connection opportunity for every house. Other areas
are to be served by new standpipes with one standpipe (2-4 taps) serving 400 persons,
with an average distance of less than 100 meter. A piped sewerage system would be
provided only to those areas where on-plot water supply shall be available. In other areas
the existing septic tanks shall be improved or replaced if necessary. New septic tanks
shall be constructed in front of each house. Where space is limited aqua privies would be
provided. No leaching cesspools or soak ways could be used because of the rocky non-
absorbent ground.
In regard to community buildings, due to the limited availability of land in the
central location only basic functions will be provided for. Four schools, with fourteen
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classrooms each, and a capacity of 45 students per class would be built, and operate on
double shifts. Improvements have been planned for the three main access routes and for
selective improvement of additional roads to provide vehicular access within 100 meters
of every plot. The proposed improvements in 1978 under the upgrading component
(World Bank, Appraisal Report, 1978, p. 11 ) of the project are summarized as follows:
Roads:
Surfacing of access and circulation roads
Grading of secondary access routes
6,400 m
3,000 m
Water:
Provision of booster pump
Provision of water supply main
Provision of new pipeline
Allowing 60% of plots to have house connection
Repair or replacement of the existing standpipes
Provision of new standpipes. 1 standpipe/400 person
Sanitation:
Repair of existing cesspits
Provision of new cesspits
800 plots to be connected to new piped sewerage line
Electricity:
Offsite: Provision of power lines
New transformers of 500 kva
Onsite: Burying of existing cable
Laying of new cables
Providing direct access to electricity
Street lights in main streets and access roads
650 m of 300 mm diameter
7200 m
8 units
23 units
450 units
400 units
9000 m pipe
400 m long
8 units
8000 m long
7800 m
1300 plots
500 units
Solid waste collection
Home improvement
Provision of materials
Provision of loans for households
Primary schools: Three primary schools of 14 classrooms, each with a capacity of 45
students per class and operating on double shifts.
Secondary schools: One secondary school for girls with 14 classrooms.
A Health clinic and a dispensary with integrated health and family planning services to be
provided under an IDA assisted population project.
A community center.
Development of about 385 new or infill plots with water supply, sewerage and ablution
units.
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Chapter 5
PERFORMANCE OF THE PROJECT
Organization of Project
The project was initially developed during the study phase of one year in a
national government planning bureau the GOPP, Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction
(MOHR), together with the international consultants, Doxiadis Associates International.
The GOPP is responsible nationally to lay down principles of general policy for physical
planning and to prepare plans and programs for urban development in coordination with
other sectors. GOPP would also monitor the implementation of plans. The Low Income
Housing Development Unit, to be responsible for monitoring the implementation phase of
World Bank funded project, was planned to be formed from the team of the professionals
at GOPP who had originally worked on the study. Monitoring of the project by the
World Bank staff was done from Washington, in addition to intermittent short-term visits
to Egypt.
In 1979 a presidential decree was issued dividing the Ministry of Housing and
Reconstruction into two entities. The Ministry of Housing (MOH) was to be responsible
for proposing, studying and executing plans for housing, public sector construction and
infrastructure and to have nominal authority on water and sewerage authorities: the
General Organization for Sewerage and Sanitary Drainage and the Public Authority for
Water. The Ministry of Reconstruction and New Communities (MORNC) was to be
responsible for the development and construction of new towns. It is now considered the
key development agency in Egypt. Together with its affiliated agencies, its responsibility
is to study, propose, formulate and implement the plans and policies of physical planning.
GOPP and the project team who had worked on the study phase was under the
jurisdiction of the latter.
With the division of the Ministry into two entities, there arose a problem for the
World Bank funded project. To which Ministry should it be affiliated? The project is a
housing project and should be part of the MOH. But the project team and the people who
have worked on the study for a year are in GOPP, which is now under the jurisdiction of
MORNC. After extensive negotiations, during which the project was stranded between
the two ministries, the final decision was to transfer the project to the newly established
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agency, the Executive Agency For Joint Housing Projects (EAJHP) within the MOH and
to appoint a new LIHDU team.
In Egypt, new institutions or agencies are established by either a presidential
decree or a ministerial decree. The difference between the two decrees lies in the legal
and financial credibility given to the new agency. The presidential decree gives the new
institution full autonomy and independence in decision making and in allocating its own
budget, while by the ministerial decree, the new institution functions merely as a new
department within the ministry, with no autonomy and no independent budget and
consequently no controlling powers.
EAJHP was created by a Ministerial Decree No. 48 for 1979 shortly after the
division of ministries, to be part of the Ministry of Housing. Its purpose was project
preparation and implementation of USAID funded projects. The first of such projects to
be the upgrading and development of new communities for low-income Egyptians in two
areas of Cairo. As a result of the above administrative changes, EAJHP's purpose was
then modified to undertake housing and shelter related programs which were jointly
funded by the GOE and other international funding organizations including the World
Bank, and USAID. Its role is the execution of the agreements signed with foreign
governments or international organizations concerned with financing low-income
housing.
During the same year in which EAJHP was established, a new local government
law was issued which dispersed power from the national government to the local
government (Law 42, 1979)1. The new legislation which transferred more power and
responsibilities from the national government to the local government, the governorates,
encouraged the World Bank to sign subsidiary agreements with the governorates involved
in the project. These agreements gave full responsibility to the governors for the
implementation of the respective project components. The most critical section in this
agreement is that it indicates that LIHDU within EAJHP would assist the governorates
only if they ask for this assistance.
Another issue which was mentioned in interviews is that the project was not
hospitably received at EAJHP. The explicit cause was that the agency was recently
established and in the process of recruiting personnel and, hence, was not ready for
additional responsibilities. The implicit causes were the competition between two
international agencies-USAID and the World Bank-the former hoping to be the first
1 Law 50/1981 gave the governor the power and authority similar to the President of the Republic each
in his Governorate. Law 124/1960, created the governorates and delegated to the local authorities all
functions which by their nature were predominantly local. According to this law Egypt was divided into 26
Governorates and with four tiers of local units in the provincial governorates and two tiers in Cairo and
Alexandria. The local government machinery and organization in Cairo functions similar to all other
governorates in Egypt. Cairo Governorate is divided into seven districts, which are administrative branches
of the governorate. In 1975 these districts were given legal entity (Law 52/1975). Thus they became local
government units having independent autonomy, within the domain of the capitol city.
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agency to develop site and services and upgrading projects in Egypt. There were
occasional conflicts among managers, as each tried to acquire the best professionals or
facilities for respective project. Within this environment the World Bank funded project
was at a disadvantage for two main reasons: first, the USAID project leads in the size of
investment $160 million versus $14 million for the World Bank, and secondly, the
USAID project appointed a permanent expatriate consultant firm to assist EAJHP in
monitoring of implementation, while the World Bank did not, and relied on short visits
from its Washington staff.
In brief, from the very beginning the World Bank funded project for $14 million
and USAID project for $160 million were to be simultaneously monitored by a new
institution, still to be consolidated. It had no credibility or authority over the participating
agencies, the local government. The new local government law 42,1979, and subsidiary
agreements with the World Bank, gave these local governorates within the national
administrative structure more credibility and higher rank, and hence more authority over
the project than EAJHP, the selected lead agency.
Establishing a new institution by a Ministerial Decree means that this institution
cannot have a management board but relies on a steering committee for decision making
which would be established by another ministerial decree. These committees are also
created to maintain coordination when the project involves many agencies. Through
these committees, agencies discuss and hope to resolve issues pertinent to the project.
Accordingly, a steering committee was established by Ministerial Decree on March 2,
1979.
The Steering Committee
The responsibilities of the Committee were to supervise, coordinate, monitor and
to offer technical assistance to the Housing and Upgrading projects for low income
people in the Governorates of Cairo, Alexandria and Assiut under the Urban
Development Project, undertaken by the MOH and World Bank. The committee was also
responsible for evaluating the implementation process and for allocating funds within the
project budget. It has the authority to form subsidiary committees from its own members
or others if the preparation of certain studies is required. The Committee included ten
participants representing: EAJHP; HIPCO; Cairo, Alexandria and Assiut Governorates;
the LIHF and the Ministry of Economics. The Committee was as follows:
1. President of EAJHP
2. Vice president of EAJHP
3. General Manager for Financial and Administrative Affairs, EAJHP
4. Undersecretary for Local Government and General Manager, HIPCO
5. Undersecretary for the Housing Department, Cairo Governorate
Performance of the Project 64
6. Undersecretary for the Housing Department, Alexandria Governorate.
7. Head of City Council, Assiut Govemorate
8. General Manager, LIHF.
9. General Manager, LIHF. (Two general managers represented the LIHDU)
10. Representative of Ministry of Economics & Economic Cooperation.
The Central Project Unit (CPU)
A Central Project Unit was also formed by Ministerial Decree on April 25, 1979,
within EAJHP the new institution. To be responsible to assist the steering committee to
supervise and execute the World Bank funded project. This unit represents the LIHDU
previously mentioned. The role designated to the CPU and mentioned in decree was very
much in accordance with what was proposed by World Bank Appraisal Report 1978. It
stated:
1. Study work programs and propose implementation steps to be undertaken by
Governorates in accordance with project goal.
2. Provide technical assistance and advice in design, erection, contracts, maintenance
and training of local staff in the three governorates, if they ask for it.
3. Study of expenditures according to technical review and execution programs.
4. Participate in choosing technical consultants for the various projects and
preparation of TOR.
5. Monitoring & evaluation of work progress and preparation of program.
6. Preparation of studies for new projects that have been implemented with the
World Bank.
The EAJHP staff in February 1979, included 20 members-technical and support
staff. They were to be responsible for both the USAID and the World Bank funded
projects. In April 1979, the Central Unit for the World Bank funded project included 14
members. The actual technical staff involved did not exceed six full time, senior and
junior professionals. The others were higher administrative posts and support staff, who
it appears have been shared by both projects. Only one professional, Ms. El Kadi, senior
sociologist, had experience with the World Bank funded project during the study phase.
She was seconded to EAJHP. According to Ms. El Kadi, because of shortage of staff she
had to work with both the World Bank and USAID projects. For April 1979 the CPU
staff included:
1. Vice President of EAJHP.
2. General Manager LIHF.
3. General Manager for Financial and Administrative Affairs.
4. General Manager for Legal Affairs.
5. Project Manager responsible for Technical Studies and Research.
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6. Engineer for Contracts and Execution Affairs.
7. Engineer for Design and Urban Planning.
8. Engineer for Monitoring and Evaluation.
9. Engineer for Handicraft and Small Business Affairs.
10. Sociologist for Social Studies and Research.
11. Budget and Accounting.
12. Secretarial Affairs.
13. Typing.
14. Archives
By January 1980, the CPU had six full time professionals and shared the services
of technical and social research units of the EAJHP. An internal consultant was hired
soon thereafter to assist with project implementation and training of the rest of the staff.
The staff was subsequently augmented by the addition of four other full time
professionals plus part time consultants (World Bank, PCR 1985, p. 18).
The Governorate Steering Unit
Three months after the creation of the central steering committee locally based
steering units were formed. In May 1979, during a steering committee meeting, the
Committee decided to form Steering Units within each governorate of Cairo, Alexandria
and Assiut. These units were to be presided by the Governorate Secretary General and
would include all heads of the service departments in the Governorate.
The Governorate Project Unit
The Project Units (PU) in governorates are to include representatives of the
governorate in the Steering Units as chairman and membership of two representatives
from heads of service departments in addition to any consultant to be hired. Contrary to
the above agreements the governorates never appointed the PU, nor did they appoint the
additional staff for their Social Affairs and Cooperative Directorates. In Assiut the Head
of the City Council was initially enthusiastic and the project was accorded high priority at
the City Council level. However, only one staff member, the engineer, was assigned to
the project full time. In Alexandria, there was a complete staff turn over between
appraisal and mid-1980, and no staff member was ever given full time responsibility for
the project.
Perfonnance of the Project
The Steering Committee Meetings
For the first two years of the project (1979-1980), Steering Committee meetings
were held regularly at two-week intervals and later, every month. The first meeting
started on February 1979, and the last meeting recorded was in November 1980. This
date coincides with the date in which the Head of EAJHP was replaced. Minutes from
meetings were recorded carefully, indicating place, participants, absentees, issues
discussed and recommendations reached (Project Files). These meetings were always
presided by the president of EAJHP. In November 1980, a new president was appointed
to EAJHP, and since the last meeting recorded on July 7, 1980, there are no documents in
project files to indicate that meetings were held after this date.
Participants in Steering Committee meetings included the original members (by
decree), and the representatives from the many governorates departments, agencies and
ministries involved in the project. The number of participants increased as the project
progressed. The number started with 10 to 14 participants in 1979, and increased to 25 to
30 participants in 1980. However, this increase is mostly attributed to the increase in
EAJHP members who were about three at the beginning but reached twelve members at
subsequent meetings. The officials from the governorates of Assuit and Alexandria
attended about half of the meetings. Attendance increased during World Bank visits.
With regard to Alexandria, from 13 meetings recorded, governorate officials attended
seven meetings, at five, World Bank officials were present. Assiut officials attended
eight meetings out of 13. In four of these meetings, World Bank officials were present.
It is of interest to compare the number of people who were finally involved in the
overall project components and the scope of work required and what was actually
achieved. It is also worth noting that the participants in steering committee meetings
which reached 25 to 30, were not the only participants in project, as there were other
professionals from their respective departments. Those present in meetings were usually
the higher management officials.
We shall consider only the participants related to the upgrading project in Cairo.
There are five departments in the Governorate involved: Planning and Monitoring;
Housing; Mechanical and Electrical; Education and Health. In addition to two agencies
for Water: General Organization for Potable Water and Greater Cairo Water Supply
Authority of which one of them is represented by two departments. Others were two
agencies for Electricity; and The General Organization for Sewerage and Sanitary
Drainage. The General Organization for Sewerage and Sanitary Drainage and the
General Organization For Potable Water are both created by a presidential decree and had
full autonomy and budgets. The former has the responsibility to expand sewage and
drainage projects to all parts of the Country, supervise the execution of all sewage
operations as well as operating Cairo and Alexandria Sewage Authorities and give
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technical aid to other regional sewage authorities, undertake technical research and
studies, and develop plans, standard measures and criteria for sanitation projects. The
responsibilities of the latter is to plan, supervise technically and control water for
household and public consumption throughout the country in a way which does not
conflict with the Greater Cairo Water Supply Authority and Alexandria Water Supply
Authority (NUPS, 1980, p. 444). Employment generation in Cairo involved two
departments in HIPCO, one department in the Ministry of Industry and one department in
the General Organization for Industry.
Agencies and Participants in Project:2
EAJHP: (number varying between 2-6)
- President
- Vice President
- General Manager for Financial and Administrative Affairs
" General Manager for Financial Affairs (CPU)
" General Manager for Technical Affairs and Project Manager (CPU).
- Technical staff and Consultant to CPU
Ministry of Economics: One member (very rarely 2)
. Head of Deptartment and Senior researcher-Department of Services and
Infrastructure Projects.
HIPCO: Two members
. Undersecretary for Ministry of Local Government and General Manager
- General Manager -Statistics Department of Census and Statistics
Cairo Governorate: 5 -6 members
. General Manager-Planning Department
" General Manager-Mechanical and Technical Department (This department
sometimes sent 3 people: 16/4, 14/5, 26/5/79).
" General Manager-Project Department
- General Manager-Planning and Monitoring Department.
" General Manager-Street Lights Installation Department
- Consultant (solid waste project).
2 Reference to Minutes Steering Committee Meetings in project files EAJHP. Dates 12/4/80, 17/5/80,
10/17/80, indicate participants have reached (24-29) representing different departments in 9 agencies. In
5/2/80 (3) more participants related to industries were invited from the General Organization For Industry,
General Manager for Small Industries, and Training From the Ministry of Industry, the General Supervisor
in the Industry Supervision Department, and the General Manager in the Handicrafts Department
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Alexandria Governorate: 1-3 members (the maximum)
- Undersecretary for Housing and Reconstruction
. General Manager, Projects Department
- Consultant (solid waste project)
*Assiut Governorate: 2 members 3
- Head of City Council.
- Private Consultant to Governorate
Egypt Real Estate Bank: One member
General Organization For Potable Water: One to two members
. General Manager-Research and Training Department.
- General Manager-Design Department
Cairo Water Supply Agency: One to two members.
" Undersecretary Network Department.
. General Manager Technical Studies Department
General Organization for Sewerage: One member
* General Manager-Design Department.
General Organization for Electricity.
Cairo Electricity Distribution Co.
North Cairo Electricity Distribution Network
3 These participants were present in meetings held in 1980. However, in 1979 Alexandria, and Assiut,
representatives were most of the time recorded as absent; 16/4/79, 26/5/79, 30/5/79, 7/6/79, 21/7/79,
1/12/79. Meeting held on 12/1/80 included General Secretary and Assistance to the Governor of
Alexandria.
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Status of Project at Closing Date 4
This section begins with a description of the status of the project at the closing
date with special emphasis on the upgrading project in Cairo Mansheyet Nasser Main
settlement (M.N.). It continues by describing how work progressed on the M.N. physical
components, for the first four years (79, 80, 81, 82), of project life, which was extended
from 1981 to 82 to 83 to 84 and finally closed up in 1985. Relatively speaking, the
project in Cairo, Mansheyet Nasser Main Settlement saw some progress in extending
infrastructure services, but less so in Assuit, while in Alexandria the shelter component
was deleted from the project. The actual implementation of the project was different
from the proposed implementation schedule, however the implementation schedule in
1978 underestimated the activities requested in the government, at implementation and
prior to implementation: preparation of tender documents, the bidding process, selection
of contractors, etc.
The World Bank funded project was planned to be implemented in four years, but
became a seven year project. Although a substantial reduction was made in its scope,
several components remained incomplete at the closing date. The project followed two
paths, one administrative and the other technical. Progress via the former path surpassed
the latter. Most of the effort, time and energy was focused on the administrative project
set-up, starting from establishing the new agency to establishing committees for
coordination purposes at both the national and local levels. The tendering process started
almost one and half years later than originally planned. While the first physical action
initiated in the project was October 1980, in the Mansheyet Nasser main settlement with
sewerage construction. This is one year and four months after the announced effective
date of the project (June 1979), which in itself was delayed from August 1978, that is, ten
months. What followed was slow and many technical problems were mentioned.
The September 1981 Quarterly Report mentions that the problems met during
execution of sewerage lines in M.N.were technical: the rocky nature of site; narrow
streets; and lack of water available for construction on-site.
In the Aide Memoire October 27, 1982, the rocky nature of the site is again
mentioned as the problem and it was decided to replace the asbestos pipes with
galvanized steel pipes. The Memoire states :
4 Information available on the progress of project was vague. Progress in some cases was reported in
percentage terms without adequate criteria for determining whether the progress made is better worse or
equal to what had been expected. Great effort was made in this investigation to collect the information
presented. The sources were various: letters; reports; telexas and interviews. To follow up on the actual
progress of work and status of project, the author has relied on information extracted from the project files
found at EAJHP which included: Quarterly Reports prepared by EAJHP every four months; WB Aide
memoires following the WB missions to Cairo, with the purpose to set down the findings and progress of
work; correspondance between EAJHP and the implementing agencies; correspondance between EAJHP
and the WB and memorandums written within EAJHP.
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"The trenches for the water supply networks pass through solid
rock and the work has been suspended. In a meeting with the Director of
GOPW at LIHDU, it was agreed to replace the asbestos cement water
pipes with galvanized steel pipes laid at a depth of 30cms only. A limited
tender, including the present contractor, will be carried out by November
30, 1982 and the revised work assigned to the most acceptable bidder
"Construction of the sewerage network was facing similar
problems. The GOSSD undertook a detailed study of the area to propose
alternative solution by November 15, 1982. These involved rerouting the
sewer lines, where possible, or using pits where no alternative route could
be found."
The same Aide Memoire (October 27,1982) included status of work in the other
cities Alexandria and Assiut. Again work is minimum on components of the site and
services at Alexandria and it was proposed to discontinue this component.
"A review of project commitments and proposed discontinuation of
certain components indicated that a sum approximately equal to LE
1,000,000 would be available for the construction of roads and some
additional utility networks in both the Main Settlement and the Zabbaleen
Settlement."
Two months later a letter written on December 19, 1982 by the Head of EAJHP to
the governorate (8597), on the infrastructure problem stated:
"Second phase in sewerage construction, M.N. rocky nature of the site and
narrowness of subsidiary streets poses problems to contractor. This is a
request for a quick solution since this problem has been mentioned six
months ago and no steps have been taken to overcome it.
"Water pipes installation have been stopped for a long period
because of the rocky nature of the site. It has already been decided with
IDA mission and representative from Water Company to replace asbestos
pipes by galvanized steel pipes, to- date, nothing has been done in that
respect.
"It was agreed during World Bank mission that the main
commercial road at M.N. 1.5 km in length shall be paved. Work was to
start December 1982. To date, the governorate has not informed us of
who the contractor is and what is the cost estimate of works."
In November, 1983 a memorandum written within EAJHP again mentions the
status of the water pipes mentioned earlier:
"The works have been awarded to contractor by the Water Utility
Company. A contractor has been ordered to replace asbestos pipes with
galvanized steel pipes to avoid deep digging. Contractor has stored the
pipes on site but work has not started. With respect to time schedule there
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is a 15 month delay in works. Sewerage network is proceeding although it
is also behind schedule."
On November 4, 1983, a telex to the Head of EAJHP from Mr Peltekian, Project
Officer, Urban and Regional Division, reveals the schools, community center and clinic
had not been constructed at M.N.:
"Your assistance may also be necessary to arrange for the
expeditions award of contracts for the construction of schools, community
center and clinic."
In June 1982, the overall status of project is described in a letter from Mr.
Serageldine, Chief Urban Projects Division, Europe Middle East and North Africa, to the
Head of EAJHP:
"As of June, 1982 and about four years after the signing of the
Development Credit Agreement and the Project Agreements in 1978, an
amount equivalent to US $5 million or about 36% of the total credit
amount has been committed, of which only US 1.9 million has been
disbursed the absorption of the remaining about $3.1 million will take
about 2 years."
Continuing in a telex sent to the new Governor on September 14, 1983, copy to
the Head of EAJHP from Peltekian, Project Officer, Urban and Regional Division:
"We are worried about the implementation of project components
within the Cairo Governorate. During the June mission, terms of reference
were drawn up for the appointment of consultants for project follow up.
So far we have no indication that any steps to that effect have been taken,
nor of any action towards the appointment of supervisory staff. Kindly let
us know what measures have been adopted in this regard.
"Consideration in an eventual postponement of the closing date
beyond Dec. 31, 1983 contracts for civil works must be awarded before
Oct. 31, 1983. This would require urgent action on the part of the
Governorate. We would appreciate your personal intervention in making
the necessary arrangements for using all pending works to tender."
In March 1984, the overall status of project, has been described in Aide Memoire
item 2, 2.11, 2.1.3, signed Albert Peltekian, Project Officer, Urban and Regional
Division. Projects Division Europe, Middle East and North Africa:
"2. Physical implementation of project components,
2.1. Cairo Governorate
2.1.1. All outstanding contracts have been awarded, the sites have been
delivered to contractors and construction has started
2.1.3. The type and volume of work in the Manshiet Nasser Main and
Zabbaleen Area requires a great deal of coordination among the
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various implementing agencies. It is appreciated that a Steering
Committee has been appointed, representing the various agencies
of the governorate. However, for details of the project it is very
strongly recommended that a full time coordinator be assigned to
the project."
In 1985, Aide Memoires May 30, 1985, says in Assuit "293 core units were
completed. Contracts for 700 are standstill while there are 1673 units remaining," while
in M.N. Main Settlement the same Aide Memoire states:
"It was agreed to finish as much of the work as possible under the credit
by June 15, 1985 and complete the rest through government financing [no
details of what the rest is].
"It is expected that IDA will close the project accounts on June
30,1985 and will process disbursements on existing commitments,
provided the relevant withdrawal applications are received in Washington
by June 15,1985. Disbursements now stand at about $11,500,000 with
works to be completed by June 15, 1985 estimated at another $1,000,000.
Thus total disbursements are expected to attain $12,500,000 and about
$1,500,000 of the credit will have to be cancelled."
At the final closing date 1985, the overall status of Project is described in World
Bank Project Performance Audit Memorandum:
"Credit 831-EGT was signed in August 1978, but became effective
only in May 1979 due to delays in the signing of the two subsidiary loan
agreements by the Borrower. Following Credit effectiveness, project
implementation did not proceed as expected and very little was achieved
during the first three years 1979-1980." (World Bank, PPAM, 1986, p.20).
"The closing date for the project was extended twice which
resulted in an expansion in the implementation period from four to about
seven years." (World Bank, PPAM 1986, p. vii)
"Project performance was disappointing in most respects. The
project was relatively successful in extending infrastructure services to
slum dwellers in Cairo, but less so in providing shelter in Assiut. In
Alexandria, the shelter components failed entirely and were deleted from
the project due to difficulties of implementation. The project succeeded in
improving solid waste management in Cairo and Alexandria through the
construction of composting plants and improved collection arrangements."
(World Bank, PPAM 1986, p. 30).
"The project was unable to support employment generation
activities in the various project areas as planned. The overall impact on
institution building was less than satisfactory" (World Bank, PCR, 1986
p.vi).
"The likelihood that the project will ultimately meet its pricing and
cost recovery objectives is small, since the charges to be levied for
infrastructure services as well as for sites and services plots were not
implemented at the time of project completion.
"Although the implementation of the project took six and a half
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years instead of the four and a half years envisaged at appraisal, and
notwithstanding the substantial reduction made to its scope, several project
activities remained incomplete at the closing date, and US $0.6 million of
credit funds which had not been disbursed, were cancelled." (World Bank,
PPAM, 1986, p. 20)
Changes Made In Overall Project During Implementation (World Bank, PCR, 1986 pp.
18, 19)
Proposed Actual
Small business assistance
Shelter components in Alexandria:
Sites and Services.
Upgrading
Shelter components in Cairo:
Upgrading of North Bassateen
Settlement
Infrastructure for upgrading sites
in Cairo
Building materials loans subcomponent in
all upgrading site & services area.
Off-site sewerage infrastructure for the
sites & services scheme in Assiut:
Composting plant in Alexandria
CANCELLED: for lack of demand for
loans and lack of implementation
capacity on part of HIPCO.
CANCELLED.
CANCELLED: because of
unwillingness on the part of the
Governorate to proceed with the project.
CANCELLED: The selection of this site
for upgrading by the government spurred
the private sector to accelerate the
development
RATIFICATION of higher infrastructure
construction standards.
CANCELLED: Due to the inability of
the government to make necessary
arrangements to process such loans.
PROVISION
Construction of a 160 ton/day plant.
Performance of the Project
Implementation of pricing and cost recovery
arrangement for shelter components.
Provision of property titles to lot
owners in upgrading sites in Cairo
Civil works of infrastructure and community
facilities in upgrading sites in Cairo and in
the sites-and-services schemes in Assiut
Selection of beneficiaries
INCOMPLETE
INCOMPLETE
INCOMPLETE
INCOMPLETE.
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Chapter 6
THE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN IMPLEMENTATION
The implementation process involves the intervention of a variety of factors and
actors, from the availability of sufficient resources to the structure of intergovernmental
relation, from the commitment of lower level officials to reporting mechanism within the
bureaucracy, from the political leverage of opponents of the policy, to accidents of
timing, luck and seemingly unrelated events, which can and do frequently intervene
between the statement of policy goals and their achievements in the society.
Many policies when not realized are explained by faulty implementation. The
activities that were intended to be carried out were not executed or were subject to
inordinate delays. Another appropriate explanation may be that aspirations were set too
high (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1979, p. xvi). Another issue is the content of policy.
Because of their content some policies can be more or less difficult to implement.
Implementation is also affected by the number of actors involved. When the number of
actors increases, the incidence of trade-offs generally increases as does the cost of
competence. Numerous approvals and clearances have to be obtained from a variety of
participants (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1979, p. xii ). The longer the chain of causality,
the more numerous the reciprocal relationships among the links and the more complex
implementation becomes. Who had to act to begin implementation? Whose consent was
required to continue it? How many participants were involved? How long did they take
to act? Each time an act of agreement has to be registered for the program to continue, it
is called a decesion point. Each instance in which a separate participant is required to
give his consent, is called a clearance. Adding the number of necessary clearances
involved in decesion points will give the reader an idea of the task involved in securing
implementetion (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1979, p. xvi). The greater the duration of
sequential steps involved in the implementation stage, the greater the possibilities for
existing actors to alter their goals, for leadership to turn over, for new actors to enter the
scene or for ever unintentional consequences to take their toll! (Grindle, 1980, p. 289)
Implementation problems might also be traced to the failure of bureaucratic and
political officials to agree on the basic parameters and intent of the policy itself. Many
governments reject the idea of increasing access to resources by the people instead of
building houses directly. When the poor make their needs known government officials
see little personnel or political benefit to be gained from responding to them. There may
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be a political wish to improve the situation, but there is also an understandable reluctance
to embark upon specific courses of action which have within them the ingredients of
substantial political difficulties. Giandomenico, Majone, and Wildavsky, (1979, p. 177)
sum up the study of implementation:
"The study of implementation is becoming a growth industry; tens perhaps
hundreds of studies are underway now. Yet researchers are visibly
uneasy. It is not so much that they expect to discover all the right answers;
they are not even sure they are asking the right questions. Amidst the
flurry of activity is an underlying suspicion that the phenomenon to be
studied-implementation--eludes understanding. But this uneasiness is
not surprising, for the attempts to study implementation raise the most
basic question about the relation between thought and action. (How can
ideas manifest themselves in a world of behavior?)"
Considering the World Bank funded project, at the beginning during the study
phase the project appeared uncomplicated and was planned to be implemented in four
years. The study phase was completed as scheduled but as the project was implemented,
the progress was slow which resulted in the extension of the project period from four to
seven years, notwithstanding the substantial reduction made in its scope, and several
components remained incomplete at closing date of project. Funding and technical
assistance were made available by both GOE and the international funding agency. The
project areas-the informal settlements-are areas where since their inception have been
self-initiated and had been improved by individuals living in these areas. Land,
construction material and labor have been acquired by individuals living in these areas.
(See the section "Informal Activities"). After roughly seven years the solutions which
have been introduced, funded, and monitored by the international agency, the World
Bank and has been explicitly encouraged by GOE, as an attempt to find solutions for the
informal areas, has not proceeded in implementation as expected. Why did this happen
and what are the underlying causes?
Relatively speaking in comparison to other projects, we can assume that the costs
of the project and other resources (land, labor, and material) were made available at the
outset of project and that the constraints to implementation did not rest on questions of
the availability or allocation of resources. On the other hand, personnel experience and
observations of the World Bank funded project during the planning phase, together with
literature reviews, have indicated that the constraints to implementation were a myriad of
factors that are political and institutional in nature. Specifically, these issues are related
to: lack of political support to the project reinforced by the nature and content of policy.
Problems related to the actual organizational structure of project: establishing a new
institution, multiplicity of agencies involved, lack of control and non-compliance, and a
distant lender.
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Absence of Political Support
In his famous work Development Planning, Waterston (1965) indicates that in
the absence of government support, development plans, no matter how well devised, have
little chance of being carried out successfully. The project as funded through its different
components initiated a new concept-the low cost site-and-service and informal areas
upgrading schemes-in addressing the growing housing problem for low income people
in Egypt. In that respect the GOE deviated from its customary role of providing
subsidized, public housing units at a standard level. (See the section "National Housing
Policies in Egypt"). In upgrading, the formal bureaucracy of government is asked to
intervene to promote and develop areas which have been declared illegal by law either
because of illegal subdivisions, illegal acquisition, or illegal because of non-compliance
with building codes, etc.
With this concept and the understanding to promote the informal areas, the World
Bank signed an agreement with GOE, which implied that the government officially
agreed on the goals and objectives of the project. However, the reluctance to support the
project by the GOE represented by the MOHR appeared in 1979, when a few institutional
changes took place within the Ministry. These changes brought in the open the implicit
desire of officials to deviate from this policy.
In 1979 the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction under which the GOPP was
functioning and from which the participants of the project unit were composed, was to be
divided into two entities: the Ministry of Housing (MOH) and the Ministry of
Reconstruction and New Communities (MORNC), with the GOPP being under the latter.
With this division, the former was to be solely responsible for housing projects, and the
latter for development and construction of new communities.
People have suggested that the overriding concern of each entity was to avoid the
project. Both claimed that the responsibility of the project lay with the other: MORNC
claiming that housing is the responsibility of MOH, while MOH claiming that the project
unit already formed in GOPP is under the jurisdiction of MORNC. Understandably, the
lack of strong support for the project occurred because the concept had been developed
during the study phase at GOPP, a national government bureau, in isolation from both the
higher political context and the local government context who were later given full
responsibility for implementation. At the time these institutional changes occurred, the
study phase of the project had been completed and implementation was to start. To
higher officials implementation meant to be publicly responsible for the new policy of
which the outcome was doubtful. When a concept is new and success is doubtful there is
an attitude of reluctance to be directly accountable for a project.
Interviews with officials during the implementation of project confirmed the
previous observations and led to the realization that there was initially a big controversy
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between the GOE and World Bank on the problem to be addressed-the informal
housing-and hence on the solution adopted. This misunderstanding was the major
reason behind this lack of support to the policy. More seriously this controversy and lack
of support to a project of this nature remained long after the project ended. Ten years
later in 1985, the General Organization for Building and Research in Cairo set up a one
week seminar to deal with the "Problem of Informal Housing." The Governor of Cairo
was present. During this seminar there was no mention whatsoever of the solutions-
upgrading and site service-presented by the international agencies in 1976, whether
positively or negatively. In fact the unimpressive outcome of project had strengthened
these anticoncept attitudes. The author attended the seminar and was not surprised that
the solutions were never mentioned. This confirmed the initial observations that there has
been, and still is, a big controversy on the problem and consequently on the solutions to
be adopted.
From the very beginning there was a big controversy about the definition of the
problem, and hence the suitability of the solution. While the World Bank was promoting
a solution to do something for the urban poor, and has chosen the informal areas for
demonstration, the GOE represented by the national government wanted to do something
about the informal areas, which is functioning in contradiction to all laws and legislation,
was encroaching on agricultural land everywhere and encroaching on city life in general.
To the national government, represented by MOHR, which was responsible for
planning of the World Bank funded project, the characteristics of informal housing, their
activities, and the extent to which they had grown as described by USAID studies, were
not fully realized by the national government prior to the publication of these studies. To
the local government, however, who was later given the responsibility for implementation
of project, the informal housing activities represented a daily confrontations. Local
officials know more about this sector than the national government officials. They are
responsible for the existence of the informal housing, whether out of sympathy,
compliance, or weak enforcement of laws. If local governments decide against any of
these informal areas, they would "bulldoze it" immediately. Hence, in 1977, while the
informal sector was new to the national government officials, it was a daily confrontation
to the local government.
Finally, realizing the extent and size of the informal housing areas, the national
government viewed these areas with great alarm. To the local government, the level of
concern was more local. Informal housing added to the problems already existing in the
governorate. By accommodating more low income people and rural migrants, more
services, water, electricity, roads, etc. are required. But to them it is a natural response by
the people in solving their problems-where shall people go?
The attitude of the World Bank on informal housing is internationally known.
Housing that has been built by the poor themselves to accommodate their needs is an
investment that should be maintained and promoted. The solution presented by the
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World Bank was in accordance with the Bank view of the problem: to let the people
continue with their activities which they are capable of doing (house building) and to let
the government intervene to do what people cannot do: build schools; install water pipes,
electricity etc. Hence, the World Bank offers the sites and service projects for future
extension of low income areas. Areas are to be legally designated and planned by the
government, and the people shall do the house building while the government shall
provide all physical and social infrastructure. The other upgrading approach requests that
the government maintain and improve what the urban poor have already built.
These solutions imply that the government shall attempt to understand and
sympathize with the operation of the informal system in order to build on its strengths,
and at the same time overcome the drawbacks of informal activities. The policy expects
that government efforts, which have always been limited to the formal sector, would
now be directed to the informal. It expects that government would explicitly formalize
what it legally refused. Contrary to the above expectations there was no sympathy in
Egypt for informal activities and for the solutions presented. To the national government,
sites and services is, a slow response to the immense housing shortage. In addition the
gradual development of these areas by the inhabitants themselves does not guarantee the
quality of the final output. Who could guarantee the final output of this housing? The
government assumed that the final output would be more slums, but this time slums
officially supported by the government. At the same time upgrading meant the
encouragement of more informal areas to spring up everywhere. More importantly, to the
local government, upgrading meant that the national government would monitor the
installment of infrastructure in areas, which is primarily the job of the local government.
Thus when the national government requested a solution for informal areas they meant a
solution to prevent the springing up of more informal areas and if possible to get rid of
what already existed. The recent offer of land for ten new satellite towns around the
Greater Cairo ring road is an example of this. The idea, as former chairman of GOPP Mr.
M. Fouad explained in an interview with the author, is to compete against the informal
developers.
The Ineffectiveness of Building a New Institution
Institutions are often created to side-step bureaucracy or to resolve contention
between agencies. In this case it seemed to be created for the project no one wanted
accountability for. This trend to create new institutions was not limited to the MOHR but
was a national trend that seemed to accelerate following Sadat's Open Door Policy and
the flow of loans and grants from international bodies. Unfortunately this trend was
encouraged by the international agencies.
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To the international agencies, the new institution is a convenient arrangement, it
makes monitoring from the center easier. It ensures having a staff whose sole
responsibility is the project. Also the project being comprehensive and dispersed, it is
necessary for the international agency to deal with one agency at the central level, in the
capital, where amenities are available and en route to other countries. They can rely on
this agency for the day-to-day problems.
Higher officials instinctively create new institutions when a new project is
introduced to them, especially if the project deviates from customary government
procedure. The reason can be briefly summarized into the announced cause which is the
request to sidestep the existing bureaucracy. The second, and in many cases, the actual
cause underlying this tendency is the doubt as to whether the new concept will succeed or
not. There is a reluctance to take direct accountability for a project which might bring
more problems and little political successes. Meanwhile the more agencies established,
the more people hired, the bigger the budget and the larger the domain. The decision to
create new institutions results-in most cases-in personal, temporary gains. So among
those who have the power to build institutions, the tendency continues whenever
possibilities prolifirate. But more detrimentally, this tendency results in serious, adverse
effects on the size and performance of the national bureaucracy.
The indirect effects on the national bureaucracy is not the concern of this research.
It is, nevertheless, important to draw attention to this issue for further research and as a
long term problem in developing countries in general and in Egypt in specific. The
adverse direct effects on new projects is the concern of this research and has been
demonstrated, by the experience in creating the new EAJHP in MOH to be responsible
for both the World Bank and USAID projects.
Considering the issue of sidestepping bureaucracy: "The first temptation is to
establish a new organization, this way you can hire new people, establish your own rules
and work out patterns of operation you believe will facilitate the new activities."
(Pressman, 1979, p. 128). The new institution is born to be different. It is born to
sidestep bureaucracy. In reality this sidestepping is only a mirage and the new institution
shall be born within the same existing bureaucratic environment, and under the same laws
and legislations that tie down any existing institution. A new institution may have
initially more freedom in selecting the new personnel and in establishing new procedures,
but it is still subject to departmental regulations on all these matters. It is very
misleading to believe that it could be different for a long time.
"The advantages of being new are exactly that: being new! They dissipate
quickly over time. The organization ages rapidly little by little. The
regulations that apply to everyone else also apply to it. Youth has gone
and middle age has come hopefully more powerful, certainly more
experienced, inevitably less innovative." (Pressman, 1979, p. 130).
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Consider for instance, Seymour Sarasons t poignant natural history of the
premature aging of a new public school program (Bardach, 1977, p. 140,-141):
"Practically everyone automatically assumes that becoming principal of a
new school is much to be preferred over assuming leadership of an older
school. The reasons seem obvious enough: a new school is expected to
have better physical facilities; school personnel; children; and parents will
take great pride in the new school; the principal will have greater freedom
to organize things his way, that is it will be easier for him to innovate and
to depart from past practices; the principal has more of an opportunity to
choose teachers who fit in with his plans; he will not have to deal with
entrenched faculty who, because of their loyality to a previous principal
(or other reasons), are not likely to change their accustomed way of doing
things. But from the time of appointment until the formal opening of the
school, the new principal spends almost all of his time in what can only be
called housekeeping matter. I can summarize our observations and
experiences by saying that by the end of the first year, life in the new
school is remarkably similar to that in old ones."
Similarly the new institution had to recruit new people. "EAJHP was unable to
concentrate on start-up activities assigned to it, since its first concern had to be hiring and
orientation of staff." (World Bank, PCR, 1986, p. 17) The new agency to be responsible
for two projects had severe shortage in staff, particularly the mid-level professionals
whose experience was necessary for coordination purposes. The staff available were
young, new graduates, whose age and experience posed difficulty, for on many occasions
they had to interact with higher officials or older professionals in the governorates. This
shortage in staff caused conflict between the managers of the World Bank and the
USAID. Each trying to acquire the best professionals for own project. Some
professionals had to work on both projects. James and Wilson wrote in "The
Bureaucracy Problem," (The Public Interest, Winter 1976, p. 3-9.):
"The supply of able, experienced executives is not increasing nearly as fast
as the number of problems being addressed by public policy This
constraint deserves emphasis, for it is rarely recognized as a constraint at
all. Everywhere, except in government, it seems, the scarcity of talent is
accepted as a fact of life. The government at least publicly seems to act as
if the supply of able political executives were infinitely elastic, though
people setting up new agencies will often admit privately that they are so
frustrated and appalled by the shortage of talent that the only wonder is
why disaster is so long in coming. "Talent is Scarcer than Money" should
be the motto of the Budget Bureau".
1Seymour B. Sarason, The Culture of the School and the Problem of Change, Boston: Allyn & Bacon,
1971, p. 115-118
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World Bank Aide Memoire, Cairo 9, 1980, item 2.3:
"Accommodation remains a major obstacle to the official organization and
operation of LIHDU. The mission therefore welcomed the assurance that
EAHP will, by December 1980, assign to LIHDU the additional offices
now occupied by staff on the USAID project (those staff members will be
moved to Maadi, nearer their project site)"
It is optimistic to assume that the new institution can be fortunate to complete
successfully the legal and operational procedures required for its creation and
consolidation. These procedures in the best of cases do not take less than two years. The
quotation from USAID, Helwan Project Cairo, describes the situation: "Introducing
innovative programs and creating a new unit to implement them, requires more time than
was originally foreseen." (USAID document 263, 1983, p. 18) It took time to establish
EAJHP and time for the agency to define its management role. During the two-year
period, the new people who were enthusiastic to start work immediately have directed
their effort and time to the problems facing the creation of the institution while the project
for which the institution had been created became second priority. "Until recently
EAJHP was totally involved in day-to-day operational issues and establishing an effective
management structure" (USAID 263, 1983, p. 18)
A draft work program was prepared by World Bank on their visit in November
15, 1978, (first draft). Seven months later a second draft was prepared in June 1979, of
the same program, (project files) the final copy was not found in the files. However a
program in Arabic was included in the files and was prepared three times by the project
team, under three dates 15/11/78, 20/2/79 and 30/6/79. The Arabic program deals more
with "housekeeping issues," as it was called by Seymour. The World Bank program
deals more with the technical aspects, and assumes that eventually housekeeping is to be
settled by the EAJHP.
During the period (two years or more) in which the institution was being
consolidated, the enthusiasm of the new personal started to waver, "The problems that
confront a multi-year project seems to increase directly with its time frame, it is difficult
to maintain the interest, coordination, and cooperation of all participants over an extended
period." (Grindle, 1977, p. 132) What is even more serious when project time extends is
the many unexpected events that could appear. To mention a few: the change in
legislation, as in the World Bank funded project, (the New Local Government Law and
the abolishment of certain institutions, the LIHF); the segregation and integration of
institutions, in seven years the MOH and MOR have been segregated and integrated four
times. A final source of concern was the many changes in personnel that takes place
among young professionals, who are continuously searching for better financial
opportunities outside the government. More importantly during the period in which the
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institution is being consolidated there could be a change in the key officials who
supported the idea, then the future of the project hangs on mere luck. If the new
chairman supports the idea, the project continues, if not, then the project collapses.
GOPP had four new chairmen in two years between 1976-1978. EAJHP had six
chairmen in the ten year period, 1979-1989. The Minister of Housing changed between
1979-1986 at the rate of once every year. As the individuals in charge of the program
change, the outlines of the original agreement become increasingly vague.
Another issue is that the new institution is still building its credibility and
reputation. It is still learning to cope and deal with other agencies. If it is not strongly
supported politically, it faces one bureaucratic obstacle after the other. On the other
hand, a well established existing institution has over the years built its credibility,
political status and bureaucratic experience. This enables it to perform immediately, to
cope with other bureaucracies. "Accommodations are made with the other organizations
in its environment. Territory is divided, divisions of labor are established, favors are
traded, agreements are reached." (Pressman, 1979, p. 130)
What can add to the difficulties facing the new institution is that it has been
announced that it's different. Some might believe that it is actually different, for example,
employees receive better wages or they are privileged for being chosen to work on this
special project. This feeling of discrimination is destructive. There is always the
question: why them? We are also capable of performing, just give us a chance!
"The establishment of special arrangements, special preferences, special
personnel frees an operation from the usual internal bureaucratic
constraints. Immediately problems arise. If the special arrangements are
so good, the other members of the organization say, they would like to
share in them. They could do a few things too, they observe, if released
from the ordinary constraints. They resent special treatment for others"
(Pressman, 1979, p. 131).
"In assessing the impact of administrative and institutional aspects on low
income housing supply, a similar number of considerations commonly
apply. Interagency rivalry is one of these and applies particularly when a
new agency is introduced onto the scene. Existing agencies naturally
resist any reduction in their budgets or technical capability and often
impose vetoes or delays which impair the new agencies effectiveness."
(Payne, 1984, p. 6)
To make things worse, in many cases the new institution has been created to do
the work already the responsibility of another organization.
"In many instances special agencies have been brought into being, either
because national government, or international organizations such as the
World Bank, believe that the local authorities are not able to effectively
operate the programs in question. Yet the creation of alternative agencies
has the effect of further emasculating local authorities, thereby making
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them less able to perform." (Amos, 1984, p. 167)
The idea of creating a non-bureaucracy within a bureaucracy was strictly a one-time
short-run theory. No one expected it to last (Pressman, 1979, p. 131).
The language in the following Work Programs is symptomatic because the
Programs are for communication among people who know the content involved. As such
they may be difficult for the reader to understand. They are placed here only to suggest
the generically different roles assumed by the World Bank and the National Government.
Work Program prepared by World Bank team
First Draft November. 15, 1978 and repeated in June 79
Consolidation of LIHDU
a) LIHDU should acquaint themselves with all aspects of the project.
b) Establish "modus operand" with the Governorates and all implementing agencies,
agree on procedures from, reporting progress, schedules for regular meetings.
c) Obtain from all agencies a Revised Implementation Schedule discuss and submit to
IDA.
d) Obtain from all agencies detailed requirements for equipment and facilities for the
project
e) Assess situation of funding and need for technical assistance by Governorates.
f) Initiate meeting with GOPP for possible temporary participation in LIHDU of
staff previously involved in project preparation as and when required.
g) Prepare progress report with revised schedule for maintaining 6/30/79 previously
agreed completion dates. Send copy of progress report to IDA .
h) Establish consolidated project accounts.
i) Advance budgetary funds to all Executing Agencies LIHDU; HIPCO; GOPW;
GOSSD; MOLG. Governorate. of Cairo, Alexandria Assiut.
j) Send copy of Agreement between LIHF/CF to IDA.
k) Prepare and set out a framework for the accounting systems to be adopted at the
central and Governorate level.
p) Prepare revised budget estimates for 5-year plan 1979/82.
Work Program prepared by PU within EAJHP
(Original in Arabic) Dates 15/11/78, 20/2/79, 30/6/79.
1. Issue the Decree forming the LIHDU.
2. Selecting a suitable place for the LIHDU to work in.
3. Acquiring equipment. necessary to facilitate work (typing machines, copying
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machines, calculators, cars, etc.) a few of these items have been acquired by
30/6/79.
4. Completing the work team by an architect, physical planner, financial supervisor,
sociologist and necessary consultants (team was completed in 30/6).
5. Send C.V.s of nominated candidates to IDA for approval.
6. Prepare the outline necessary for writing the reports, method of monitoring
periodical meetings. (Monitoring method was mentioned in Decree establishing
LIHDU).
Request for Governorates
1. Finding a consultant to design works.
Non-Compliance of Local Government
In spite of its relatively small scale, the project was geographically dispersed and
had a large number of separate components. Each component required the participation
of one or two independent agencies, sometimes three and more. (See section on the
Organization of Project). Coordination arrangements relied on two institutions, the
Central Project Unit in EAJHP and LIHF. The LIHF was discontinued by the GOE in
June 1979, one months after credit effectiveness. Since the CPU was part of the newly
established institution it was ineffective the day it was created. In addition, the new local
government law (Law 43/1979) which dispersed powers and responsibilities from the
national government to the governorates, and encouraged the World Bank to sign
contracts with the local governors for the implementation of the respective project
components made the CPU more ineffective. The role of the CPU became limited to
consulting with no power to guarantee that the other authorities would accept advice and
assistance. To that effect the CPU, had very limited controlling power over the agencies
involved, and among the large number of those involved it was clear that no single
organization or individual exercised controlling influence over the project.
"The upgrading component as a demonstration project failed to
bring about results in the construction of the various infrastructure
elements, primarily because the coordination was assigned to a national
government agency which was incapable of bringing local authorities to
work together. In this case three parastatal utility companies and three
separate departments in the governorate: GOGCW, GOGCSSD, CEDC,
and the Departments of Roads and Bridges, Mechanical and Electrical
Works and Planning and Monitoring." (World Bank, PCR, 1986, p. 20)
The formation of steering committees followed by steering units in the local
governerote were all efforts by the EAJHP to coordinate agencies and attempts to attract
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the attention of those involved. Needless to say all these efforts were wasted. The more
people they got involved the less the results. In an interview with Mr. I. Shiri,
Undersecretary of Management Development and director of the World Bank funded
project, he said:
"This is a Christmas tree project, there are too many agencies involved and
there are too many components to the project. EAJHP has no controlling
power over the agencies involved. In an effort to have some sort of
controlling power, when the Low Income Fund was dissolved, he
suggested that EAJHP would take over its responsibilities and we did. In
this way the money for the project will be under our control and we might
get some response from the governorates. If we can't have legal power
then we might at least have some sort of financial power. He also added
that unimpressive as the results might be, we have very good people on
this job; they are working very hard and they are doing their best but
somehow there is a problem in this comprehensive project."
World Bank Aide Memoire, Cairo 9, 1980, Item 2.2:
"The relationship between LIHDU and the Governorates remain a major
problem area, as the assistance which LIHDU can render depends upon
the degree to which the Governorate will accept the coordinating role of
LIHDU. The crux of the problem is the LIHDU has no positive authority
over the Governorates, but rather possesses the "negative" authority
occasioned by its junction of forwarding (and presumably commenting in
advance upon) plans and documents for IDA review, and by its control
over disbursements. In order to facilitate the work of coordination with
the Governorates, the Director of LIHDU now intends to appoint a
specific LIHDU officer who will be primarily responsible for cooperation
with each local Governorate. By strengthening working level
relationships, and giving more responsibility to particular offices, this
action should increase the flow of information vital to the successful
implementation of the project. It may also form a basis for a more
fruitful interaction at a technical level."
What exasperated matters more was that the governorates who were given full
responsibility for the execution of project, were not involved in the initial preparation of
the studies of the components. According to the (World Bank, PCR, 1986, para. 5.10)
the large bureaucracy (about 160,000 employees in 1985) was only recently acquainted
with the project and treated it as a minor investment, out-of-scale with the city's sizeable
capital expenditure budget (LE 90.8 million in 1980). The upgrading component as
appraised (IBRD 1983 Table 2.4) represented about LE 4.7 million in 4.5 years or an
annual expenditure averaging about 1% of the city's total annual investment budget.
(World Bank, PCR, 1986, p. 22)
Difficulties encountered by EAJHP to work with the governorates is evident in a
memorandum found in Project files written in Arabic by the project manager indicating
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the obstacles to implementation facing the project. The first obstacle mentioned related
to the attitudes of officials to project:
"noncompliance by officials in governorates, who still insist on the
conventional methods to solve the housing problem. They have refused
the site and service approach and demand better design standards, and the
execution of complete dwellings. There is also lack of understanding that
the new approach abolishes subsidies and is targeted at the ability of the
people to pay for their dwellings."
The other obstacles mentioned in the same Memorandum is:
"the frequent changes in the State structure and the dissolvement of
several institutions, LIHF being one. The increase in the responsibilities
of local government while they lack the staff to undertake the tasks
expected of them; thus we find a shortage in full time personnel for
supervision of construction and for monitoring."
Local governments have their own objectives, and are overwhelmed with daily
urgent problems. They are not interested in objectives set by the national government
and they want no interference from the center (own observations). Its noteworthy to
mention that in a table indicated in the World Bank, Project Completion Report, 1986:
"Components appraised and components implemented," it indicated that:
"Some other main roads were surfaced by the Governorate of Cairo,
without the prior knowledge of EAJHP. Also the Governorate of Cairo
chose to extend the piped sewerage system to serve the whole settlement at
their own expense independent of the project and EAJHP. The as-built
sewerage system served an area approximately 65% larger than planned at
appraisal. The need to repair existing cesspits, construct new ones, was
therefore obviated."
Shlomo Angel (1983), has studied several, mainly Asian, upgrading projects and
discusses the objectives of various actors involved in the Lusaka project. Referring to the
municipal engineers in Lusaka he says:
"They felt responsible for infrastructure and public health. If the network
of the infrastructure of the city was to be extended, it was their task, and
should not require any special treatment beyond the need for an expanded
budget. They were reluctant to accept lower standards and did not like the
project approach. Infrastructure was their domain, and their work was
only made more difficult by other participants. The Lusaka project was
not only financed by special money, it had its own staff physically
separated from the staff of the city council by having a building of its own.
The separate organization created conditions for more efficient project
completion, simply by not including municipal engineers and other people
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within the city council who held pessimistic views of the project."
As examples of the difficulty met by CPU during implementation the following
are noted from project files: letter from Head of EAJHP to Undersecretary Of Technical
Affairs, MOH, dated 13/5/82, indicates difficulty met by EAJHP to work with
Governorates. On a very simple matter as the cost of housing; the request was forwarded
from the EAJHP to Department of Technical Affairs in the MOH. From MOH to Greater
Cairo Reconstruction Projects in MORNC and back to EAJHP. The translation of the
letter is as follows: "Please be informed that EAJHP is responsible for monitoring the
implementation of the foreign loans and grants agreements. But EAJHP is having great
difficulty in relating to other agencies participating in this agreement..." Another letter
written on January 1981, reveals more drastically the lack of credibility and control of
EAJHP: From Mr. El Wakil Head of EAJHP (2nd chairman) to the Undersecretary for
International Finance, Ministry of Economics and Economic Cooperation:
"...referring to the World Bank telex dated 19/1/81 concerning their
request to meet the governors of Cairo, Alexandria and Assiut on their
next visit to Egypt. Please be informed that EAJHP is facing difficulties to
arrange for such a meeting with the respective governors. Perhaps you Sir,
given the status of your Ministry, can intervene to arrange this meeting,"
(Translation by author).
Also in a telex dated 28 September 1983 from Peltekian Project officer URD
Projects Dursion World Bank to El Rafie, Head of EAJHP (3rd chairman )
"Eye was disappointed, however, that tenders for the civil works of the
Zabbaleen Settlement are not yet out. It had been agreed during my
mission of February, 1983, to issue the work in one contract. At the time
no one raised the difficulties mentioned by Mr. Chiri. It is hard to believe
that a governorate cannot issue an integrated civil works contracts for
urban upgrading and instruct its various departments to cooperate..."
After four years of the project agreement, there is a request from World Bank to
the Governor of Cairo to intervene to expedite recruitment of full time personal for
project monitoring and supervision and for award of contracts for construction. From I.
Serageldine, Chief Urban Projects Division, Europe, Middle East, and North Africa to Y.
Abou Taleb, Governor of Cairo (3 November 1983).
"We would like to thank you for the personal interest shown in the
above project. We trust that arrangements are under way for the
recruitment of Full-Time personnel or consultants for project monitoring
and supervision. Such full time staff will have a major effect on
expediting arrangement between the WB and the Cairo Governorate, such
recruitement should be carried out directly by the governorate or
alternatively by the EAJHP upon receipt of the specific, written request
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from the governorate.
"Your personal assistance may be necessary to make sure that the
two contracts are awarded in due time for construction to commence by
beginning of Jan. 1984. Your assistance may also be necessary to arrange
for the expedition award of the contracts for the construction of school,
community center and clinic."
Following this above letter, the Chairman of EAJHP writes to the Governor on
27/12/1983 (Translation):
"In reference to your letter No 512 dated 13/12/83 concerning the
responsibility of EAJHP to monitor and supervise the implementation of
projects in Mansheyet Nasser and Zabbaleen Area, within the Loan
agreement EGT 831, together with the assistance from the various
departments in Governorate and other agencies related to Governorate.
This is to inform you, that this project has actually started during the year
1979. Since that date the project has been stumbling through because of
non-compliance by officials in the governorate who are burdened by their
daily exigency of tasks. As a consequence IDA has requested the
appointment of full time personnel or consultants for project monitoring
and supervision. The Governor of Cairo has agreed to this appointment, in
a meeting, held in his office, several months ago. He has also forwarded
to you the terms of reference proposed by IDA in that respect. From the
above it is necessary to consider the following procedures:
1-Either the governorate shall select, from the various units in the
governorate, full time personnel for monitoring and supervision, to work
within and under the supervision of EAJHP.
2-Or to appoint a consulting firm to undertake monitoring and
supervision under the supervision of EAJHP."
Explicitly this means appointing someone to do the work of the CPU. On the
issue of coordination, Aide Memoire, March 6, 1984, Albert Peltekian, Project Officer
URD Projects Division:
"2.1.3. The type and volume of work in the Manshiet Nasser Main
and Zabbaline Area requires a great deal of coordination among the
various implementing agencies. It is appreciated that a steering committee
has been appointed, representing the various agencies of the governorate,
and staff have been assigned to supervise project implementation.
However for details of the project it is very strongly recommended that a
full-time coordinator be assigned to the project."
Distant Lender
The principle purposes of the World Bank as set forth in its Articles of Agreement
Charter may be summarized as follows:
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"To assist in the reconstruction and development of its member
countries by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes,
thereby promoting the long range growth of international trade and
improvement of standards of living.
"To promote private foreign investment by guarantees of and
participation in loans and other investment made by private investors.
When private capital is not available on reasonable terms, to make loans
for productive purposes out of its own resources or funds borrowed by it."
(Encyclopedia Britanica, p. 901)
The Bank came into being in 1945 to promote international investments that
would aid in the postwar reconstruction and economic development of member nations.
The Bank encourages private foreign investments. However when a member is unable to
secure a loan from private interests, the Bank lends money from its resources or from
funds borrowed by it. The Bank also has an advisory function, and sends missions of
experts to member nations. The missions study the economics of the country and then
plan investment and development programs. IDA is a part of the World Bank group and
also makes loans to member nations for their economic development. The terms of these
loans however, are more lenient than those of the bank. The World Bank monitors the
progress of projects from its headquarters in Washington, D.C., through telex, reports and
letters and by sending intermittent missions to the receiver country. The attitude is of a
bank lending money and to do so it must make sure its money will not be wasted away
and to make sure the creditor is proceeding on the agreed project according to program,
schedule and rules of the Bank. This lending is done under the umbrella of aid and
technical assistance to developing countries. Hence the banking role is slightly modified
to be targeted at projects which assist in the development of these countries. As a result
the Bank is involved in deciding the type of projects to be financed and often initiates
projects, and recommends what is best for the receiver. During the Study and
Implementation phases of projects, World Bank missions assist in choice of technical
consultants, in approving these consultants, choice of contractors etc. Accordingly the
role of Bank expands to benevolent initiator of project in addition to a traditional banking
role.
The receiver of credit perceives World Bank as initiator of projects, consultant to
the project and even owner of the project and misunderstood to be present on site at all
times. This observation is based on interviews with professionals and officials working
on the project case and based on the attitudes of participants from the governorates during
World Bank visits to Egypt. These attitudes are conveyed in the number of participants
attending the steering committee meetings. During World Bank visits most of those
involved in project were present, while a high absentee of participants was recorded on
other meetings, not including World Bank members. In spite of the frequent changes in
members of World Bank missions, these visits were like the arrival of owner and
consultant to the project. Progress was achieved during these visits. Perhaps one should
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progress" but "the awakening of the project." Meetings were held to include all those
involved. All the agencies appeared to be cooperating, involved and committed.
However, as the project period prolonged, this enthusiasm by participants
(whether set up or authentic), started to fade away and the enchantment of World Bank
visits started to lose its effect. This is evident in the attitudes of representatives to the
Governorates of Alexandria and Assiut who were absent in the later meetings of (Steering
Committee and World Bank groups). This loss of interest was also confirmed by EAJHP
officials working on the project. The diminishing effect of World Bank visits was very
much related to the prolongation of project life and to the slow positive visible results.
As the project stumbled, those who at the beginning were under the impression that the
World Bank as a renown institution was here to assist in development and was coming in
with new approaches were gradually disappointed until they lost all interest, and finally
the component of the project in Alexandria was cancelled. This perception of World
Bank as owner of the project and not only financer, has been magnified by the actual
reality that there was no other owner. The EAJHP was a weak institution and the
involvement of a multiple of agencies in the project made "ownership" unclear.
The acceptance of the role of the World Bank--as a lending agency, controlling its
expenditure by monitoring the progress of work from Washington, D.C. and by
intermittent visits to the receiving country--then to evaluate or assess the efficiency of
this monitoring method would be the business of the World Bank only. However from
the perception of the receiving country, the World Bank method of monitoring would be
appraised on a different set of criteria and failing to meet this criteria would cause
disappointment to the receiver and finally loss of interest in the project. It is this
controversy of the role of World Bank, that makes the author believe that professionals
expected the World Bank to be present more frequently, or at least expected consistency
and continuity in members of the missions. They also expected a different attitude from
the World Bank officials when a new institution was to be created.
The World Bank Appraisal Report (1978) clearly states that no new institutions
are to be created except for the LIHDU. However, during the implementation phase of
the project, unexpected organizational changes brought about a change in policy. These
changes created problems to the project from the very beginning. Interviews with former
GOPP, project unit staff and personal experience, indicated that there was a general
feeling that the World Bank was very passive regarding the initial organizational changes
made in the Ministry concerning the Project. To a few, this passive attitude was
attributed to political reasons, the project being the first between GOE and World Bank
since the High Dam incident in 1959, and the intent was to improve relations with the
GOE. To others this attitude was attributed to the monitoring World Bank officials desire
to work with one agency at the national level, while a new agency would involve a staff
whose main concern would be the project.
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Whether the World Bank was actually passive or local professionals expected too
much from expatriates is difficult to determine. However what concerns us is that this
was the impression the local professionals had. The incident at the time was unexpected
and naturally it presented a local problem. Can the World Bank officials interfere and to
what extent? Considering that implementation represents a new phase, is it really
necessary to make use of the GOPP and the former team? At the same time the USAID
was initiating a project of similar nature and thus it seemed reasonable to create a new
agency, to be responsible for these projects. This agency might even ensure replicability
of these projects as a long term housing strategy in Egypt. . Perhaps with a new
institution there loomed the possibility of side-stepping the existing bureaucracy and
profiting from the enthusiasm of the new staff. On the other hand, there is also the
possibility that even if the World Bank had resisted the changes, GOE would still have
insisted on the new institution. Whatever the motives were for theWorld Bank to accept
the change, the effect on the future progress of project was underestimated and certainly
the long term effect on the growth of the national bureaucracy was no one's concern.
In brief the receiver country expected the World Bank to be both a lending agency
and a full time technical advisor, someone to share the job especially when a new
approach was proposed. Whether this perception might have changed if EAJHP had been
a strong monitoring agency well staffed, having credibility and ability to coordinate the
many agencies involved instead of only a new institution is doubtful. This doubt is
attributed to the fact that the project is a deviation from customary government practices
and most of all it involves a large number of agencies.
Monitoring Of The Project By The World Bank
Monitoring of the project by the World Bank was done from Washington D.C.,
through letters, telexes, quarterly reports, in addition to short intermittent visits to Egypt
by World Bank consultants every 3 to 4 months. Most of the information received by the
World Bank was second hand, indirect information. Only during the missions visits was
information acquired directly. Even if we are to assume that this information was well
represented, one should consider the time spent to prepare this information, to send it and
to wait for a reaction or answer to the information. This procedure prolongs projects to a
large extent and would be in most cases too late to prevent disaster. It is also the best
way to prolong any project endlessly, especially if many agencies are involved.
An additional problem is when the participants are also not in the same place
where the project is implemented. The daily changes, whether in positions of officials,
changes in laws and legislation, and changes in political trends, demands direct and
immediate actions, not only by the local participants but also by the expatriate advisors.
Absence of the participants delays reactions to problems and in all cases delays solutions
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of minor problems before they become major.
Another issue is the time committed to the project by the participants and the
negative effects on the project when those involved are not present all the time, whether
they are the local participants or the expatriates. When a new team is formed for a
particular project, the objective is that this team would forget the daily existence of other
tasks and concentrate on this particular one in order to achieve full-time effort and
commitment. The same applies to the World Bank staff. The negative effect on the
project when the participants are not fully involved, is loss of commitment, delays in
reacting to problems and hence a less satisfactory outcome. Equally important is the
effect on the feelings of the full time participants (GOE team). The local professionals
starts to resent interference of part-time participants. "What does he know of the
problems I meet every day?" Especially if, after a long absence the expatriate comes with
the attitude: "I know what's best for you."
The above issues have been discussed with the assumption that the part-time team
is the same all through the job. Part-time is one thing but being the same team all along is
another thing. How can one imagine the effect on work when this part-time team is
changing all along the project? People who are having difficulty committing themselves
as part-timers, eventually after understanding the project and its procedure, etc. are to be
replaced by others completely new to the project. What does this mean when these new
people through hearsay try to understand the history of project, how it proceeded, get
acquainted with local participants, let alone the effect on the local team trying to get
acquainted with a new team, and also wasting time and effort repeating history. To make
things worse, this change and turnover in World Bank staff was repetitive. The result
was less commitment to the project, loss of institutional memory, and less satisfactory
decisions and more delay.
The World Bank visits to Egypt were usually short (2 weeks at the most) and in
many cases these visits were by members on their way to other countries. These two
weeks for the mission were usually full of travelling to governorates, and attempting to
solve whatever problems existed at the time. Sometimes they also included monitoring of
other projects or planning for new projects.
In 1980, three years after the completion of the studies and while the author was
working as Deputy Project Manager for the El Obour Master Plan, a new town in the
desert, the author was informed by Ms. El Kadi that the new head of the World Bank
mission requested to meet her as former member of the GOPP project unit, to understand
the history of the project and, in particular, the layouts which were prepared for the sites-
and-service component. At this time problems were at their peak in the governorate of
Alexandria. During this meeting, the history of the project was explained briefly to the
head of mission, including how work on the layouts plans proceeded with former World
Bank staff. That the objectives of these plans were to reach a size of plot that is
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affordable by the targeted groups, and at costs that required no subsidies from the GOE.
How these plans were further developed in 1978, at an MIT workshop, was also
explained. It was also noted that they could continue forever to develop these plans. The
head of the mission discussed the plans on the basis of the governorate's objections,
which were related to the basic planning concept. The plans were described as
monotonous, lacking aesthetics, and that the plots were too small, etc. It was also
mentioned that the professionals in the Governorate of Alexandria believed they could
produce without the assistance of the national government professionals, better plans. At
the time it was apparent to the author that the underlying cause for the refusal of these
plans by the governorates was the desire to produce the plans themselves! The author
also realized that the team in Alexandria had not internalized the concept of sites-and-
services before evaluating these plans. The new head of mission was spending a lot of
time and effort understanding what had happened previously, and trying to convince
people to accept work with which he was not previously involved. From interviews it
became obvious that local participants preferred continuity in members of the World
Bank missions for the sake of commitment to the project and for strengthening the
working relationships
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSIONS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study is an appraisal of planning practice by means of an analysis of a selected
case study in the shelter sector. The project involved an international agency, the World
Bank, and the host government, the Government of Egypt, represented in this research by
both the national and the local governments. The case study identified some of the reasons
why projects of this nature rarely progress beyond the initial demonstration phase and only
then with great difficulty. Generalizing from this case into a broader model it was possible
to suggest several factors that should be taken into consideration, in order to improve the
chances for similar projects in other developing countries. The concern of this research
with the upgrading policy is pertinent to the viability of its implementation. Throughout the
case study, there has been emphasis on the institutions which were responsible for the
planning and implementation of the project. An understanding of how these institutions
interrelate is the key to the understanding of the model.
It should be noted that the objective at this point is not to pose as a reformer of
existing institutions nor to recommend specific changes in existing institutions. The
objective is to build into upgrading plans the effect of institutional limitations that are almost
certain to be encountered during implementation and to outline a framework into which
upgrading programs could fit. It is also not an objective to condemn upgrading projects but
to understand as fully as possible the organizational set-up necessary for their
implementation. Specifically this appraisal had two aims:
The first more general aim was to identify major problems and issues facing
implementers. These problems have been discussed in Chapter 6, in relation to the case
study. These issues included:
- Lack of political support for projects.
- Ineffectiveness of establishing a new institution for project implementation.
- Noncompliance in the implementation process by the local government.
- Problems of communication with a distant lender.
The second aim dealt with underlying issues. A model of collegiality is presented
which argues that the above problems are symptoms of the underlying relationships
between organizations. Its insights on agencies views of the policy of upgrading and the
viability of implementation via the government bureaucracy are outlined.
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Recommendations on the upgrading policy are suggested which could improve the
prospects for meeting project objectives.
This dissertation has particular strengths because it is the evaluation of a case in
which the author was a responsible participant professional. But this also imposed
limitations.
As a participant, the author was concerned with the impending failure and was
constantly looking for solutions to the problems while the implementation process was
under way. At the same time the author was participating in other projects of the same
organizations. She was able to consider why some projects were much more successful
than others. As a result, her observations of the characteristics cited in the model of
collegiality are much broader than just in the case that is the subject of this dissertation.
This means that events, actions and opinions that illustrate this model were observed many
times in the course of professional work that included plan and project development all over
the country. Her views and perceptions were broadened and matured by these other
experiences and by the level of responsibilities. Though this is the only case in which the
World Bank became fully involved, she was involved in initial discussions on another
project. Personal association with the case means that the author knew the other
participants in person, is able to sort out personal issues, and was aware of details and
nuances that were not recorded in the documentation, things that were shared candidly only
in informal conversation.
The author was associated intermittently with this project for seven years, from
1979 to 1986--the complete life of the project. In the Honeymoon and Realization Phases
the author was an active participant. In the Accommodation Phase, her association was
indirect and informal, and based on personal concern for the project and for her involved
colleagues. In the later phases of Frustration and Resentment her association was as a
researcher. Such a comprehensive, lengthy association is rarely possible in housing
research.
Limitations are inherent by the personal participation of the author in the case. In
fact some of the issues mentioned above as attributes could also be considered limitations.
At the time of the case study, the author was a senior professional in the GOPP, concerned
about Egyptian professionalism in this field and headed toward a management position in
the GOPP which she now holds. She was one of a number of staff members who spoke
adequate English, and therefore had considerable contact with the World Bank missions.
Her identification with the national professional cadre no doubt resulted in a bias toward
them and against the local point of view. There was always a tendency to present the
national government in a favorable image and to hide issues that might jeopardize that
image. This bias against the local officials reflected the assumptions that the author made
about the beliefs of the local government professionals. The nature and requirements of her
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tasks and the organizational hierarchy as opposed to the local government have
systematically put her in a position of dominance. In this position the local government are
in a position where they are struggling to extend the administrative bounderies of their
jurisdiction and have adopted a subservient stance. However both of these roles fit in the
model of collegiality.
At the same time the author has limited direct experience with the local pressures
believed to condition the local government orientation. The experience was gained
indirectly through formal interaction through various projects. Equally the author has no
experience with the detailed execution and their problems that the local government
confront on a daily basis.
Her relationship to World Bank staff was ambivalent, including respect for their
perceived superior experience and world-wide view, but at the same time at least mildly
resentful of their inclination to impose ideas and practices. The sense of wariness toward
the World Bank professionals was because they were cosmopolitan and western oriented.
It was felt that there was lack of true appreciation--however limited--of the culture and the
way of doing things in Egypt. There is also a sense of awe of World Bank professionals
because of their presumed breadth and depth of their knowledge and the belief that they
bring with them the state-of-the-art policies. As with the dominant national and subservient
local government relationship, equally the author has a tendency towards this same
relationship with the World Bank professionals. There is an inherent bias when perceiving
the World Bank professionals as bankers, in contrast to the author's professional
background. There is a sense that the basic motivation of World Bank is driven by
financial concerns and not the project issues that are the concern of the author. On the other
hand the author realizes that there are possible benefits in working with the World Bank
and hence she becomes more tolerent with believed shortcomings.
In spite of all this, the author argues that she had tried to be objective to the best of
her capabilities but nonetheless there is still apt to exist a bias. However the author would
like to point out that for the purposes of this research, this bias fits in the model for it has
been argued that there is a bias that exists among the professionals in the national
government against the local government, and is apt to exist for some time. It also might
be argued that the model is biased in favor of the local government for it gives a convenient
excuse to their noncompliance. (In brief, it says the national government and international
agency worked together and excluded the local government).
Sources of information were varied and were acquired through the life span of the
project. The agencies involved in the implementation were contacted and past and present
officials familier with the project, or those who had played a role in it were interviewed.
There are other groups of actors involved in the project: the inhabitants, national and local
politicians, other ministries and agencies at the national and local levels, already listed in the
section on 'Organization of the Project', Chapter 5. Interviews were restricted to the three
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main entities officially responsible for planning and implementation. Interviews with
officials and professionals included questions which would clarify their attitudes toward the
nature of project, the procedures, and problems in implementation. Questions were
designed to identify consensus, support, responsiveness, bias or conflict of interest. To
augment these interviews the author relied on information extracted from the project files in
EAJHP which included in-house memorandums; quarterly reports prepared by the project
unit every four months; correspondence between the EAJHP and the governorates of
Cairo, Alexandria, and Assuit; correspondence between the EAJHP and the World Bank;
World Bank aide memoirs, which were prepared following the IDA missions to Egypt.
Other documents were the World Bank Appraisal Report (1979), the World Bank Project
Completion Report and Project Performance Audit Memorandum, acquired in EAJHP.
Fuller coverage would have necessitated seeing the project files in the other governorates
and even more the project files in Washington DC. However for the purposes of this
research the information acquired from the project files in EAJHP was considered
sufficient. In addition, the authors experience in the writing mannerisms adopted in the
bureaucracy has made it possible for her to detect the underlying meaning. Accessibility to
the local governorate files and equally to the EAJHP files would present a difficulty for any
outsider, including the author. Accessibility to these files was made possible by former
colleagues and by the Egyptian director of the World Bank funded project.
During the Harmony and Realization Phases the author was an active participant as
a professional and part of the national/international strong collegiality relationship with
lesser collegiality to the local government. Information in this phase was direct and out of
first-hand experience. During the latter phase and out of concern for the project the author,
in addition to other officials in the Ministry, resorted informally to the Prime Minister1 at
the time, who was doubtful of the outcome of such projects, in particular sites and services
programs, but at the same time was also concerned about sustaining good relations with the
Bank. In the early stages of the Accommodation Phase the author was indirectly involved
through other professionals and colleagues in the new institution, and with a few of the
World Bank officials who were members in the missions. In the later stages of Frustration
and Resentment Phases, the author was involved as a researcher. Interviews were
conducted with officials in EAJHP and external consultants hired for the World Bank
project. Interviews were also conducted with consultants to the USAID project as a
comparison to the former.
However there were some limitations to these interviews, particularly in the role of
researcher, and accessibility to the local government officials was limited and information
was indirect. Their reactions in the life span of the project was portrayed through the
national government professionals and World Bank officials and also through the aide-
1 Infornal discussions, at the end of 1979, with Dr. Moustafa. Khalil, Prime Minister of Egypt.
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memoirs and memorandums in EAJHP. Another limitation is that views were shared by
the author with the World Bank officials in the three first phases, some of these views were
with the head of the missions, while in the later two phases the information was extracted
from project files. To overcome the above mentioned limitations, the author has tried to
observe attitudes and to share views with other local government officials and professionals
involved in other projects undertaken within the GOPP. These included the heads of city
councils, the heads of the various departments in the city councils, other professionals, and
local politicians. The bias that could exist in such views have been discussed with regards
to the dominant/subservient roles. The involvement with projects that involved other
international agencies offered opportunities to observe the attitudes and the procedures of
more international professionals and in effect to generalise the model.
Reviewing the methodology from the international lender and local government
perspectives--as opposed to the author's national government background--it may be
argued that from the WB bias the same model would evolve but they might attach different
names to the phases. In a way this also applies to the local government officials. The WB
would clearly be favorably inclined toward the national government and to a lesser extent to
the local government. In effect they would tend to blame the local government to some
degree for the consequences of the project. Their accusations to the local government
would be lack of professional skills, fragmentation, obstruction, etc.
It is also argued that a local government respondent would lump the two first
phases--Honeymoon and Realization--into a phase where people are working together and
they are left out and then they are called in when it is convenient for the national
government. They would actually blame the national government for this situation. To
them, as usual, the national government is pushing them away and wants the project for
themselves, a project in which the local government has more experience. The
Accommodation Phase again may be termed differently by them, a phase where the
international and national entities realized that they cannot do this job without them.
Frustration and Resentment appear to be terms appropriate in these phases to all the three
actors.
The national government professionals might argue that there is no national
/international collegiality, it is a matter of international vested interests. The World Bank is
interested in Egypt because of political and financial interests. They encouraged the
building of a new institution at the center because they do not want to be involved at the
local level. They believe that nationals and locals lack professional skills but relatively
speaking they would rather deal with the national professionals. They came in with a new
idea that was not workable, they got the national government involved, and were not even
around when there were problems. They initiated the project, in spite of being told from
the beginning that the policy is not appropriate to Egypt. They monitored it from
Washington at their convenience, earning as individuals a lot of money, while the Egyptian
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counterparts were left with the problems with none of the advantages. This was a project
"forced" on the Egyptians, a project that could readily fail, and with the result that Egypt
has more debts. The Bank officials were not able to perceive the size and difficulties of
problems faced in the project daily. They were involved in all procedures, in the choice of
professionals and consultants and contractors. This method of monitoring and distant
involvement delayed the project, because of the time delay in sending telexes and waiting
for a response. In some cases when there was an urgent need for immediate action, the
response came too late. They signed agreements with the local government, which in effect
both included and excluded the central project unit. "The local government is to call on us
when and if they want.us. Is it possible, that the local government would come on their
accord and ask for our assistance?!" The end result could be stated as: "How can we--the
national government--monitor and be responsible for this project under such agreements?"
From the point of view of the World Bank they might argue as follows: The Bank
comes in with a project that has been tested in other developing countries, in a few cases
some problems arose, but nothing that could not be dealt with. The government does not
know what is best for them. All this money and a solution to do something for the poor,
who are always excluded, and all national government care about is the aesthetics and their
political image. They want grandoise, visible projects. They knew what they were getting
into but they chose to go along to acquire the funds. They set up a new institution, when
we wanted to work with the GOPP, true they are still at the center, but it is not a new
institution. In effect they were trying to avoid accountability and at the same time also
augment budgets and expand their power base. How can we work at the local level? We
are here for short visits and we cannot be involved on a daily basis with these dispersed
projects. Besides we cannot work with the local government. They lack skills and there are
other local political issues and conflict of interests that it is better to be far from. The
national government have problems with their local government, which might be a power
conflict. Local government departments are fragmented and at the same time there is loss
of control from the center. The obstruction and delay of these people, it took them a year to
sign the subsidiary agreements and to conform with our requirements. It took them two
years to consolidate the new agency and even then it was an agency with no credibility.
Local government, on the other hand might argue as follows: The national
government, as usual, brings in the World Bank and they side together, and they think they
understand our problems. They offer us a solution that is basically our work and pretend it
is a new concept. What do they know of the procedures of providing infrastructure, of the
struggle of the people for acquiring priority. They sit there in Cairo, where the amenities
are available and tell us what we should do. What do they know of the informal sector,
how this sector functions, the interests that underpin these settlements, the daily demands
and the pressures that the inhabitants exert on us politically. We told the World Bank
officials that that these plans were not acceptable but they still insisted--together with the
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national government officials--that this is what we shall get. To make things worse they
want us to be monitored from the center in our own jurisdiction. The funds are also to be
monitored by the center, they do not trust us. Are they trying to show who is boss?
In the above scenario the author has tried to show the different views of actors and
the problems that are presented by each in-the case. This is another way of describing the
obstruction and hesitation and fragmentation, etc., that seemed to be in the project. Thus
each of the groups of actors might characterize the others. But these statements, however
accurate or distorted, are based on simple appraisals of vested interest and identity. They
fail to account for the array of interrelated beliefs, professional ideoligies, social status
characteristics, educations, language skills, and personal economic opportunities that vary
among these three groups of participants. Only by considering differences described by a
richer mosaic of interrelated personal and organizational attributes can a clearer
understanding of the confrontations arise. This is what the model of collegiality tries to
do.
The model discusses administrative relationships and from it the author finds
ways in which projects of this kind could function more smoothly. By using the model it
is not assumed that it is possible to solve all problems encountered in implementation: for
example, as indicated by Pressmamn and Wildavsky, 1973, p128: "Obstruction, delay,
red tape, overlapping, duplication, vacillation, hesitation", are only indirectly within the
domain of the model.
As previously mentioned these projects involve other actors, the consumer as an
example, but the research deals only with those who are charged with planning and
implementation in an effort to initially ensure the delivery of the project to the people. This
research does not discuss whether government should intervene in the housing market or
not. The model assumes that once the government is involved, how do you proceed? This
model does not suggest solving all the problems encountered in implementation but clarifies
an aspect of them.
Collegiality--Problem or Opportunity
The author has refrained from using the term "problem", in describing this
relationship, because collegiality among actors is a requirement. When does this
collegiality become an impediment to implementation and hence problematic, and how can
we make use of it to promote implementation?
In our case study three entities are involved: a strong lender, a highly centralized
national government, and a distant local government. The project is an upgrading project
for the poor, a new approach, in dispersed locations and within the jurisdictions of the
local government. The unequal collegiality among the three actors--a strong
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international/national collegiality and lesser collegiality with the local government--was a
strong impediment to implementation and hence is apt to arise in similar circumstances.
Collegiality among two entities is a prerequisite for success. However as noted in
the model, among three entities unequal collegiality will cause jealousy, noncompliance by
the third party, and hence impede implementation.
Observing the phases through which the project evolved, it is noticed that the
Harmony Phase involved only the international agency and the national government, and in
this phase of the project collegiality promoted the work. Both actors worked in Harmony
and completed the study on schedule. To a large extent this collegiality has delayed the
next Realization Phase because they failed to realize early on the controversy among them.
They had no problems working out the plans together and hence found no need to resort to
other parties. Collegiality made the realization period short and steps for accommmodation
were quickly introduced. Collegiality also extended the Frustration Phase and delayed the
Resentment Phase. Collegiality in that sense has made both the national government and
the international agency carry the project for a long period and try--to the best of their
efforts--to overcome obstacles. Once the third party was introduced international/national
collegiality became a setback and this is when frustration started. The third party was left
out despite that the project is within its jurisdiction. Not surprisingiy the third party reacts
by defying both, the international and national agencies.
Collegiality----A Structural Issue
The model of collegiality argues that it is a structural issue that is difficult to
overcome and therefore likely to persist. What then are the implications?
The World Bank as an international lender has its own agendas and procedures
which most probably will not change in the near future. Also both the national and local
goverments have their agendas and procedures which most likely will not change in the
near future. The World Bank as an institution is set up to move money in a given period of
time for certain goals and will continue to monitor from Washington by short intermittent
visits to the receiver country. As an entity that offers loans it needs to ensure recovery of
its money hence it would prefer to work with the national government. They will continue
to build up institutions because from a managerial point of view it is more convenient to
them and less time consuming--their time--it ensures that the sole responsibility of the staff
employed focuses on the project. They will continue to perceive local government as
incompatible with their professional standards and to a lesser degree the national
government and hence often require a new agency, often in the capitol city. They cannot
afford to be caught up in local administration and implementation problems. All these
requirements necessitate affiliation with the national government. "One of the conditions of
the World Bank loan in the Kampung project in Indonesia in 1974, was the establishment
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of a separate project unit" (Devas, 1981).
As long as the World Bank is the entity that is offering the money it will continue to
select the project, initiate the project, and to a large extent set the agenda for the procedure
of work. National governments who are always short for funds will continue to seek
affiliation to the World Bank and to sustain this affiliation. National government will
continue to seek grandiose visible projects, in areas which avoid to a large degree local
government jurisdictions. National government professionals will continue at least for
some time to come, to perceive the local government to be distant and divorced from policy
and planning. In the case study even though the national government did not support the
policy, they did not turn it over completely to the local government, but they built a new
institution and went along with the policy. Even though the projects--upgrading and sites
and services--are simple and do not require much sophistication in experience, they are
more in the realm of the local professional than the national professional. While the local
government deals directly with the people and are under pressure to answer their demands,
accessibility to these areas is made easier by the local professionals.
Local government will continue to struggle for existence and struggle to prove its
identity and its right to be on an equal basis with the center. They will continue to be in
competition with the national government for scarce resources with the local government at
a disadvantage. Even though they have some similarity there is still a lack of collegiality
among them that will persist.
Degrees of Collegiality
It is also argued that collegiality between the international agency and the national
government will be strong or weak depending on three variables: the international agency,
the receiver represented by the national and local governments and the policy. Strong is in
the sense that it is inevitable, and weak when it is less likely to happen.
The International Agency
Using a few indicators to categorize international agencies: multinational; national;
governmental; nongovernmental; size of budgets; size of organisation; donors or lenders,
we can divide them into three families. The first category would include the larger agencies
like the World Bank, the USAID and the United Nations for Development Programs
(UNDP). The second level would include the intermediate sized agencies like the British
Overseas Development Agency and the German Agency for Technical Cooperation. The
third level includes the small agencies which are most of the non-government
organizations.
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It is argued that the large agency seeks collegiality with the national government,
while both the national and local government seek collegiality with the large agency. Hence
the larger the international agency the stronger the collegiality with the national government.
The national government will not necessarily seek collegiality with an intermediate
and small international agency. The intermediate and small agencies would seek collegiality
with either the national or local governments. The local government would seek collegiality
with an intermediate or small international agency. Hence the smaller the international
agency the weaker the collegiality with the national government.
Whether an agency lends or donates funds is also important. An international
lender would seek collegiality with the national government while a donor would not
necessarily seek collegiality with the national government.
The Receiver
The more politically centralized the receiver, the stronger the international, national
government collegiality. The more contrasts between the national government and the local
government the weaker the national/local government collegiality. The weaker the national
/local collegiality, the stronger the international/national collegiality. The less contrasts
between national government and the international/agency the stronger the
international/national collegiality.
The negative effect of unequal collegiality is stronger when the local government
professionals are compatible to the professionals in the national government, like in the
case of Cairo and Alexandria.
The Policy
The more dispersed the project across the country, the stronger the
international/national collegiality. New approaches tend to create a stronger
international/national collegiality.
The stronger the collegiality between the international agency and the national
government in projects that will eventually involve local government, the less successful
the project will be in implementation. Upgrading and sites and service projects fall into this
category. Differentiating between upgrading and sites and service projects, upgrading
projects require local government expertise and knowledge, and therefore a strong
international/national collegiality relationships would impede project implementation. To a
lesser extent, for sites and services, which requires less local expertise, collegial
relationships are of relatively lesser importance.
Collegiality between national government and international agencies would be
favored for policies within the jurisdictions of national government. Collegiality between
the international agency and the local government is favored for policies within the
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jurisdictions of local government.
For projects like upgrading, which fall in the jurisdiction of the local government,
collegiality should be sought with the local government and hence a large international
agencies should avoid such projects. A middle or small international agency would be
more successful.
Policy Implications
Accepting the model of collegiality as previously indicated and as a structural
problem that is apt to persist in the future, it is argued that identifying this underlying
relationship is the first step to finding solutions to it and the second step is to be aware of
its broader implications. It has been also argued that collegiality between the international
agency and the national government will be stronger or weaker depending on three
variables: the international agency, the receiver and the policy.
In cases when collegiality with the national government is inevitable as in cases
where a strong international agencies----lender or donor----like the WB, USAID and
UNDP are involved, perhaps one way is to get all three entities to work together at the
beginning and break the unequal collegiality at the start. Another way deals with the choice
of projects to be sought by the international agencies. The following projects offer
examples of different collegial arrangements:
Projects that are within local government jurisdiction but that do not necessitate
working with the LG: The shift back to sector funding2 adopted more recently by most
of the large agencies would be more suitable for large agencies. An example is the "The
Urban Health Delivery System Project" comprising: a center for social and preventive
medicine and eight, general urban health centers, built in several low income
neighborhoods in Cairo. An agreement was made between the USAID and the GOE
represented by the Ministry of Health, whereby the USAID would be responsible for
financing the design and erection of buildings, while the Ministry of Health would provide
the land and necessary utilities. The design and execution of the project was undertaken
and completed in the time planned for it, by American/Egyptian firms under the supervision
of the Ministry of Health.3
Projects that meet the specifications of national government----grandoise and
2The national government is divided into functional sectors and is responsible for implementing medical,
educational, housingetc. projects. These projects are then handed over to the local government according to
location of project and administrative boundaries. The different directorates in the local government will
then be responsible for providing the infrastructure, maintaining and managing these projects.
3Information acquired from Hosny and Fahmy, Architects & Planners, 24, Fawakih St., Cairo, Egypt,
local consultants to DMJM/KIDDE, USA, Architectural & Engineering Firm, contracted by the Ministry
Of Health, for the above mentioned project.
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visible----and are not in the jurisdiction of local government: new towns, new residential
neighborhoods. Other examples of international/national collegiality and sector financing
of a grandiose visible project was the High Dam project in Aswan. Funded by the Soviet
Union in 1957 and designed by both national and Soviet professionals, a new institution
was built at the national level to undertake the design and implementation of the project.
Ayoubi 1981, describes in detail the building of the High Dam, within the Egyptian
bureaucracy as an example of a successful project. The author is not discussing here the
concept but the actual implementation of a huge project within the time-frame planned for it.
Other examples of sector financing are, the High Tension Power Lines between the
Ministry of Electricity and East Germany, and the Steel Industrial Plant in Helwan
between, the Ministry of Industry and the Soviet Union.
For projects which are within the local government jurisdiction and that necessitates
working with the local government: Upgrading projects is an example which falls within
the jurisdictions of local government and at the same time does not come under the criteria
of projects sought by the national government. These projects require that the national
governments be by-passed and collegiality with the local government is sought. To that
effect the model of collegiality suggests that large international agencies should avoid such
projects. However if they must be involved then they should consider setting up the
project units at the local level, within the local councils departments as the case in Amman,
Jordan. This example was mentioned by Mr I. Chiri, former Director of the World Bank
funded project in EAJHP, as an example of a successful upgrading project sponsored by
the World Bank. The solution in Lusaka is an example that shows the World Bank actually
by-passed the national government. However they eventually also by-passed the existing
local council and built an unequal collegiality at the local level: In Lusaka, the World Bank
built a new institution at the local level.
"The Lusaka city council, and the World Bank agreed on the need to set up
a separate Housing project unit within the city council, which would
specifically carry out the sites and service and upgrading projects. This was
because it was believed that the project team would find it difficult to
implement their objectives within the city council Department of Housing
and Social Services. At one stage, there were some doubts about this
approach, as it was considered that problems would arise when the time
came for handing over completed projects to the responsible council
department, especially as day-to-day operations were carried out in isolation
from the main city council departments, responsible for housing. However
others argued in favor of a separate unit to avoid being caught up in the
usual local government bureaucracy and to increase the chance of giving
these communities an experience of participation. In the end a separate
Housing Project Unit (HPU) was accepted, though it must be
acknowledged that not all the problems involved have been solved"(Jere,
1984, p.59)
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Another alternative for the large international agencies is not to be involved in
upgrading projects and to leave it to the intermediate-sized international agencies like the
GTZ and British ODA or to nongovernmental organizations. As examples to the
collegiality of intermediate international agencies and local government the following cases
are presented:
The ODA financing the upgrading and sites and services project in Ismailia
Governorate, to the east on the Suez Canal is one example. The international agency
worked with the local government in both the development of plans and implementation
phases. It was the local government's project and the national government was not
involved. This project is described as one of the few examples of upgrading and sites and
service projects that was successful in Egypt.
Another example is the GTZ assisted project in Aswan, south of Egypt. Here the
intermediate-sized international donor worked with the local government in producing the
plans and in implementation. The project is still at the early stages but it shows the
possibility of working with the local government by an intermediate-sized international
agency. Aswan is about 800 km south of Cairo and is very distant from the national
government, not only in Kilometers but more so in collegiality. According to the GTZ
consultant, Dr S. Mildner, the structure plan for the town of Aswan was prepared by
GOPP and the GTZ, and within this plan the neighborhoods that required upgrading was
identified. The GOPP chairman at the time, refused to continue the detailed planning and to
be involved in the upgrading project. His reply was that the minister expects him to
produce structure plans for these towns and not to be involved with upgrading This
incident happened in 1987, ten years after the introduction of the World Bank funded
project.
The model is very clear in Egypt, and cursory evidence from elsewhere suggests
that it applies as a general model in other contexts. However the author is more speculative
for other contexts and for other scenarios and further research is suggested to test it in other
cultures and under other government structures. Other research would also include looking
in depth into the above mentioned case studies or others of similar nature with the model in
mind.
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